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Dissertation overview
The three chapters of this dissertation contribute to a diverse set of current topics in labor
economics and, by introducing new estimation techniques, to the applied microeconometrics
literature. Each chapter makes a methodological as well as a substantive contribution. In
this overview, I first summarize the chapters’ individual contributions, before highlighting their
common grounds.1
Chapter 1 titled Subjective completion beliefs and the demand for post-secondary education is
written jointly with Kevin Staub. In this chapter, we study the role of uncertainty in individuals’
post-secondary education choice. Although investment in human capital is a classical topic
in labor economics, evidence on the impact of uncertainty is still relatively scarce. Early
studies introducing uncertainty relied heavily on structural assumptions; most commonly on
rational expectations (that is individuals make on average correct predictions). These and
other less restrictive assumptions have been called into question by several recent studies, which
show elicited subjective beliefs to be superior to assumptions-based imputations when assessing
individual’s education choices (i.e. Huntington-Klein, 2015b; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner,
2012; Zafar, 2011a).
Most existing research in this area focuses on uncertainty about earnings or employment
prospects. At this point the verdict is still out, whether underinvestment results from misaligned
subjective beliefs about objective labor market information. However, most convincing evidence
1Full citations details can be found in the references of the respective chapters.
1
based on randomized information-experiments suggests that it is not the lack of labor market
information that governs individual’s choices (i.e. Kerr et al., 2014; Fryer, 2013). In contrast, we
focus on the role of uncertainty in completing an educational degree. Completion uncertainty
is a broader concept as it entails not only pecuniary but also non-pecuniary returns whose
relevance to educational choice have been confirmed in several studies. A recent survey is given
by Oreopoulos and Salvanes (2011). Similar to pecuniary returns, non-pecuniary returns are
likely to depend on graduation. In the chapter, we discuss additional reasons why subjective
completion beliefs might be more important to an individual’s choice than subjective earning
or employment beliefs.
Turning to our results, we first establish that subjective beliefs about finishing an edu-
cational track are important determinants of post-secondary education choices and that they
have long-lasting impacts on the adolescents’ educational careers: they are highly predictive
of aspirations (measured concurrently with the beliefs), actual investments (measured at least
two years later), and actual completion (measured at least five years later). By varying spec-
ifications, including a large set of control variables, and bounding the effect against potential
selection-on-unobservables we show that this is a very robust finding.
Most available evidence using subjective beliefs (about the state of the labor market) to
study uncertainty in educational choices extends only to college-major choices of students al-
ready enrolled in a specific institution. Broadly speaking, these studies find that early subjective
beliefs (at college enrollment) continue to be important for educational choices and outcomes
later on (Zafar, 2011b) and are revised in response to information revealed by academic per-
formance (Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2014b). Exploiting a large-scale population survey
in Germany, we extend the literature by presenting evidence that the formation of subjective
beliefs takes place already while in secondary education. Thus, they date further back than
previously found. Moreover, subjective completion beliefs are relevant in the overall population
2
of adolescents and not specific to college major choices (of students already enrolled in a spe-
cific institution). In addition, using a rich set of covariates, we find that both subjective beliefs
and educational aspirations are strongly related to academic ability and personality traits. By
contrast, actual enrollment and completion depend to a larger extent on family characteristics,
the state of the local labor market, and the regional supply and demand in the post-secondary
education market. This suggests a potential for informational policy interventions.
Despite the advantages of our dataset, it is not without caveats: the subjective beliefs are
not repeatedly assessed and are not elicited separately for counterfactual education choices.
We further disaggregate the impacts of subjective beliefs into the choices between educational
tracks: apprenticeship, high school and apprenticeship, and university. Due to the lack of coun-
terfactual beliefs, we condition on the students’ educational aspirations when disaggregating to
educational tracks. In confirmation with the existing literature, we find GPA to be the main
driver also of subjective completion beliefs for students choosing an university education. Yet,
subjective beliefs of those choosing a vocational education seem to be driven by other char-
acteristics. For those students, the subjective beliefs remain a substantial predictor for future
investments after accounting for GPA on top of a large set of individuals’ characteristics.
In the last part of the chapter, we develop and estimate a structural education choice
model that accounts for unobserved preferences for post-secondary education, forward-looking
behavior, and the sequentiality of choices. Accounting for the option value that arises from
the continuation possibility after finishing high school, our results reveal that the subjective
completion beliefs are essential to the choice of an apprenticeship (as before), but also to the
choice of obtaining a high school degree (which confirms and extends the results found by Pinger,
2015). After finishing high school, they are irrelevant to the choice between an apprenticeship
training and university studies. This might be explained by updating in response to information
revealed by grades obtained in high school. Moreover, we find that the subjective completion
3
beliefs to be most decisive for adolescents with low academic ability and weak preferences
for education; a group of high policy relevance that has largely been ignored in the present
literature. As more and more countries striving to introduce an apprenticeship system (Obama,
2014, State of the Union Address), this finding is of first-order relevance to policy-makers.
Methodologically, the chapter makes two simple but seminal contributions that are likely
to be important for future research in this area. First, we extend the framework to bound
selection-on-unobservables of Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005a,b, 2008) to a non-binary endoge-
nous random variable. Second, we extend the structural education choice model of Taber (2000,
2001) to the German educational system, a system with multiple education streams.
Chapter 2, titled An econometric model of health care demand with non-linear pricing is
written jointly with Rainer Winkelmann and forthcoming in Health Economics. In the chapter,
we introduce a new structural estimation model to study health care demand (as measured
by doctoral visits). Our model is well suited to study a new payment scheme introduced in
Germany: Between 2004 and 2012, patients had to pay a one time fee for the first-visit in a
calendar quarter, all subsequent visits in that quarter were free of charge.
The decision to visit a doctor is subject to an extensive literature in health economics. A
stylized finding is that many people never visit a doctor. However, once they visit a doctor
their likelihood of further visits increases (i.e. Pohlmeier and Ulrich, 1995). This led to the
conclusion that the first visit is structurally different from subsequent visits, justifying a policy
targeting the first visit. A class of models accounting for this difference is hurdle models, which
we extend by allowing the timing of the first choice to influence subsequent choices. This
naturally fits situations in which the first visit influences the costs of subsequent visits. We
further extend the model to a panel framework, which allows us to account for unobserved
heterogeneity and show that our model can easily be adapted to reporting mismatches (when
4
the reporting period overlaps two payment periods). In the appendix to the chapter we present
estimation details and Monte Carlo simulations. The simulations show that the model works
well in small samples.
Turning to the policy intervention, by changing the cost of visiting a doctor the policy was
explicitly designed to reduce the number of doctoral visits. To identify the reform effect we use
a difference-in-differences strategy, where the privately-insured (which were not subject to the
reform) serve as a counterfactual for the publicly insured individuals. Previous research using
the same identification and policy change found mixed results of the policy. Augurzky, Bauer
and Schaffner (2006) and Schreyo¨gg and Grabka (2010) find no (significant) effect, whereas
Farbmacher and Winter (2013) find a significant negative effects of the policy upon the number
of doctoral visits. Farbmacher and Winter (2013) suggest that the different results are due to
the fact that for most individuals the reporting period was different from the payment period.
However, their introduction of the reporting mismatch is rather ad hoc. By contrast, it can be
introduced very naturally in our model. In sum, across various estimation models that account
for unobserved heterogeneity and reporting mismatch, we find no evidence that the policy had
a significant effect upon the number of doctoral visits.
Chapter 3, titled Analyzing educational achievement differences between second-generation
immigrants: Comparing Germany and German-speaking Switzerland is published in the Ger-
man Economic Review. In this chapter, I promote a new approach to assess immigrants’
children learning achievements by comparing them across countries.
Ideally, when assessing immigrant children one would like to use standardized achievement
test data which contains information on the policy area, migration history of the individual,
and a sufficient sample size to assess immigrants’ children in detail. In most European countries
neither is available; most importantly, the only large scale standardized achievement test such
5
as PISA, PRILS, or TIMSS do not allow for regional assessments of students across educational
institutions (i.e. federal states in Germany). The dominant approach in the literature to learn
about institutional differences is to compare the immigrant children to their native peers and
to compare their test score differences across countries (i.e. Dustmann, Frattini and Lanzara,
2012). This approach is suited to assess inequality within the educational systems. However,
it is flawed for the assessment of learning achievements by immigrant children. This is due to
the fact that native pupils are different in many aspects and, as I argue, are an inappropriate
counterfactual for the second-generation immigrants’ achievements. It is, for example, typical
in the literature to assess immigrant-native achievement gaps conditional on language spoken
at home. Although the natives who do not speak the national language at home are either
not existent (hence predicted) or most likely a very different group of students (i.e. third-
generation immigrants). A related problem is that in these large scale student assessments
there is no information on pre-migration characteristics, such as the reason for or the time
of migration, which would, at least partly, help to control for potential self-selection of first-
generation migrants to host countries.
To advance our understanding, I propose a new approach to study second-generation immi-
grant students by comparing them directly across countries. Focusing exclusively on second-
generation –as opposed to first-generation– immigrants has the advantage that they are born in
the country of testing and shared the entire school system, which limits the impacts of the un-
observed pre-migration environment. Obviously, comparing immigrants or their children across
countries creates another problem. Immigrants self-select into countries (even more than into
locations/policy areas), hence caution is warranted when applying this approach. I therefore
compare Germany to German-speaking Switzerland which, as a I argue, are well suited for such
a comparison as both regions experienced a very similar migration history. This aligned reasons
for migration and countries of origin of the first-generation immigrants. As a side effect, their
6
countries of origin are sufficiently overlapping, which allows to compare students from the same
home country in different host countries. The lack of overlap in migrants ancestry across host
countries is a recurring problem in the existing literature. Moreover, as both regions have the
same testing language (German), the reading test scores can validly be compared, which is
paramount to immigrants’ learning achievement and integration into the host society. Despite
these advantages, the comparison of Germany to German-speaking Switzerland is of course
not without problems, as it might still be the case that the immigrants in Germany are differ-
ent from those in Switzerland. I therefore control for a substantial set of controls and use a
matching decomposition technique to assure that only comparable students are compared.
On the substantive side, I show that children of immigrants in Switzerland are performing
much better than their counterparts in Germany and these differences cannot be explained by
observable background characteristics. By decomposing this effect along the test score distribu-
tion, I find that the differences mainly stem from very low performing children of immigrants.
The most crucial difference seems to be the language spoken at home. When it is different from
German, it always increases the gap that cannot be explained by the students’ background
characteristics. These differences are robust to the inclusion of the parents’ country of origin.
Additionally, Switzerland seems to be particularly beneficial for unfavorably-endowed children
of immigrants and children of Turkish descent, while being relatively less beneficial for chil-
dren of native-born parents. The almost equal performance of natives suggest that there is
an integration-specific reason for the enhanced performance in German-speaking Switzerland.
Any analysis of institutional differences is necessarily suggestive, however, my results point
to a role of segregating students into classes of low-performers in Germany as compared to
German-speaking Switzerland, which almost fully accounts for the differential performance.
To sum up, both chapters 1 and 3 contribute to the economics of education, and have im-
7
portant implications for disadvantaged students; chapter 2 contributes to the health economics
literature, and how to better assess policy interventions targeting the number of doctoral visits.
Although the three chapter presented in this dissertation cover a diverse set of contents, all
advance current topics in labor economics by introducing new microeconometric estimation
techniques to their respective subfields. Chapters 1 and 2 develop and extend dynamic estima-
tion models of individuals’ decision-making. In these, choices taken by the individual impact
their future decision-making. In addition to this dynamic aspects, both empirical models ac-
count for unobserved heterogeneity. In both chapters advanced maximum likelihood procedures
are developed, programmed, and will be made publicly available. In contrast to the parametric
approaches used in chapters 1 and 2, chapter 3 introduces semi-parametric matching technique
and a sound approach to study immigrant students’ learning process.
This dissertation shows how applied research can benefit from careful implementation of mi-
croeconometric estimation techniques. Currently, there is an apparent skepticism in mainstream
economic literature against thoughtful modeling of economic behavior (although very recently
the pendulum appears to be swinging back again). The change in the empirical paradigm was
let by the desire to establish credible causal claims, which can only be assured with exogenous
variation (based on experiments). From the perspective of this dissertation, there will always
be a back and forth between more or less theory-dependent approaches. Establishing causality
with as few as possible assumptions is an indisputable objective of all social sciences. How-
ever, results of experimental and quasi-experimental variation are necessarily application- and
circumstance-specific. Thus, to take credible findings to greater use, it is necessary to put these
back into models to extend their implications and reach. Dogmatist proponents of either side
are important for the advancement of science, but so are undogmatic researchers making the
tools from both sides available and easily accessible to researchers and policy-makers with an
applied interest.
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Based on these arguments, the models and approaches pursued in this dissertation are aimed
to add as much structure as necessary and as little as possible. On the one side reducing or
relaxing the assumptions in structural models and on the other advancing the treatment effect
methodology to more model based implications. This reasoning is the basis of introducing
assumption-free subjective beliefs in a very simple two-stage decision process, in chapter 1. Or,
to identify a structural model based on a natural experiment, i.e. a group unaffected by the
policy used as a counterfactual, as in chapter 2. Or, to interpret a classical topic of inequality
in a treatment effect perspective which implies that natives cannot serve as an adequate control
for immigrant children, as in chapter 3. Introducing simple structure in combination with ex-
perimental or quasi-experimental variation allows researchers to draw more useful conclusions
than from exogenous-variation-assumptions or adding-as-much-structure-as-possible alone. Ad-
vances presented in the following chapters based on the idea of combining credible identification
with implications from behavioral models include bounding effects against unobservables (chap-
ter 1), assessing unobserved preferences for education (chapter 1) or unobserved heterogeneity
in doctoral visits (chapter 2), and comparing immigrants across host countries (chapter 3).
9
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Chapter 1
Subjective completion beliefs and the demand for post-
secondary education
This chapter is jointly written with Kevin E. Staub.1
The outcome of pursuing a post-secondary educational degree is uncertain. A student
might not complete a chosen degree for a number of reasons, such as academic insufficiency or
financial constraints. Thus, when considering whether to invest in post-secondary education,
students must factor in their completion probability into their decision. We study the role
of this uncertainty in educational choices using students’ subjective beliefs about completing
a post-secondary education, which were elicited prior to students’ completing secondary ed-
ucation. We relate these subjective completion probabilities to their subsequent educational
choices and outcomes using representative survey data from Germany. Following the students
over time, we find that the initial beliefs are predictive of intentions to invest in education, ac-
tual subsequent educational investments, and degree completion. We assess the heterogeneity
of the impact across different educational paths. After controlling for academic ability, we find
that subjective beliefs are most relevant in choosing a vocational education. In addition to re-
duced form models, we estimate a structural choice model of sequential investment in education
that allows for unobserved tastes and preferences for education and forward-looking behavior.
The results confirm the influence of subjective completion beliefs on choosing a post-secondary
education.
Keywords: Subjective beliefs, Educational completion uncertainty, Human Capital Invest-
ment.
JEL classification: I21, I26, J24;
1We thank Joseph Altonji, Orazio Attanasio, Uschi Backes-Gellner, Dan Black, Timo Boppart, Gregory
Crawford, Thomas Dohmen, Ernst Fehr, Joe Hirschberg, Jamie Gloor, Uli Kaiser, Ed Lazear, Edwin Leu-
ven, Jenny Lye, Philippe Ruh, Florian Schaffner, Carmit Segal, Andreas Steinhauer, Steven Stillman, Sabrina
Studer, Rainer Winkelmann, Joachim Winter, and seminar participants at Kloster Kappel, Luzern, Melbourne,
Schaffhausen, Zurich, the Ski and Labor Seminar, Laax, and the Workshop of Personnel Economics and Eco-
nomics of Education, Lech, for helpful comments and suggestions, and Daniel Auer and Luca Tonizzo for very
helpful research assistance.
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1.1 Introduction
Educational choice is one of the most important career decisions young adults have to make,
and one that must be made under partial information. Students not only face the difficulty
of having to predict labor market prospects for several educational degrees —an endeavoring
task even for highly distinguished scholars (Manski, 1993)— but also the challenge of having
to predict their own returns to each of these degrees. When choosing an educational track,
students further need to foresee their own abilities for that new educational environment and
their chances of succeeding in such an environment. Understanding the role of uncertainty in
individuals’ post-secondary educational choices is essential for designing effective educational
policies. For instance, if students’ expectations are misaligned, providing additional information
can be a cost-effective measure to enhance educational choices, and eventual career success.
In this study, we assess the role of uncertainty about completing an educational degree in
young adults’ education choices. We show how subjective beliefs about completing a post-
secondary education, elicited while in secondary education are important predictors of post-
secondary educational aspirations, enrollment, and completion. We find that both beliefs and
educational aspirations are strongly related to academic ability and personality traits. Con-
versely, actual enrollment and completion depend to a larger extent on family characteristics,
the state of the local labor market, and the regional supply and demand in the post-secondary
education market, which suggests a potential for informational policy interventions. In addi-
tion, we assess effect heterogeneity across post-secondary educational tracks. Academic ability
appears to be the main driver of subjective beliefs in choosing a university education. In con-
trast, subjective beliefs of those choosing a vocational education seem to be driven by other
characteristics. Finally, we develop and estimate a structural educational choice model that ac-
counts for unobserved preferences for post-secondary education, forward-looking behavior, and
the sequentiality of choices. We find that the subjective completion beliefs are most decisive
for adolescents with low academic ability and weak preferences for education; a group that has
largely been ignored in the present literature.
The context of this study is the secondary and post-secondary educational system in Ger-
many, which is renowned for its well-functioning apprenticeship system. Apprenticeship systems
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are now tested and implemented in several countries (including the US, cf. President Barack
Obama’s State of the Union Address, 2014) motivated by the low youth unemployment rates
observed in countries with apprenticeship systems. In Germany, when finishing secondary edu-
cation at the age of 16 to 17, young adults choose between dropping out of education, investing
in an apprenticeship, or continuing with general education that enables them to enroll in an
university. In addition to analyzing the demand for education under conditions of uncertain
outcomes, we study how the demand varies across educational tracks, which is relevant to policy
makers who aim to introduce apprenticeship systems.
In general, when studying choice under uncertainty, researchers have to assume how expec-
tations are formed (Manski, 2004). Most commonly, researchers impose rational expectations;
e.g., that individuals’ predictions, usually about future wage distributions, are unbiased. In
the context of individuals’ educational choices it is important to note that even if students
were able to accurately predict the future wage distribution, their (perceived) internal rates of
return —the rates upon which they act— might be very different from the aggregate returns.2
By far, the most widely used alternative is to use direct measures of elicited subjective beliefs,
which circumvents these problems (Manski, 2004). Several studies show that the use of elicited
expectation data can be superior to those constructed using rational expectation assumptions,
and they are meaningful measures in educational choice models (e.g., Attanasio and Kaufmann,
2014; Huntington-Klein, 2015b; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2012; Zafar, 2011a). Although
the literature on educational decision making under uncertainty using elicited subjective beliefs
is rapidly growing, we advance the literature in important dimensions. We assess the role of
prior subjective beliefs formed in secondary education in a representative population survey
and follow these adolescents over time until they complete their post-secondary education.3
Second, much of the existing literature on the demand for post-secondary education focuses
2Several approaches were proposed to circumvent rational expectations. Early approaches based on structural
assumptions that distinguish ex ante from ex post returns include Carneiro et al. (2003), Cunha, Heckman and
Navarro (2005), and Cunha and Heckman (2007). Their framework is also applied recently in Foley, Gallipoli
and Green (2014). Another approach is to include measures of uncertainty within the expected wage functions of
Roy-type selection models; for example, Mazza (2014) introduces the (rational expectation) variance of earnings
and Fossen and Glocker (2014) include risk preferences.
3Also related to our study is the evolving literature on college major choice using subjective beliefs: Ar-
cidiacono, Hotz and Kang (2013), Arcidiacono et al. (2014), Hastings et al. (2015), Huntington-Klein (2015c),
Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2014a), and Wiswall and Zafar (2015a). In Germany there are no majors, as
students specialize at the beginning of their studies. However, we follow a similar approach as these studies by
allowing for selection into different educational tracks.
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on investment, rather than on aspirations or completion.4 Thus, we assess each of these three
outcomes while also accounting explicitly for uncertainty in students’ choices.
In contrast to the existing literature that investigates the uncertainty about wages or the
likelihood of unemployment, our main focus is on completion uncertainty. Although some
theoretical work includes completion uncertainty (e.g., Comay, Melnik and Pollatschek, 1973;
Manski, 1989; Altonji, 1993), there is little empirical work in this area. Theoretical stud-
ies emphasize the sequentiality of the educational decisions and that “[d]ifferences in dropout
probabilities may be more important than differences in ex post payoffs in determining the ex
ante return to attending a particular school,” (Altonji, 1993, p74).5 This hypothesis is empiri-
cally supported by Hussey and Swinton (2011), based on a predicted likelihood of completion.
However, such predicted completion probabilities are limited in that they are only a crude proxy
for the subjective beliefs on which people act. We contribute to this literature by integrating
elicited subjective completion probabilities into a sequential model of educational choice. In
this respect, our analysis is most closely related to Wiswall and Zafar (2015a), which also uses
students’ subjective completion beliefs. Our research addresses complementary questions such
as how the choice process differs for adolescents not enrolled in college and how these beliefs
relate to actual completion. Our paper is the first to study subjective completion beliefs as-
sessed before the end of secondary education in a population survey in the context of a detailed
educational investment model.
One way in which completion uncertainty affects educational choice is by simply amplifying
ex ante wage uncertainty. However, completion uncertainty may have important consequences
beyond that general channel. For example, various non-pecuniary aspects have been shown to
be relevant to educational choice (see Oreopoulos and Salvanes, 2011, for a recent summary).
In order to benefit from them, staying in the chosen educational path and/or completing the
degree might be crucial. For instance, studies using elicited subjective beliefs about labor
market prospects consistently find the (non-financial) consumption value of education or major-
4One reason is that the data on completion is necessarily incomplete: individuals can always come back and
acquire more education. For a detailed discussion of educational completion, see Turner (2004) and Bound and
Turner (2011). Notable exceptions are Venti and Wise (1983) and Light and Strayer (2000). Similarly, the
literature on aspirations is still comparatively small, although it has been growing recently (e.g., Christofides
et al., 2015; Wiswall and Zafar, 2015b; Zachary and Zafar, 2015).
5Manski (1989) raises an important point by clarifying that drop-out rates are not necessarily undesirable
from a social planner’s point of view: since educational outcomes are uncertain, schooling should be evaluated
based on ex ante returns rather than on ex post success rates.
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specific unobserved tastes to be the main drivers of educational choices (i.e., Huntington-Klein,
2015a; Wiswall and Zafar, 2015a).6 Such preference-related factors are not affected by pure
labor market uncertainty, but they can be affected by completion uncertainty.7 Our results also
point to unobserved preferences for a post-secondary education that play a substantial role in
students’ choices.
Our study is also closely related to the literature on learning about one’s own academic
ability (or preferences).8 The central finding in this literature is that learning about one’s own
ability is based mainly on academic ability conveyed by students’ grade point averages [GPA]
(e.g., Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2012, 2014b; Zafar, 2011b). Although these studies offer
a valuable assessment of the subjective beliefs at various points in time and in great detail,
thus far they have focused on single institutions rather than a representative sample. Milla
(2014) adds to and supports the generalizability of the previous findings by studying aspiration
updating in responses to changes in GPA using a population survey of college students. Still,
such a design imposes a sample selection. By exclusively focussing on college students it ignores
young adults who dropped out of education because they were less optimistic about their
educational prospects. We contribute to this literature by assessing initial subjective beliefs
prior to college enrollment in a representative survey population and by providing evidence on
both beliefs and educational aspirations at this early stage. Our evidence supports and extends
Zafar’s presumption that “prior belief[s] [at the start of college] continue[s] to be important. In
attempting to understand the choice of college majors, it might be useful to focus on students
at earlier stages of their schooling (for example, in high school) and analyze their subjective
beliefs” (Zafar, 2011b, p339f).9
6Similar evidence comes from more structural approaches that do not rely on subjective beliefs. For in-
stance, D’Haultfoeuille and Maurel (2013) use a sophisticated Roy model and find non-pecuniary aspects to be
predominant in educational choice.
7Evidence whether the provision of information about the labor market induces students to invest more in
education is mixed, which can be interpreted as broadly in line with our view that there is more to uncertainty
than pure wage uncertainty. Supporting evidence comes from developing countries, for instance, see Jensen
(2010) for evidence from Dominican Republic and Nguyen (2008) for Madagascar. Oreopoulos and Dunn (2013)
find that high school students in Canada update their beliefs in the context of an information experiment. Yet
in Finland, Kerr et al. (2014) find that —while students do update their beliefs— there is no significant effect
on enrollment; similar results are reported in Fryer (2013). Assessing students’ choice process in more detail is
therefore highly valuable.
8Bulman (2015) shows that providing young adults with better information about their own ability impacts
enrollment and college graduation. He finds that important factors other than aptitude deter college attendance,
which might be explained by subjective beliefs about educational outcomes.
9Due to data limitations, we do not examine subjective beliefs at multiple time points. A detailed analysis of
the process behind learning about one’s own ability and the evolution of subjective beliefs is beyond the scope
of this study, but remain key questions for future research.
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Throughout our analyses we account for personality skills, which have been highlighted as
main determinants of educational success (see Almlund et al., 2011; Borghans et al., 2006,
and references therein). In particular, we show how subjective beliefs relate to the Big Five
personality measures, risk attitudes, and locus of control, all of which are now ubiquitous in
economic applications (see, for example, Borghans et al., 2006; Dohmen et al., 2010; Caliendo,
Cobb-Clark and Uhlendorff, 2015). Of special interest to our design is the locus of control, as
Coleman and DeLeire (2003) hypothesize that students with a more internal locus of control
(i.e., students who believe their actions affect their outcomes) have higher subjective beliefs
about their own returns to education, which increases their efforts and investments in their
human capital. Our results support the hypothesis that one’s locus of control affects educational
choices via subjective beliefs.
Finally, our study is related to recent contributions assessing the role of subjective beliefs
as a mediator and a potential explanation of educational differentials in parental unemploy-
ment (Pinger, 2015), family background (Keller and Neidho¨fer, 2014), or gender and migration
(Tolsma, Need and De Jong, 2010). Our framework might prove useful in studying the medi-
ating role of subjective beliefs, since it integrates investment in both secondary and tertiary
education jointly in both reduced-form and structural models.
In sum, the main contribution of this study is to provide a better understanding of uncer-
tainty in educational choices and a broad assessment of subjective completion beliefs of young
adults. Our analyses include how beliefs are determined and how beliefs relate to intentions
to invest in education, actual investments, and degree completion. We explicitly account for
the sequentiality of choices and forward-looking behavior of individuals. Moreover, we relate
students’ beliefs to individual characteristics, family background, personality skills, regional
labor and education market conditions, and unobserved tastes and preferences for education.
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows: In Section 1.2, we describe the institutional
features of the educational system in Germany and present the data we use. In Section 1.3,
we assess determinants of subjective completion beliefs. In Section 1.4, we relate the beliefs to
educational outcomes and present how the impact of the subjective beliefs varies with selec-
tion on observables and unobservables. In Section 1.5, we presents effect heterogeneity across
different educational tracks, and in Section 1.6 we develop and estimate a structural model of
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sequential educational choice. Section 1.7 concludes our paper, briefly summarizing our key
findings.
1.2 Institutional setting, data, and descriptive statistics
Institutional setting
A simplified version of Germany’s educational system is depicted in Figure 1.1, in which we
briefly summarize the system’s key features that are relevant to our analysis (more information
can be found in Wo¨lfel and Heineck, 2012).
— — — Figure 1.1 about here — — —
The German educational system is characterized by early tracking, which takes place after
grade 4 (elementary school), at age 9 to 11 years.10 Based on grades and teachers’ recommen-
dations, the children are tracked into three streams according to their academic ability.11 The
statistical agency in Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2014, p27) reported that in 2012, 10%
of children were assigned to the lower track, 19% to the intermediate track, 40% to the upper
track (high school), and the remaining children visited other, so-called comprehensive schools
that essentially follow the same structure without separating the children.
At the time of entering the survey population, the young adults —ages 16 to 17 years—
are in the midst of deciding upon a professional education according to their track. Students
completing lower or intermediary tracks have the opportunity to apply for and to start a
profession-specific apprenticeship or a vocational education.12 Although investing directly in an
apprenticeship is the dominant path, the young adults can alternatively enroll in a consecutive
school-track that leads to the university entrance qualification (German: Abitur), an equivalent
of a high school degree.13 This high school degree can also be a valuable asset for students
who do not want to attend an university. When applying for highly competitive apprenticeship
positions, students with a high school degree typically have better chances compared to their
10With the exceptions of Berlin and Brandenburg, which track after grade 6 (ages 11 to 13 years).
11The binding nature of these recommendations varies across states.
12Students who started an apprenticeship before entering the survey population are excluded from our analy-
ses. However, in 2011, only 10.6% started an apprenticeship before the age of 17 years (Statistisches Bundesamt,
2013, p17).
13Due to the limited time horizon of our sample we focus on early investment. The possibility of visiting
complementary courses that allow students to go to university after apprenticeship completion is not modeled
separately. We discuss the implications of this for the interpretation of our results below.
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peers who completed a lower track. Some apprenticeship positions are even exclusively available
to such students. In 2010, 20.9% of the newly signed apprenticeship contracts went to students
holding a high school degree (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2011, p1004). Thus, we model this path
separately and refer to it as tertiary apprenticeship.
The decision to start an apprenticeship is somewhat different for students already enrolled
in high school. In principle, they can also drop out to start an apprenticeship or continue their
high school education and after finishing go on to university or a tertiary apprenticeship.14 Yet,
their default choice is certainly different as they are already enrolled in high school and they
do not have to make an active choice to enroll.15 In sum, 4% of the class of 2011 dropped
out without a degree, 17% completed the lower track, 36% the intermediary track, and 43%
obtained a high school degree (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2013, p7). As a final remark, it is
important to realize that in Germany, an apprenticeship degree has a high standing and a
reputation similar to an university degree —especially when acquired after completing high
school.
Summing up, in the subsequent analysis we distinguish between the four most commonly
taken education paths in Germany, which we index by j. The student can choose to drop out
(j = 0), invest in an apprenticeship directly after completing either the lower or intermediate
school track (j = 1), or continue schooling in high school. After completing high school, the
student can decide whether to invest in an apprenticeship (j = 2) or continue to university
studies (j = 3).
Data sources
Our primary data source is the German Socio-Economic Panel [SOEP]. We focus on young
adults, ages 16 to 17 years, who have newly entered the survey population by answering the
youth questionnaire between 2000 and 2013. The SOEP is a household panel that provides a
rich set of parental background information. We use all available waves of data collection to
follow the young adults over time up to 14 years. Additionally, we combine the individual-
level data with regional labor market information and educational supply and demand mea-
14Additionally, students could also drop out after completing high school, but this rarely occurs in practice
(see also Fossen and Glocker, 2014). Note that here university subsumes universities of applied sciences. While
it would be interesting to consider those separately, we have to leave this to future research due to our current
sample size.
15We, therefore, include the indicator variable “In high school with 17” in all regressions. We also estimated
the regressions of our main Table 1.3 separately —fully saturated in this variable— for the two groups and
present the results in Appendix Table A.2.5.
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sures based on 96 geographic regions, which we will refer to as Ror (for their German name
Raumordnungsregionen).16 All regional information is matched according to the individual’s
residency when answering the youth questionnaire, and lagged by one year to avoid endogene-
ity or reverse causality. Unless stated otherwise, we only use variables assessed in the youth
questionnaire to avoid any biases from conditioning on outcomes (Angrist and Pischke, 2009,
p64f).17
Sample selection
As stated above, we exclude all individuals who have already started an apprenticeship.
Moreover, we exclude students with missing information in the core variables: subjective be-
lief, GPA, and educational status. All other missing information are included along with cor-
responding indicator variables for missing observations. This selection results in a sample size
of 3,610 individual observations. In the longitudinal analysis, we additionally require at least 2
years of information to assess the end of secondary education and the start of a post-secondary
education (reducing the observations to 2,116), and to assess educational completion, we restrict
the sample to students who responded for at least 5 years of data collection (1,372).18
Descriptive statistics
Our main variable of interest is the subjective completion belief, pi, that was assessed by
the following question:
Think about your future in your job and private life: how probable is it, in your
opinion, that the following events will occur?
[Please check off a probability on the scale from 0% to 100%.]
You successfully finish your vocational training or university studies? 19
There are two caveats about how the question is assessed. First, the question is only elicited
16A map of the Ror’s is provided in Appendix A.1, Figure A.1.1. The data source is INKAR 2012 provided
by the German Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development (BBSR,
2013). For more information, see Pinger (2015) who also uses this additional data source. Moreover, we add
the number of universities (higher learning institutions) as a proxy for distance to university provided by the
statistical agency of Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt).
17We develop a structural model below in order to account for sequential decision-taking and to avoid asso-
ciated biases.
18More information on missing values and the construction of the variables can be found in the Appendix,
Table A.1.2.
19Students could answer on an eleven point scale. The exact wording in German is:
Wenn Sie sich einmal Ihre berufliche und private Zukunft vorstellen: Wie wahrscheinlich ist es, dass die fol-
genden Entwicklungen eintreten werden? [Stufen Sie bitte jeweils die Wahrscheinlichkeit auf einer Skala ein,
die von 0 Prozent bis 100 Prozent geht.] Ihre Ausbildung oder Ihr Studium erfolgreich abschließen?
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once. Second, the question does not elicit beliefs for every possible counterfactual education.
We discuss the implications of these issues later in the estimation results. For now, we focus on
the role of initial beliefs in the combined effect of any post-secondary education. In this way,
the question directly relates to the outcomes that we assess. In Figure 1.2, we plot histograms
of the subjective beliefs by students’ intentions to invest in education. Intention to invest is
a self-reported measure of educational aspiration that asks students to indicate which further
educational degree (if any) they plan to complete. It is constructed analogously to our outcome
variable: 0 refers to no further educational aspiration; 1, to apprenticeship; 2, to tertiary
apprenticeship (high school and apprenticeship); and 3, to university studies.20
— — — Figure 1.2 about here — — —
Overall, the German students appear to be confident about finishing a post-secondary edu-
cation, as most of the adolescents report a probability above 50%. The distributions of students
implicitly aspiring to a high school degree (implied either by tertiary apprenticeship or univer-
sity, Panels C and D) are very similar in shape. Yet, the subjective beliefs of young adults who
aspire to a university degree are more concentrated and slightly shifted to the right compared
to their high school counterparts who aim for a tertiary apprenticeship position. The mode of
the distribution of students who intend to start an apprenticeship without finishing high school
lies at 100%. Finally, students with no educational aspiration display a much larger spread in
their beliefs. In what follows, it is important to keep in mind that most variation —and the
bulk of the students’ beliefs— are located between 60 and 100%.
Analogously, Table 1.1 presents descriptive statistics by aspiration level for our baseline
sample.21
— — — Table 1.1 about here — — —
At the bottom of the table, we present the sample shares of the intentions to invest: Most
students want to complete an apprenticeship, followed by university studies. A substantial share
20That means that, for consistency with our outcome variables, students who want to enroll in an appren-
ticeship first and then continue with supplementary courses that prepare for university are subsumed into the
apprenticeship category. Moreover, we also cannot distinguish in detail between students who first want to
complete an apprenticeship and then a high school degree, without aiming to go university. However, this path
is neither optimal from a human capital investment perspective nor one that is commonly taken in Germany.
21More information on the construction of the variables can be found in the table notes. Unconditional
descriptive statistics for the various subsamples considered in the analysis below are presented in the Appendix,
Table A.1.1.
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wants to complete a high school education and an apprenticeship (tertiary apprenticeship),
and roughly 10% do not aspire to any professional education. It is reassuring that the sample
statistics are broadly consistent with the population statistics presented above (Statistisches
Bundesamt, 2013).
The individuals who aspire to a university education are on average the most confident
about successfully completing their post-secondary education, and have the lowest standard
deviation. However, all young adults who have any educational aspirations exhibit a similar
level of completion beliefs —which are close to 80%— as opposed to those without educational
aspirations. The fact that all students have positive beliefs, even the ones who do not plan to
invest in further training or education, can be rationalized in a simple expected utility frame-
work where students weight their utility from education by their beliefs about their completion
probabilities and report their aspirations based on their highest expected utility. This is also
the interpretation we pursue in the following analysis.
Some interesting patterns emerge when relating educational aspirations to our three mea-
sures of academic ability: Aspirations are increasing in the grade point average [GPA].22 Prior
track recommendations at the age of 10 years seem to be a good indicator for the aspirations
up to 7 years later, which could either be caused by a well-working ability streaming or a
manifestation of students’ expectations as a result of early-tracking. Interestingly, having no
educational aspirations occurs in all tracks, and the largest share of students without aspira-
tions is found in high school. This could be explained by a default effect, as the survey elicits
these aspirations at a time when students not enrolled in high school have to make an active
decision as opposed to their high school counterparts who can follow their track and decide
after obtaining a high school degree.
We assess the adolescents’ personality by locus of control, risk attitudes, and the Big Five
personality inventory.23 Educational aspirations are positively associated with the locus of
22The GPA refers to the student’s average of the German and Math grade, which is standardized over the
sample population we present in our main results from Table 1.3. We also standardize the GPA within school
track in Appendix Table A.2.3 to show that the choice of standardization does not drive the results. We
further standardize GPA within federal states to show that different grading levels do not affect the results, see
Appendix Table A.2.4.
23We standardize all the principal components of the personality variables (all but risk attitudes, which are
assessed by one question only), small deviations from (0,1) result from the missing values which do not enter
the standardization but are set to 0 afterwards. The locus of control has been developed by Rotter (1966),
the Big Five inventory by Costa and McCrae (1992) and validated in the SOEP version by Hahn, Gottschling
and Spinath (2012). Risk attitudes have been introduced and extensively studied by Dohmen et al. (2011) and
references therein.
21
control, which measures to what extent a person believes her life is under her own control.
Among the standard Big Five inventory, aspirations increase with openness, agreeableness,
and extraversion but they are less monotonically related to conscientiousness or neuroticism.
Unconditionally, aspiring to a university degree is positively associated with risk attitudes.
Individuals’ characteristics and family backgrounds are captured by their gender, number
of siblings, whether they are second-generation immigrants (persons whose parents were both
born in a foreign country), whether at least one parent has a college education, is currently un-
employed, and the logarithm of the net household income. Aspirations tend to be higher among
males, children from smaller families, natives, persons with employed and college-educated par-
ents or with a higher household income.
The regional labor and education market (Ror) characteristics relevant for the students’
choices set are a mix of (exogenous) educational supply and demand shifters. We use the cycli-
cal component of the youth unemployment rate, and the number of apprenticeship positions,
students, high school graduates, and universities in the region. Throughout, the aspirations are
increasing with the local labor and education market characteristics as expected; only children
with no educational aspirations tend to have no clear ordering. In the following analysis, we
will also account for region and year of first questioning (which is roughly identical to students’
age).24
1.3 Determinants of subjective completion beliefs
To analyze how the variables we discussed in the previous section relate to subjective completion
beliefs, we estimate OLS regressions of the model
pi = x
′
iβ
p + υi, (1.1)
24For some of the regressions, the number of students within a state is too small. To obtain consistent sam-
ples, we use a broader grouping by dividing Germany into the following 5 regions (and an indicator for missing
values). Southern Germany: Baden-Wuerttemberg, Bavaria; Eastern Germany: Berlin, Brandenburg, Sax-
ony, Saxony-Anhalt, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania; Central Germany: Hesse, Thuringia; Western Germany:
North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland; Northern Germany: Bremen, Hamburg, Lower Sax-
ony, Schleswig-Holstein. We present analogous results of our main Table 1.3 in Appendix Table A.2.3 were we
use federal states fixed effects, as the jurisdiction over educational policies are on the federal state level. The
results are qualitatively the same.
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where i indexes individuals, pi is the subjective completion belief, xi are varying sets of ex-
planatory variables with corresponding vector of coefficients βp, and υi is an unobserved error
term.
The estimates are presented in Table 1.2.25 In Column (1), the beliefs are explained solely by
academic ability. In Column (2), we add the personality measures; in Column (3), individual
and family and individual background characteristics; and, finally, in Column (4), regional
measures, year and region fixed effects.
— — — Table 1.2 about here — — —
The explained variation, as measured by the adjusted R2, increases substantially only when
academic ability and personality measures are included, but stays relatively unaffected when
adding individual and family characteristics, or fixed effects and regional characteristics. The
joint significance tests for subsets of variables reported at the bottom panel of the table give
analogous results: Academic ability and personality characteristics are highly significant across
all regressions; individual and family characteristics are jointly significant; labor market char-
acteristics, regional and time effects are not. Since the labor market coefficient estimates are
neither jointly nor individually significant, we omitted these estimates from the table.
Looking at the determinants individually, all academic ability variables are consistently
positive and significant. Somewhat surprisingly, already being enrolled in high school does not
alter students’ subjective completion beliefs. This might be due to this effect being conditional
on track recommendation. As hypothesized by Coleman and DeLeire (2003), the locus of control
is a very important determinant of subjective completion beliefs throughout the regressions,
both in magnitude and significance.26 Risk attitudes do not matter once family characteristics
are accounted for. Our regressions indicate that among the Big Five measures of personality,
conscientiousness is the most influential in shaping subjective beliefs. This finding highlights
the importance of conscientiousness for educational outcomes, as is consistently found in the
literature (see, inter alia, Borghans, Meijers and Ter Weel, 2006). While we find little evidence
that openness or neuroticism influence completion beliefs, extraversion has a coefficient which
25Note that our dependent variable is a fraction. In the Appendix, Table A.2.1, we present fractional response
regressions (as in Papke and Wooldridge, 1996, 2008). The results are virtually indistinguishable from the OLS
estimates.
26Caliendo, Cobb-Clark and Uhlendorff (2015) also find a strong link between subjective beliefs and the locus
of control in the realm of job search among the unemployed.
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is about half as large as conscientiousness, and the effect of agreeableness is about half as large
as extraversion.
On average, females seem to have lower subjective completion beliefs. This estimate is,
however, only marginally significant (at least conditional on personality and academic ability).
Household income is positively and significantly related to subjective completion beliefs. Be-
ing a second-generation immigrant is significantly negatively associated with subjective beliefs.
However, the significance vanishes after including regional determinants. This suggests a seg-
regation effect, with immigrants being located in less economically and educationally active
areas. The other covariates are insignificant and mostly very small in magnitude.
1.4 Subjective completion beliefs and educational out-
comes
In this section, we turn to our central question of how subjective completion beliefs measured
at age 17 years relate to intended investments in education, actual investments in education,
and, finally, educational degree attainment. To fix ideas, let the individual i’s utility uij from
choosing an uncertain post-secondary educational track (j ≥ 1) be
uij =


µij + εij with probability pij
µ¯ij + εij with probability (1− pij)
, (1.2)
where pij is the subjective completion belief, µij (µ¯ij) is the utility from (not) completing, and
εij is an utility component unaffected by completion. The associated expected utility is
Uij = pijµij + (1− pij)µ¯ij + εij (1.3)
= µ¯ij + pij(µij − µ¯ij) + εij.
Hence, adolescents get a baseline utility from attending a particular educational track µ¯ij.
The subjective completion belief pij weights the utility differential between completing and not
completing an educational track either up or down. Since not investing in an educational track
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does not involve educational uncertainty, its utility is simply
Ui0 = µi0 + εi0, with certainty. (1.4)
In this section, we assess the investment in any post-secondary education Uij = Ui for
j ≥ 1, against not investing Ui0. The subjective belief pi therefore corresponds directly to the
question in the survey. A student prefers to invest in education if Ui > Ui0; where, by standard
normalization, µi0 = 0. Taking averages across individuals, adding covariates xi that measure
observed preferences and skills, and assuming that νi = εi − εi0 follows a standard normal
distribution, we estimate probit models of the form
di = 1[αpi + x
′
iβ
d + νi > 0]. (1.5)
We consider three binary outcomes di. First, whether a student intends to invest in any further
education, which is measured concurrently with subjective beliefs at age 17 years. Second,
whether a student actually invests in any further education; that is, whether the student started
an apprenticeship or, tertiary apprenticeship, or enrolled in a university. This event can be a
few months or a few years away. Third, whether a student completes an apprenticeship or
university degree, an event that is at least a couple of years away.
When di stands for the intention to invest, the expectation of (1.5) gives P (Ui > 0), so that
α = µ− µ¯. A similar interpretation is possible when di represents the second outcome. It then
corresponds to the revealed preferences of actual investment in post-secondary education. The
interpretation is somewhat different when di stands for the third outcome, the completion of a
degree. In this case, α gives an indication of the student’s ability to incorporate information
beyond that in xi into their forecast of di = 1. Here, we interpret the subjective beliefs in
a similar vein as Finkelstein and McGarry (2006). The adolescents process all their available
information in forming their beliefs, meaning that relevant information over and above their
subjective beliefs are either not used, not used efficiently, or influence the decision through
another channel than subjective completion uncertainty.
— — — Table 1.3 about here — — —
Table 1.3 contains the estimation results. Vertical panels (A) to (E) present the probit
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regressions of the subjective completion beliefs on the different educational outcomes. In each
panel, we report the estimated coefficients, robust standard errors (in parentheses), average
marginal effects (in squared brackets), pseudo R2n for the model estimated with and without pi,
and sample statistics for the respective subsamples. Columns (1) to (4) contain the simple probit
estimates of the educational outcomes on the subjective beliefs and varying sets of covariates:
The specification in Column (1) contains, apart from pi, only an indicator of whether the
student is currently in high school, region and year fixed effects. Thus, in this specification,
any other variable acts on the intention to invest in education through its effect on pi. The next
columns progressively control for the sets of academic (Column 2), personality (Column 3), and
family and labor market variables (Column 4). We turn to the results in Columns (5)-(8) at
the end of this section.
Panel (A) contains results corresponding to the intention to invest in any post-secondary
education. Unsurprisingly, uncertainty appears to be important for aspirations: The coefficients
on subjective beliefs are large and highly significant throughout the probit regressions. The
average marginal effects are economically relevant. In the most parsimonious specification,
increasing the subjective beliefs in the population by one standard deviation increases intentions
to invest in post-secondary education by 2.7 percentage points (0.14 × 0.198), which is very
large given that only 9.2% of students do not intend to invest in a post-secondary education.
This changes little if we condition on increasing sets of background characteristics commonly
considered in the literature. A one standard deviation change results in an increase of 2.1
percentage points using all background characteristics. Moreover, the increase in the pseudo R2
when including the subjective beliefs is similar to the increase when adding both personality and
family background. Thus, we find subjective beliefs are strongly related to intended behavior,
a result consistent with Huntington-Klein (2015b).
Several explanations can account for this observed correlation between beliefs and aspira-
tions; therefore, we examine whether the link from beliefs to intention carries over to revealed
preferences in actual investments (at least two years later). Our dependent variable is now an
indicator that equals one if the student started any post-secondary education. Panel (B) uses
the broadest sample possible for this question. Compared to (A), it only excludes students
who are still in school and students who have not completed any subsequent questionnaires
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two years after the baseline questionnaire at age 17. The average marginal effect is somewhat
smaller than for the intentions, ranging from 1.4 to 0.9 percentage points for one standard
deviation increase in the subjective beliefs.27 In Panel (C), we show that similar results are
obtained when restricting the sample to students who expressed earlier intentions to invest in
post-secondary education. This shows that the subjective completion belief drives not only hy-
pothetical, intended investment, but it also has real behavioral consequences. Compared to the
previous results on students’ intentions-to-invest, the set of family background and labor mar-
ket variables explain a larger fraction of the completion belief effect and exhibit a substantial
explanatory power.
It is interesting to compare how the subjective completion beliefs relate to actual comple-
tion (at least five years later). This can be interpreted as how well the students can predict
their future outcomes.28 The estimation results are given in Panels (D) and (E). The average
completion rate is roughly 55%. Unconditionally, a one standard deviation increase in the
subjective beliefs increases completion rates in the population by 3.3 percentage points in the
overall sample (Panel D), and by 3.6 when conditioning on the sample with positive intentions
(Panel E). This decreases to 2.6 and 3.3 percentage points, respectively, when including the full
set of individual, family, and regional characteristics. Comparing the coefficients across rows, a
notable result is that for degree completion, the set of covariates that affect the coefficient of pi
most is that of the personality measures. Including these variables reduces the estimated coeffi-
cient by about 15 to 20 percent. The explanatory power of personality, family background, and
labor market characteristics are substantial. This suggests that the students do not optimally
account for this information when forming their beliefs. Again, the explanatory power of the
beliefs is substantial.
Taken together, the results show that subjective completion beliefs formed during secondary
education are predictive over a long time horizon for future post-secondary education. The
27Almost all adolescents in Germany start some post-secondary education, 95.6% in our sample, which explains
why the average marginal effect for investment is smaller than that for intentions despite an estimated coefficient
of similar magnitude.
28Since completing a program and graduating takes some time, we only consider students which we see at
least five years after they have taken the youth questionnaire when they indicated their completion beliefs. This
further reduces our available sample. Moreover, it is clear that students who were interviewed in earlier years
are more likely to have completed their degrees simply by virtue of being in the sample for a longer period of
time. However, this mechanism is captured by the year fixed effects, and is therefore unlikely to bias our results.
A second concern is that some of the observations are censored: As of the time we observe them, some students
have not yet completed their degree, but they might do so in the future. In this sense, our results should be
interpreted as representing the average effect of completion beliefs on completion within a given time frame.
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subjective beliefs are predictive even after accounting for a large set of previously identified,
important characteristics. In the appendix, we present further results showing the robustness of
these findings across a number of alternative specifications. We show that the results are robust
to dichotomizing the subjective beliefs to a dummy variable, thus accounting for potential non-
linearity as discussed in Pinger (2015). Further, since academic ability is found to be the main
determinant of learning about one’s own ability in the literature, we use various reasonable
standardizations of GPA that account for potential differences in grading across federal states,
or within high school versus no high school. We also use a fifth-order polynomial to show
that the beliefs do not pick up non-linearities in academic ability. Additionally, we use federal
state dummies instead of the region dummies used in the main specification (cf. footnote 24).
Finally, we present separate estimations for students enrolled in high school when answering the
youth questionnaire to account for the different default choices discussed above in a completely
flexible way.
A remaining concern might be that the uncertainty is confounded with unobserved hetero-
geneity. We therefore use a bounding strategy for the coefficients by taking potential selection
on unobservable tastes and preferences for education into account when estimating (1.5). We
use the approach developed by Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005a,b, 2008, hereafter, AET). More
specifically, we simultaneously estimate the models given in (1.1) and (1.5), imposing the fol-
lowing dependence between the error terms:
(νi, υi) ∼ Φ2(0, 0, 1, 1, ρ), (1.6)
where Φ2(·) denotes the bivariate normal distribution, and its arguments are the two errors’
means, variances, and their correlation. In other words, we estimate probit models for all
outcomes di with pi as a normal endogenous explanatory variable [denoted probit eev here-
after].29,30 The bounding is achieved by setting the correlation coefficient ρ to increasing values
29The corresponding log-likelihood is given by
lnL(di, pi;xi, α, β
d, βp, ρ) =
n∑
i=1
lnΦ
[
(2di − 1)
(
x′iβ
d + αpi + ρ(pi − x′iβp)√
1− ρ2
)]
+ lnφ (pi − x′iβp) . (1.7)
For more information, see the discussion in Greene (2012, p747f).
30In contrast to AET, our main variable is a fraction rather than an indicator. Instead of estimating a
bivariate probit, we therefore estimate a probit eev. The use of a continuous normal variable is motivated by
the estimation of (1.1), where we found that it made little difference whether it was estimated by OLS or a
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until the coefficient of the subjective beliefs α tends to zero. Note that Column (4) in combi-
nation with Table 1.2’s Column (4) is equivalent to the probit eev with ρ = 0. AET argue that
the selection-on-observables is a reasonable (upper) bound on the selection-on-unobservables.
Therefore, we also estimate the model replacing
ρ =
cov(x′iβ
d, x′iβ
p)
var(x′iβ
d)
≡ ρˆo
as a suggestive upper bound. Columns (5) to (7) contain the probit eev estimates using the
full set of covariates and ρ constrained to 0.1, 0.3, and 0.5. Finally, Column (8) constrains
ρ to be equal to the selection-on-observables ρˆo. Up to a correlation of 0.3 all coefficients
are positive, and for aspirations and intentions they remain statistically significant. This is a
sizeable correlation when comparing it to the applications considered in AET. When using the
AET bound of selection-on-observables in the last column, the coefficients are all statistically
significant and similar in magnitude to those using all covariates and a correlation between 0
and 0.1. This indicates that the results are robust to a sizeable selection-on-unobservables.
The results presented in this section indicate that the uncertainty of 17-year-old students
about completing an educational degree is an important determinant of educational choices
and outcomes. While we focused our discussion on the average effect, another effect which
is of interest is the one corresponding to the marginal student (a student with an outcome
probability of 50%). An increase in the subjective belief by one standard deviation (0.2)
for this student would: increase her intention to invest by 5.7 percentage points (i.e., Φ(0.2 ×
0.716)−Φ(0)), her investment by 6.9 percentage points (5.8 if she stated an intention to invest),
and her completion by 2.6 percentage points (3.4 if she stated an intention to invest). In sum,
differences in beliefs about being capable of successfully finishing a post-secondary educational
degree can explain not only differences in intended future investments in schooling, but in
actual investments as represented by enrollment into university or obtaining an apprenticeship
position. Moreover, students with higher subjective beliefs are also associated with higher
completion rates, even after controlling for several potential confounders and allowing for some
fractional response model (cf. Appendix Table A.2.1). As a robustness check we dichotomize the subjective
beliefs at p ≥ 70% and estimate bivariate probit regressions as in AET. Estimates for such an approach can be
found in the Appendix Table A.2.2. The results are similar but somewhat more conservative, possibly due to
the reduced variation.
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selection-on-unobservables.
1.5 A view at the disaggregated level
To understand how subjective beliefs influence educational choices and outcomes, we proceed
with a more disaggregated analysis: different educational choices. In the estimations before, we
implicitly assumed the subjective belief measure has the same effect on all educational invest-
ments. Clearly, while this is a useful simplification that allows to gauge overall average effects,
it might also hide important differences in how completion beliefs explain, say, enrollment in
a university program versus enrollment in a vocational training degree. In this section, we
separately asses each of the three educational investments: apprenticeship (j = 1), tertiary
apprenticeship (j = 2), and university (j = 3). Compared to the previous sections, in which
the subjective belief measure corresponded directly to the outcome, for the disaggregated edu-
cational tracks one would ideally like to assess the role of counterfactual choices. Unfortunately,
these were not elicited in the survey. Therefore, we condition on students’ aspirations; however,
results have to be interpreted more cautiously.
As before, the analysis starts at the level of intended investment. This time we present
results from a multinomial probit model with four outcomes. The base category is not having
any intention to invest, and the remaining categories are the intention to invest in each of
the three educational choices mentioned above. The results are presented in Table 1.4, whose
four columns represent specifications with the increasing sets of covariates discussed previously.
We present the χ2-statistic and corresponding p-value for the likelihood ratio test against a
restricted model without subjective beliefs.
— — — Table 1.4 about here — — —
All coefficients are statistically significant and large in magnitude. The first column shows
that the overall average marginal effect of subjective beliefs (in squared brackets) found before
stems almost exclusively from the fact that students with higher completion beliefs aspire to
a university education. Notice that the sum of the three average marginal effects is roughly
equal to the corresponding effect presented in the previous section.31
31We omit the average marginal effect for the base category: it is equal to minus the sum of the marginal
effects of the remaining categories.
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Yet, the second column shows that academic variables, such as GPA, are central in shaping
this effect. Once the academic background has been accounted for, the effect of subjective belief
works mainly through the apprenticeship channel. The average marginal effect for university is
reduced substantially and rendered statistically insignificant. Thus, high GPA has the effect of
inducing high completion beliefs, which in turn pushes students towards desiring a university
degree. But within a given GPA level, a higher completion belief is positively associated
with starting an apprenticeship. Compared to this big shift, the changes resulting from adding
personality, family background, and labor market variables are modest (at least beyond its effect
through GPA or personality skills). This result is in line with those found in the literature that
for college students most of the information is based on measures of academic ability (Zafar,
2011b; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2012, 2014b; Milla, 2014). Yet, for those who choose a
less theoretical education, other characteristics seem to be more influential.
Turning to the behavioral responses, we estimate separate regressions for the three subsam-
ples according to intended educational choice. That is, we address the question, for example, of
how does a higher subjective completion belief increase a student’s university enrollment and
completion probabilities, given that the student aspired to a university degree. Estimates are
reported in Table 1.5. Columns (1) to (4) display the results for enrollment and (5) to (8) for
completion. The three vertical Panels (A) to (C) contain separate probit regressions of each
educational track.
— — — Table 1.5 about here — — —
Panel (A) reports the estimates for investment and completion of an apprenticeship. The
results indicate that the effects of subjective beliefs are indeed large and statistically significant,
with the average marginal effect ranging from about 10 to 15 percentage points, depending
on the set of control variables used. With 883 observations, the subsample with intended
investment in apprenticeship is the largest of the three subsamples, accounting for almost half
of the total number of observations. The subsample for intended tertiary apprenticeship has
only 456 observations. In three out of the four specifications shown in the middle panel, the
estimated coefficient is insignificant. The coefficient —and hence the marginal effect— increases
as more covariates are controlled for, and only reaches marginal significance in the last column of
the panel. The bottom panel, containing the results of the subsample aspiring to a university
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education, features the opposite pattern. Here, completion beliefs have a large, statistically
significant effect on enrollment in university. However, academic background explains almost
half of the effect. Adding more sets of control variables further erodes the effect of subjective
beliefs on college enrollment.
Comparing the results across the three panels, it appears that the decision to enroll in a
post-secondary educational program is related most strongly to subjective completion beliefs
for those students aspiring to a university degree (see columns 1 across panels). At the same
time, the determinants of these beliefs are mainly related to observable academic and demo-
graphic variables for the university-aspiring students. For the two apprenticeship streams, the
observable academic and demographics add comparatively little information to the completion
beliefs. Moreover, for the tertiary apprenticeship, there even seems to be a negative correla-
tion with these characteristics, but the estimation results are too imprecise to allow for further
interpretation.
To conclude this part, we estimate analogous probit regressions for the probability to grad-
uate. The results are depicted in the right-hand-side panel of Table 1.5. Small sample size
issues are a concern, especially for the tertiary apprenticeship graduation regressions. How-
ever, the estimates are consistent with our previous results. In particular, the aggregate effect
found in the previous section is corroborated in the apprenticeship category. For students who
indicated their intentions to invest in an apprenticeship degree at age 17 years, the subjective
completion beliefs are highly informative about their actual completion years later. The av-
erage marginal effect is close to 30 percentage points —a figure that is reduced to about 20
percentage points after accounting for differences in observables. We cannot estimate precise
effects for tertiary apprenticeships. While the point estimates are sizeable, none of them are
statistically significant. The results for students aspiring to a university education also echo the
previous results. The effect of the completion beliefs at age 17 years is large and statistically
significant: a one-standard-deviation change in pi increases the probability of graduating from
university by about 6 percentage points for a student with a baseline graduation probability
of 50 percent. Finally (and as before), the available control variables, particularly academic
background variables, explain a large portion of this effect.
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1.6 A dynamic model of educational choice
In this section, we conclude our investigation by developing and estimating a model of edu-
cational investment along the lines of Taber’s (2001) seminal contribution that encompasses
three features. First, we allow for the sequential nature of the process: students can only decide
whether they want to go to university if they chose to finish high school previously (Comay,
Melnik and Pollatschek, 1973; Altonji, 1993). Second, we introduce the dynamics of the op-
timization process: when deciding whether to go to the labor market or to go to high school,
forward-looking students account for the option value of continuing education after finishing
high school (Stange, 2012; Trachter, 2015). Finally, we allow for unobserved factors that influ-
ence student utilities derived from their choices, which may be correlated across choices and
over time, a topic of substantial attention in the returns to education literature (see, e.g., Card,
2001; Belzil, 2007, and references therein).
Model
We consider a stylized two-period model in which students sequentially choose between risky
educational paths, as outlined in Figure 1.3.
— — — Figure 1.3 about here — — —
Ex ante, students do not know for certain whether they will successfully complete the chosen
education track, but they have subjective beliefs, pi, about finishing. The first period or first
stage (T = 1) occurs when students finish compulsory education at the age of 17 years. At
this point, they face the choice between dropping out of school (di1 = 0), investing in an
apprenticeship training (di1 = 1), or continuing with high school education (di1 = 2). A high
school degree involves the option value of continuing with tertiary education. Students who
choose high school reach the second period (T = 2), where they graduate from high school and
now have the choice of either investing in a tertiary apprenticeship (di1 = 2, di2 = 0) or in a
university education (di1 = 2, di2 = 1).
32,33
32As noted before, students could also drop out at this point, but this is an extremely rare event in the data
and therefore not modeled (see also Fossen and Glocker, 2014).
33We only focus on the initial beliefs in shaping young adults’ educational choices because we lack a repeated
measurement of the subjective beliefs at the end of high school that would allow us to study the learning about
ones’ own ability in more detail.
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As mentioned in Section 1.4, apprenticeships, tertiary apprenticeships, and university all
involve uncertainty, which we model according to equations (1.2)-(1.4). A key assumption of this
approach is that utility can be decomposed into a component that depends on the realization
of graduation (µij for graduation vs. µ¯ij else) and an idiosyncratic component unaffected by
graduation, εij, which captures features such as a preference for attending, say, university
irrespective of receiving a degree.
By backward induction, we begin with the students’ second stage problem. Students ad-
vancing to the second stage choose between starting a tertiary apprenticeship (j = 2) or going
to university (j = 3). We denote this choice by di2, a binary variable where 1 represents
choosing university,
di2 =


1 if Ui3 − Ui2 > 0
0 if Ui3 − Ui2 ≤ 0
which we specify analogously to equation (1.4) by
Ui3 − Ui2 = α3pi + x′i,t+1β3 + δ3θi + νi3 ≡ zi3,t+1 + νi3.
Here, α3 = (µ3 − µ2) − (µ¯3 − µ¯2), νi3 = εi3 − εi2, and xi,t+1 consists of the same covariates
considered above, although we include time-varying labor market conditions measured two years
after answering the youth questionnaire, which is the time one would need to start a higher
education after obtaining a high school degree.34 This exogenous variation in the decision
problem induced by the timing of the events provides an additional source of identification
(see, Taber, 2000; French and Taber, 2011, for a discussion on the identification for these
models), which has become standard practice in the literature on dynamic models of educational
choice (e.g., Taber, 2001; Heckman et al., 2014). To allow for dependence of the unobservables
between the two time periods in a flexible way, we add a standard normal random variable θi
to the utilities, capturing unobserved tastes and preferences for education. We assume that
νi3 ∼ N(0, σ3), thus the probability of choosing university relative to tertiary apprenticeship is
34We use students’ location at the age of 17 for the region regional variables, to avoid a bias due to moving.
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given by
P (di2 = 1) = Φ
(
zi3,t+1
σ3
)
,
where Φ(·) represents the univariate normal cdf.
In the first stage, the student has an expectation about her second stage decision (she knows
the distribution of νi3) but does not know her realized value. If students knew their realized νi3
at the time of the first stage, the model would reduce to a simple static polychotomous choice
problem, similar to those estimated and reported in Table 1.4. Thus, the students’ expectation
about her value of advancing to the second stage, as formed during the first stage, is
E(max(Ui3 − Ui2, 0)) = σ3
[
Φ
(
zi3,t
σ3
)
zi3,t
σ3
+ φ
(
zi3,t
σ3
)]
≡ EVi,
and φ(·) denotes the normal pdf. Now the labor market and educational supply and demand
characteristics are measured at time t, one year before the adolescent answers the youth ques-
tionnaire corresponding to her information set. The difference between high school and drop
out utility is then
UiHS − Ui0 = α2pi + x′i,tβ2 + δ2θi + EVi + νiHS
≡ ziHS,t + νiHS,
which comprises EVi, the option value of continuing to the second stage. In these types of
models, we cannot distinguish between the baseline utility of the second stage tertiary appren-
ticeship and the utility of high school. The coefficients α2, β2, δ2 thus capture the sum of these
two effects (while the coefficients in zi3,t correspond to the differences between preferences for
university and tertiary apprenticeship).
The apprenticeship utility is
Ui1 − Ui0 = α1pi + x′i,tβ1 + θi + νi1 ≡ zi1,t + νi1,
where we set δ1 = 1, a necessary normalization to identify the impact of unobserved hetero-
geneity, θi, on latent utilities. By the bivariate normal assumption on the ν’s we can write the
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probabilities
P (di1 = 2) = Φ2 (ziHS,t, ziHS,t − zi1,t, 0.5) ,
P (di1 = 1) = Φ2 (zi1,t, zi1,t − ziHS,t, 0.5) ,
P (di1 = 0) = 1− P (di1 = 1)− P (di1 = 2).
The individual likelihood contribution, conditional on the unobserved heterogeneity θi, is
given by
li(θi) = {1− P (di1 = 1)− P (di1 = 2)}1(di1=0) × {P (di1 = 1)}1(di1=1)
× {P (di1 = 2)[1− P (di2 = 1)]}1(di1=2,di2=0) (1.8)
× {P (di1 = 2)P (di2 = 1)}1(di1=2,di2=1) ,
and to obtain the marginal likelihood contribution, we integrate over the distribution of θ,
li =
∫
li(θi)φ(θi)dθi,
an expression which we approximate by simulation, l˜i, by taking random draws from the dis-
tribution of θi. We then maximize the simulated sample log-likelihood
∑
i ln l˜i.
Results
The estimation results are depicted in Table 1.6 in two panels. The left-hand-side panel
contains estimates from a constrained version of the model without heterogeneity (θi = 0 for all
i), whereas the right-hand-side panel contains estimates from the full model with unobserved
heterogeneity. Moving from left to right, the columns again contain the expanding set of
covariates considered previously. With the exception of the local labor and education market
characteristics, all the regressors are time-invariant.35
— — — Table 1.6 about here — — —
Table 1.6 depicts large and significant estimates for the coefficients of the subjective proba-
bilities in the indices for both di1=1 and di1=2. Thus, these results, too, suggest that a higher
35The estimate of σ3 is only identified when time-varying covariates are included (Taber, 2000; French and
Taber, 2011). We present it therefore only in Columns (4) and (8).
36
pi pushes students away from leaving school without further investments. In particular, the
coefficients for di1=2 suggest that subjective completion beliefs are important determinants of
second-stage participation; of completing high school and beginning a tertiary apprenticeship
or university studies (which confirms and extends the results found by Pinger, 2015). On the
other hand, the coefficients for university are insignificant throughout, and close to zero when
accounting for covariates. This indicates that, once in the second stage, the initial subjective
beliefs are not informative about the choice of tertiary apprenticeship versus university. A po-
tential explanation for this is belief updating in response to new information revealed by high
school grades.
— — — Figure 1.4 about here — — —
Figure 1.4 illustrates the role of the option value, EVi, in shaping the choice probabilities.
The figure uses predicted probabilities obtained from the estimated parameters in Column (5)
and evaluated at sample means. The left-hand-side panel artificially sets the expected value
to zero; that is, we evaluate a constrained model where students ignore the option value of
further investment. Thus, we interpret the coefficients from di1 = 2 as corresponding only to
high school utility, and we assume students neglect the option value of continuing to the second-
stage choices. As expected, it can be seen by contrasting the two panels in the figure that the
option value decreases the level of the apprenticeship probabilities and increases those of the
second-stage choices. But the option value also affects how the probabilities change with the
subjective belief, making the gradient on apprenticeship flatter —and even slightly negative
for high values of pi— and the gradient on university steeper. Therefore, the option value in
conjunction with the subjective beliefs can play a substantial role in shaping the adolescents’
high school investment.36
We now turn to the role of the unobserved preferences for post-secondary education or
unobserved skills, θi. Comparing the two panels of Table 1.6, we see that all the significant
coefficients in the right-hand-side panel, which accounts for such heterogeneity, are somewhat
larger than the ones from the left-hand-side. Recall that θi has no natural scale, its scale
has been fixed such that a unit coefficient in the index corresponds to apprenticeship. The
36The extent of these effects depends on the values of the covariates, which in Figure 1.4 were set to sample
means. In Figure A.1.2 in the Appendix we present graphs where we set all the linear indices x′iβj = 0 and thus
obtain effects which are much stronger.
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coefficient on the linear index for the baseline second-stage utility is about 0.85 across all
specifications (5)-(8) and highly significant. It shows that there is a strong positive correlation
between unobserved preferences for apprenticeship and for high school. Unobserved preferences
for education are very important for the adolescents investment decisions, as found in the
prior literature (e.g. Bulman, 2015; D’Haultfoeuille and Maurel, 2013; Huntington-Klein, 2015a;
Wiswall and Zafar, 2015a). Yet, there is no evidence for differences between unobserved tertiary-
apprenticeship-specific skills versus university-specific skills, with the estimated coefficient being
virtually zero, potentially a result of preference updating within high school.
Figure 1.5 further uses the results from Table 1.6 to visualize how the effect of pi might
differ for different “types” of students.
— — — Figure 1.5 about here — — —
Based on the estimates of the full specification from Column (8), we define four types by
their academic ability level (high versus low GPA) and their unobserved skill level (high versus
low θi) and plot their predicted choice probabilities against pi, evaluated at sample means.
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For students who have high observed and unobserved skills, subjective completion beliefs have
negligible effects on investment probabilities. Yet, for adolescents with low unobserved skills
(and high GPA), subjective beliefs positively influence all educational tracks. For students with
low academic performance, subjective beliefs are more relevant if they have a low preference for
education. It is also interesting to note that high GPA (for given level of θi) has a much larger
effect on investment than high unobserved skills and preferences (for a given level of GPA).
This suggests that the subjective beliefs are most relevant for students with low unobserved
skills.38
In sum, the results from the dynamic sequential model with unobserved heterogeneity shed
light on some aspects of educational choice which were masked in the reduced form models of
Sections 1.4 and 1.5. One such aspect is that the sequentiality of choices shows that pi has a
highly significant effect on the combined high school and second-stage choice; in contrast, it was
difficult to estimate precise effects for pi in the static reduced form model where all four choices
were disaggregated. Furthermore, we have seen that accounting for the option value and for
37Specifically, we define high and low values of GPA and θi as Φ
−1(0.75) and Φ−1(0.25).
38Figure A.1.3 contains a similar graph to Figure 1.5, but evaluated at x′iβj = 0, thus yielding even more
pronounced effects.
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unobserved skills can modify the effect of pi on the choice probabilities. Speaking more broadly,
the structural estimates confirm the main results from the reduced-form estimations presented
previously: subjective probabilities contain predictive information for educational investments
even after accounting for differences due to an extensive set of controls and unobserved het-
erogeneity. Additionally, and consistent with the recent literature, throughout the analysis
GPA has been shown to be the main driver of subjective beliefs. Thus, learning about one’s
own ability is largely determined by school grades already before entering a post-secondary
education.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated the role of uncertainty for 17-year-olds on their post-secondary
educational outcomes by means of subjective beliefs. Two features of this problem are the young
age of the students at the time their subjective completion probabilities were elicited and the
long time horizon of the choices to which these measures referred. Both features make this a
difficult problem, and it is remarkable that these necessarily crude initial beliefs retain their
predictive power over a period of several years. The effects of subjective beliefs on investment
intentions and actual investments in any post-secondary education are substantial, remaining
so even after controlling for observables. Moreover, subjective beliefs have explanatory power
comparable to that of academic and personality variables combined. For the marginal student,
a one standard deviation increase in subjective beliefs is associated with a 6 percentage points
increase for investment intentions and a 7 percentage points increase for actual enrollment.
Finally, the subjective probabilities of completion are also predictive of actual completion,
increasing completion probability by 3 percentage points.
When disaggregating the educational tracks and estimating a structural choice model, we
find the subjective beliefs most relevant for students who aim for a university degree. This is
due to the information revealed by GPA, which broadly confirms results found in the litera-
ture. Most notably, we confirm Zafar’s (2011b) finding that ex ante subjective beliefs continue
to be important even until the degree is completed. Advancing his findings, we conclude that
this is even true for subjective beliefs formed already in or before investing (or staying) in high
school. Conditional on the academic ability, the subjective beliefs are most relevant for students
39
who start an apprenticeship, which is largely driven by students with additionally low unob-
served skills or preferences for post-secondary education. The literature on subjective beliefs in
educational choice has largely ignored these students and evidence on their learning/decision-
making processes are almost non-existent. Our study suggests that these students deserve more
attention.
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Table 1.1: Descriptive statistics by educational aspirations
By aspiration level Total
Variables 0 1 2 3
p 0.692 0.768 0.782 0.805 0.776
(0.258) (0.220) (0.176) (0.155) (0.198)
GPA (std) -0.269 -0.288 -0.000 0.404 0.000
(1.035) (0.919) (0.902) (1.007) (1.000)
Rec: Lower Track (yes/no) 0.166 0.265 0.044 0.034 0.132
(0.373) (0.441) (0.204) (0.181) (0.338)
Rec: Intermediate Track (yes/no) 0.248 0.351 0.271 0.150 0.259
(0.432) (0.477) (0.445) (0.358) (0.438)
Rec: High school (yes/no) 0.284 0.092 0.524 0.698 0.402
(0.452) (0.289) (0.500) (0.459) (0.490)
In high school (yes/no) 0.272 0.015 0.596 0.767 0.411
(0.446) (0.123) (0.491) (0.423) (0.492)
Locus of control (std) -0.178 -0.169 0.082 0.195 0.003
(1.014) (0.963) (0.861) (0.862) (0.928)
Risk attitudes (std) -0.057 -0.006 -0.037 0.053 0.001
(0.962) (0.945) (0.914) (0.895) (0.924)
Openness (std) -0.178 -0.134 0.048 0.167 -0.000
(0.990) (0.956) (0.879) (0.926) (0.942)
Agreeableness (std) -0.103 -0.048 0.068 0.042 0.002
(0.928) (0.987) (0.909) (0.919) (0.944)
Extraversion (std) -0.135 -0.051 0.021 0.075 -0.002
(0.948) (0.914) (0.919) (0.989) (0.945)
Neuroticism (std) 0.059 0.009 0.053 -0.066 -0.000
(0.942) (0.922) (0.885) (1.003) (0.943)
Conscientiousness (std) -0.132 0.053 -0.059 0.026 0.002
(0.967) (0.938) (0.915) (0.953) (0.942)
Female (yes/no) 0.486 0.454 0.541 0.539 0.504
(0.501) (0.498) (0.499) (0.499) (0.500)
Nr. of siblings 1.613 1.710 1.433 1.496 1.570
(1.461) (1.494) (1.206) (1.099) (1.316)
Second-generation migrant (yes/no) 0.746 0.680 0.574 0.557 0.623
(0.436) (0.466) (0.495) (0.497) (0.485)
Parent college-educated (yes/no) 0.199 0.101 0.306 0.495 0.283
(0.400) (0.301) (0.461) (0.500) (0.450)
Parent cur. unemployed (yes/no) 0.124 0.160 0.087 0.045 0.103
(0.330) (0.367) (0.282) (0.208) (0.304)
Log. net household income 10.019 9.890 10.624 10.855 10.377
(2.231) (2.216) (1.358) (1.295) (1.834)
Cyclical youth unemployment (in Ror) 0.154 0.101 0.043 0.041 0.074
(1.079) (1.044) (0.982) (1.020) (1.026)
Nr. of apprenticeship positions (in Ror) 98.380 98.544 98.538 99.368 98.791
(4.906) (5.261) (5.600) (5.124) (5.279)
Nr. of students (in Ror) 23.700 22.711 24.156 25.730 24.095
(14.204) (14.354) (13.991) (14.091) (14.223)
Nr. of high school graduates (in Ror) 26.081 25.755 27.289 27.758 26.775
(6.313) (6.526) (6.218) (7.064) (6.673)
Nr. of Universities (in Ror) 10.789 9.620 10.916 11.381 10.585
(10.304) (9.666) (10.037) (9.988) (9.938)
N 331 (9.17%) 1’302 (36.07%) 826 (22.88%) 1’151 (31.88%) 3’610
Note: Table presents sample means and standard deviations in brackets in total and by aspiration levels. Individual characteristics
are assessed at the time of answering the Youth Questionnaire (with 17). GPA is the grade point average of German and Math
grades, standardized and reversed, that higher values indicate better performance. Three indicators for school recommendations
(with the age of 10), one indicator indicating if the student is currently in high school. Locus of control, openness, agreeableness,
extraversion, neuroticism, and conscientiousness are principal components, std- stands for standardized to (0,1), where small devi-
ations result from missings. We define second-generation migrants as having both parents born in a foreign country, parents college
educated/unemployed if at least one has a college degree, is currently unemployed, cyclical component of youth unemployment
in the region is extracted using the Hodrick-Prescott-Filter. The number of Universities in the region include all higher learning
institutions.
Source: SOEP 2000-2013, INKAR 2012, own calculations.
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Table 1.2: Determinants of subjective completion beliefs, OLS regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GPA (std) 0.037 0.029 0.029 0.029
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Rec: Lowest Track (yes/no) 0.025 0.026 0.025 0.028
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Rec: Intermediate Track (yes/no) 0.061 0.058 0.052 0.056
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Rec: High school (yes/no) 0.046 0.042 0.034 0.039
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
In high school (yes/no) 0.005 0.003 -0.004 -0.005
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Locus of control (std) 0.022 0.019 0.019
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Risk attitudes (std) 0.008 0.005 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Openness (std) 0.005 0.004 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Agreeableness (std) 0.008 0.008 0.008
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Extraversion (std) 0.016 0.017 0.017
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Neuroticism (std) 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Conscientiousness (std) 0.031 0.034 0.034
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Female (yes/no) -0.013 -0.013
(0.007) (0.007)
Nr. siblings -0.002 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
Second-generation migrant (yes/no) -0.022 -0.010
(0.007) (0.013)
Parent college-educated (yes/no) 0.007 0.008
(0.007) (0.007)
Parent cur. unemployed (yes/no) -0.002 0.001
(0.013) (0.013)
Log. net household income 0.007 0.007
(0.002) (0.002)
N 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610
p¯ 0.776 0.776 0.776 0.776
SD(p) 0.198 0.198 0.198 0.198
adjR2 0.052 0.107 0.115 0.116
Academic + + + +
F(pval) 30.470 (0.000) 20.679 (0.000) 17.564 (0.000) 17.029 (0.000)
Personality - + + +
F(pval) 24.168 (0.000) 24.626 (0.000) 24.328 (0.000)
Background - - + +
F(pval) 3.796 (0.000) 2.431 (0.013)
Labor market + FE - - - +
F(pval) 1.257 (0.184)
Note: Table presents coefficients, from linear regressions of subjective beliefs on varying sets of covariates, in (1) only on
academic, (2) adds personality, (3) family background and individual characteristics, and (4) local labor market charac-
teristics, region and time fixed effects (coefficients not presented). No recommendation is the base category, we include
indicator variables for missing values in any of the covariates. Robust standard errors are given in brackets. We present the
unconditional mean p¯ and standard deviation SD(p) of the dependent variable, the adjusted R2, and joint significance tests.
In the appendix we present analogous fractional response regressions.
Source: SOEP 2000-2013, INKAR 2012, own calculations.
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Table 1.3: Effect of subjective completion beliefs on educational outcomes
probit probit eev
ρ = .1 ρ = .3 ρ = .5 ρ = ρˆo
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(A) Intention-to-invest
p 0.921 0.809 0.726 0.716 0.612 0.383 0.120 0.561
(0.142) (0.146) (0.148) (0.150) (0.149) (0.141) (0.129) (0.168)
[0.140] [0.121] [0.108] [0.104]
R2n 0.029 0.040 0.048 0.059
R2n(p) 0.049 0.055 0.059 0.069
Sample: N = 3, 610, d¯ = 0.908, p¯ = 0.776, SD(p) = 0.198, ρˆo(se) = 0.147(0.003)
(B) Actual investment
p 0.997 0.915 0.908 0.866 0.762 0.527 0.250 0.846
(0.223) (0.228) (0.240) (0.249) (0.250) (0.247) (0.215) (0.234)
[0.069] [0.062] [0.056] [0.044]
R2n 0.087 0.100 0.122 0.184
R2n(p) 0.113 0.121 0.141 0.199
Sample: N = 2, 116, d¯ = 0.956, p¯ = 0.772, SD(p) = 0.201, ρˆo(se) = 0.021(0.003)
(C) Actual investment, conditional on intentions
p 0.901 0.845 0.836 0.726 0.622 0.393 0.129 0.716
(0.256) (0.262) (0.272) (0.276) (0.277) (0.269) (0.240) (0.141)
[0.058] [0.053] [0.048] [0.031]
R2n 0.085 0.095 0.115 0.205
R2n(p) 0.104 0.111 0.129 0.214
Sample: N = 1, 919, d¯ = 0.961, p¯ = 0.781, SD(p) = 0.192, ρˆo(se) = 0.010(0.002)
(D) Actual completion
p 0.434 0.410 0.351 0.331 0.229 0.015 -0.214 0.326
(0.181) (0.185) (0.189) (0.192) (0.190) (0.190) (0.171) (0.094)
[0.172] [0.162] [0.139] [0.131]
R2n 0.089 0.093 0.102 0.123
R2n(p) 0.092 0.096 0.104 0.124
Sample: N = 1, 372, d¯ = 0.544, p¯ = 0.769, SD(p) = 0.197 , ρˆo(se) = 0.005(0.003)
(E) Actual completion, conditional on intentions
p 0.467 0.478 0.439 0.421 0.319 0.102 -0.135 0.418
(0.198) (0.202) (0.206) (0.210) (0.210) (0.191) (0.197) (0.083)
[0.185] [0.189] [0.174] [0.167]
R2n 0.095 0.098 0.108 0.127
R2n(p) 0.099 0.101 0.110 0.129
Sample: N = 1, 244, d¯ = 0.547, p¯ = 0.778, SD(p) = 0.190, ρˆo(se) = 0.004(0.003)
Academic - + + + + + + +
Personality - - + + + + + +
Family Background - - - + + + + +
Labor market - - - + + + + +
Note: Table presents coefficients (robust standard errors in round and average marginal effects in squared brackets),
from probit (1)-(4) and probit endogenous explanatory variable (5)-(8) regressions of varying educational outcomes on
subjective completion beliefs and varying sets of covariate, in (1) on in high school, region and time fixed effects, (2)
adds academic, (3) adds personality, (4) to (8) family background, individual, and local labor market characteristics.
In the probit eev regressions we restrict the correlation between the errors to be 0.1, 0.3, 0.5 and to be equal to the
selection-on-unobservables (the estimated is given by ρˆo along with its standard error). For each outcome in Panels
(A) to (E), we present McFadden’s pseudo-R2 with and without p, and sample statistics for the varying subsamples.
In the appendix we present analogous probit and bivariate probit regressions for dichotomized p ≥ 70%.
Source: SOEP 2000-2013, INKAR 2012, own calculations.
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Table 1.4: Disaggregated intentions-to-invest, multinominal probit regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Apprenticeship, d = 1
p 1.045 1.136 1.038 1.068
(0.206) (0.214) (0.218) (0.221)
[0.021(0.029)] [0.081(0.029)] [0.081(0.030)] [0.089(0.030)]
Tertiary Apprenticeship, d = 2
p 1.094 0.907 0.802 0.776
(0.210) (0.221) (0.226) (0.230)
[-0.011(0.034)] [-0.003(0.035)] [0.002(0.036)] [0.001(0.036)]
University, d = 3
p 1.557 1.073 0.881 0.827
(0.217) (0.227) (0.233) (0.237)
[0.141(0.035)] [0.052(0.035)] [0.030(0.036)] [0.021(0.035)]
N 3,610 3,610 3,610 3,610
LR(pval) 54.900(0.000) 36.009(0.000) 26.476(0.000) 26.237(0.000)
Academic - + + +
Personality - - + +
Family Background - - - +
Labor market - - - +
Note: Table presents, multinominal probit regressions of the educational intention-to-
invest: drop out, apprenticeship, tertiary apprenticeship, and university on subjective
beliefs and varying sets of covariates in (1) on in high school, region and time fixed
effects, (2) adds academic, (3) adds personality, (4) to (8) family background, individual,
and local labor market characteristics. Robust standard errors in round, average marginal
effect along (with standard errors) in squared (round) brackets. The Likelihood Ratio
(LR)-statistic measures the significance of p across equations.
Source: SOEP 2000-2013, INKAR 2012, own calculations.
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Table 1.5: Disaggregated actual investment and completion, conditional on intentions,
probit regressions
Actual investment Actual completion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(A) Apprenticeship (d1 = 1)
p 0.902 1.055 1.007 1.043 0.794 0.737 0.645 0.559
(0.256) (0.266) (0.269) (0.275) (0.271) (0.273) (0.276) (0.278)
[0.133] [0.151] [0.136] [0.090] [0.292] [0.271] [0.237] [0.204]
R2n 0.033 0.044 0.073 0.175 0.051 0.060 0.069 0.106
R2n(p) 0.054 0.071 0.096 0.196 0.064 0.071 0.077 0.111
Sample: N = 883, d¯1 = 0.948, p¯ = 0.769, SD(p) = 0.218 N = 502, d¯1 = 0.669, p¯ = 0.760, SD(p) = 0.220
(B) Tertiary apprenticeship (d2 = 1)
p 0.362 0.455 0.673 0.784 0.409 0.358 0.374 0.669
(0.368) (0.379) (0.412) (0.416) (0.549) (0.564) (0.578) (0.619)
[0.120] [0.150] [0.219] [0.250] [0.098] [0.089] [0.094] [0.129]
R2n 0.079 0.084 0.107 0.137 0.140 0.139 0.148 0.223
R2n(p) 0.081 0.087 0.112 0.143 0.142 0.141 0.150 0.226
Sample: N = 456, d¯2 = 0.965, p¯ = 0.781, SD(p) = 0.179 N = 314, d¯2 = 0.557, p¯ = 0.779, SD(p) = 0.177
(C) University (d3 = 1)
p 0.789 0.431 0.308 0.038 0.980 0.665 0.894 0.656
(0.367) (0.388) (0.405) (0.409) (0.487) (0.512) (0.538) (0.546)
[0.282] [0.153] [0.108] [0.013] [0.253] [0.172] [0.226] [0.155]
R2n 0.140 0.186 0.219 0.275 0.177 0.194 0.223 0.252
R2n(p) 0.146 0.188 0.220 0.275 0.186 0.198 0.229 0.255
Sample: N = 580, d¯3 = 0.978, p¯ = 0.801, SD(p) = 0.154 N = 428, d¯3 = 0.397, p¯ = 0.799, SD(p) = 0.156
Academic - + + + - + + +
Personality - - + + - - + +
Family - - - + - - - +
Labor market - - - + - - - +
Note: Table presents coefficients (robust standard errors in round and average marginal effects in
squared brackets), from probit regressions of investment (1)-(4) and completion (5)-(8) on subjective
completion beliefs and varying sets of covariate, in (1/5) on in high school, region and time fixed
effects, (2/6) adds academic, (3/7) adds personality, (4/8) family background, individual, and local
labor market characteristics. We present McFadden’s pseudo-R2 and sample statistics for the varying
subsamples. For some regressions the numbers of observations are slightly reduced.
Source: SOEP 2000-2013, INKAR 2012, own calculations.
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Table 1.6: Dynamic models of actual investment
Dynamic model Dyn. model with unobs. heterogeneity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Apprenticeship (d1 = 1)
p 1.173 1.213 1.187 1.198 1.406 1.432 1.407 1.420
(0.303) (0.314) (0.327) (0.328) (0.313) (0.324) (0.338) (0.339)
θ 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
(.) (.) (.) (.)
High school (d1 = 2)
p 1.307 1.143 1.147 1.186 1.549 1.370 1.370 1.409
(0.388) (0.406) (0.423) (0.391) (0.396) (0.414) (0.432) (0.401)
θ 0.846 0.846 0.851 0.848
(0.061) (0.062) (0.062) (0.054)
University (d1 = 2, d2 = 1)
p 0.462 0.105 0.063 0.084 0.462 0.103 0.062 0.082
(0.259) (0.273) (0.282) (0.301) (0.260) (0.273) (0.282) (0.300)
θ -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.049)
ln(σ3) -0.719 -0.688
(0.717) (0.708)
N 2,116 2,116 2,116 2,116 2,116 2,116 2,116 2,116
Academic - + + + - + + +
Personality - - + + - - + +
Family+Labor market - - - + - - - +
Note: Table presents estimates of the model in equation (1.8). In the panel “Dynamic model”, θi = 0
for all i. The model in the panel “Dyn. model with unobs. heterogeneity” estimated by MSL with 100
random draws from N(0, 1). The sets of covariates correspond to those in Table 1.3. Standard errors in
parentheses. All regressions include an indicator for being in high school with 17, region and time fixed
effects.
Source: SOEP 2000-2013, INKAR 2012, own calculations.
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Chapter 2
An econometric model of health care demand with non-
linear pricing
This chapter is jointly written with Rainer Winkelmann. A version of this paper is forthcoming
in Health Economics.1
From 2004 to 2012, the German social health insurance levied a co-payment for the first
doctor visit in a calendar quarter. We develop a new model for estimating the effect of such
a co-payment on the individual number of visits per quarter. The model combines a one time
increase in the otherwise constant hazard rate determining the timing of doctor visits with
a difference-in-differences strategy to identify the reform effect. An extended version of the
model accounts for a mismatch between reporting period and calendar quarter. Using data
from the German Socio-Economic Panel, we do not find an effect of the co-payment on demand
for doctor visits.
Keywords: Count data, Poisson process, co-payment, hurdle model
JEL classification: I10, C25
1We are grateful to two anonymous referees, Gregori Baetschmann, Helmut Farbmacher, Martin Grabka,
Robert Jung, Joao Santos Silva, Kevin Staub, Joachim Winter, as well as participants of the 16th IZA/CEPR
European Summer Symposium in Labour Economics for valuable comments, to Daniel Auer for very able
research assistance, and to the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW Berlin) for providing access to
the Socio-Economic Panel.
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2.1 Introduction
Around 90% of the German population receive their health insurance coverage through the
German statutory health insurance system (SHI). Before 2004, the SHI did not require any
co-payment for doctor visits, although prescription drugs were subject to cost sharing for many
years. Starting January 1st, 2004, the insured had to pay a 10 Euro fee for the first visit
to a doctor in each calendar quarter (“Praxisgebu¨hr”). Additional visits in the same quarter
were free of charge. Thus the individual out-of-pocket expense became a non-linear function of
utilization, dropping from 10 to 0 Euros after the first doctor visit in a quarter. Only individuals
without any visit to a doctor could avoid paying the quarterly fee. Moreover, the fee did not
apply to those with private health insurance (PHI). On January 1st, 2013, the co-payment was
abolished.
Arguably, the introduction of a co-payment created an incentive to avoid doctor visits in a
particular quarter of the year, at least at the extensive margin, for those close to indifference
between consulting or not consulting a doctor. One therefore would expect that the probability
of visiting a doctor at least once within a quarter should have fallen in the SHI population
relative to the unaffected PHI population. By the same token, one might think that the number
of doctor visits for those with at least one visit (the conditional-on-positives or intensive margin
effect) should be unrelated to the co-payment (see Augurzky, Bauer and Schaffner, 2006, for
such a view) although our analysis below will provide reasons why this is not necessarily the
case.
A number of researchers have conducted quantitative evaluations of the effect of this reform
on overall demand and demand at the extensive margin (Augurzky, Bauer and Schaffner, 2006;
Schreyo¨gg and Grabka, 2010; Farbmacher and Winter, 2013). So far, results have been mixed.
Augurzky, Bauer and Schaffner (2006) report a negative and statistically significant difference-
in-differences (DiD) coefficient in a logit model for “any visit”. However, in their preferred
specification they control for individual specific fixed effects, and the co-payment effect switches
sign and becomes insignificant. Schreyo¨gg and Grabka (2010) estimate a hurdle-at-zero negative
binomial model and find no effect in either part of the model. Farbmacher and Winter (2013)
find a statistically significant 4 percentage point reduction of the probability of any visit.
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Our paper makes two main contributions. First, rather than using ad-hoc reduced form
count data or binary response models to estimate the reform effect, we develop a new approach
based on a structural model of health care demand. In our model, individuals are exposed to
random health shocks arriving according to a homogeneous Poisson process. Individuals are
myopic and decide at each instance whether or not to visit a doctor. In the random utility
decision model, the out-of-pocket costs for seeing a doctor drop non-linearly after the first visit,
leading to an increased hazard rate for subsequent visits. The model introduces a dynamic
aspect, absent in econometric models used in prior work, where an increased cost of a first visit
has two effects: The probability of no visit increases; moreover, a first visit, if it takes place,
will tend to do so later in the quarter, lowering the overall number of subsequent visits. This
does not require forward looking behavior of agents (which in fact is ruled out by our model).
The second contribution is an internally consistent approach to deal with a discrepancy
between calendar quarter (i.e., pricing period) and reporting period. This is relevant if one uses
survey data such as the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP, Wagner, Frick and Schupp, 2007) where
respondents are asked to state the number of visits during the three-months period preceding
the day of interview. Often, the reporting period overlaps with two calendar quarters, and
“reporting-mismatch” arises if, unrecorded in the data and thus unobserved by the analyst, a
visit has taken place between the start of the relevant calendar quarter and that of the reporting
period. In this case, the first visit in the reporting period has an effective price of zero under
treatment, not of 10 Euros, as would be the case if the reporting period and the calendar
quarter matched perfectly. Ignoring this issue leads to a misspecified likelihood function.
Farbmacher and Winter (2013) recommend to base estimation on the subset of individuals
who were interviewed close to the end of a calendar quarter. Even if one can treat the interview
day as random, this approach takes a heavy toll in terms of sample size and thus precision.
For example, in our data, the number of available observations drops from 32,888 to 6,236 if
the sample is restricted to those interviewed within a ± 10 days-window around the end of a
quarter. On the other hand, using our assumptions on the underlying stochastic process, it
becomes possible to derive the correct probability model for mismatched observations, and thus
to employ all available data for estimation. Extensions to allow for unobserved heterogeneity
are available.
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Regarding data and identification, this paper largely follows the lead of the prior literature.
For example, Augurzky, Bauer and Schaffner (2006) employ two waves from the SOEP, 2003 as
pre-reform period and 2005 as post-reform period. The control group consists of people with
private health insurance and provides a baseline counterfactual pre-and post reform trend in
doctor visits. Any deviation from this baseline trend observed for the treated group (SHI) is
then assumed to capture the effect of treatment. The co-payment was abolished in 2013, and
we can use this as a second DiD experiment, by adding data on doctor visits from the 2012
and 2013 waves (for the subset of persons interviewed in the second quarter of 2013 or later).
Assuming symmetric effects, a joint analysis of the two changes allows us to increase power.
While the main contribution of the paper is the development of a new model of demand for
doctor visits with non-linear pricing, and thus methodological, our results add to the existing
evidence regarding the lack of a robust effect of the 10-Euro co-payment on health care utiliza-
tion. Perhaps, household data from the SOEP provide an indicator of utilization that is too
noisy. Researchers might benefit from access to richer information provided by insurance level
data, as in (Farbmacher et al., 2013). Or else, there really was no sizeable effect, because the
amount was too small to be decision-relevant for most people, because it applied to the first
visit only or because, in other cases, there just was no choice but to pay the fee, e.g., for the
chronically ill.
2.2 Modeling the number of doctor visits
In this section, we derive the distribution of the individual number of visits Yi during a fixed
time interval (0, T ) representing a calendar quarter (i.e., T = 90 if time is measured in days).
Suppose that sickness events arrive according to a Poisson process with constant rate λi. The
total number of sickness events Ni during a quarter is then Poisson distributed with mean λiT .
Let Xij ∈ {0, 1} denote the individual decision to visit a doctor (Xij = 1) or not (Xij = 0)
at the j’th sickness event. The decision is made by comparing two utilities, utility u1ij with a
visit and utility u0ij without. Utility depends on net income (after deducting direct cost cj) and
health: uXij = u((yi − cj)X , hXij ), where it is understood that cj = 0 when X = 0.
Assume linear utility u1ij = α(yi − cj) + h1ij and u0ij = αyi + h0ij . People choose to see a
doctor if u1ij > u
0
ij, i.e., h
1
ij − h0ij > αcj. The idiosyncratic health improvement from a visit, net
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of all non-pecuniary cost, has to be at least as large as the marginal utility of income times the
pecuniary cost of a visit at sickness event j. Therefore, the probability of a visit is given by
Pr(Xij = 1) = 1− Pr(h1ij − h0ij < αcj) = p(cj),
where p(cj) is decreasing in cj as long as α > 0.
With constant cost cj = c, the probability of a visit is the same for all sickness events, and
the total number of visits
Yi = Xi1 + . . .+XiN (2.1)
has a Poisson distribution with mean λi×p(c) (Feller, 2008). Under the aforementioned reform,
only the first visit during a quarter has a price of c > 0 whereas all subsequent visits are for
free. Thus, the cost of a visit is path dependent. For example, the cost at the second sickness
event can be written as ci2 = c× 1(Xi1 = 1), and the probability of a visit at the second event
is given by
Pr(Xi2 = 1) = p(c)× p(0) + (1− p(c))× p(c)
In general, it holds for all i that
Pr(Xi1 = 1) < Pr(Xij = 1) j = 2, . . . , N
since p(c) < p(0). With non-constant probabilities, (2.1) cannot be Poisson distributed.
To derive the distribution of Yi in this case, it is useful to consider an alternative representa-
tion of the problem in terms of the underlying stochastic process. Specifically, Yi is equal to the
number of “renewals” (i.e. completed time spells between visits) during a fixed time interval.
Inter-arrival times for a Poisson process are exponentially distributed. The non-linear pricing
introduces a one-time jump in the hazard rate: λi0 = λi × p(c) is the hazard rate for the time
to first visit, and λi1 = λi × p(0) that for the duration between subsequent visits. Under the
assumptions of the model, λi0 < λi1. This “non-stationarity” implies that the model does not
correspond to a standard renewal process, and a new type of count data model is obtained.
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2.2.1 The distribution of the number of visits
For simplicity of notation, we drop the “i” subscript in the following three subsections. Given
the above assumptions, the time of the first visit t has an exponential distribution with rate λ0,
whereas the number of further visits during the quarter between t and T is Poisson distributed
with rate λ1, Y (t, T ) ∼ Poisson(λ1(T − t)). Therefore, for k ≥ 1, the total number of visits
during a quarter has probability function
Pr[Y (0, T ) = k] =
∫ T
0
exp(−λ1(T − t))[λ1(T − t)]k−1
(k − 1)! λ0 exp(−λ0t)dt . (2.2)
where a first visit occurs between 0 and T , if at all, and we integrate over all these possible
times. If we could observe t, we would directly estimate the parameters using the terms under
the integral, Pr(Y = k − 1|t, t < T ;λ1) and f(t;λ0). Our model applies to the case, where t is
unobserved, as is typically the case in general purpose household or health surveys where just
the number, and not the times, of visits is recorded.
Note that the time of first visit is not a choice variable in our model. It results from the
interplay between a stochastic sickness arrival process (which is unaffected by the co-payment)
and a utility maximizing choice that trades off the instantaneous health benefit of a visit with
its monetary cost. One can show (see, e.g. Janardan, 1980; Baetschmann and Winkelmann,
2016) that the integral (2.2) has a closed form solution, and the probability function is given
by
f(y;λ0, λ1) =
λ0λ
y−1
1 exp(−λ0T )
(λ1 − λ0)y
[
1−
y−1∑
j=0
exp(−(λ1T − λ0T ))(λ1T − λ0T )j
j!
]
y = 1, 2, . . .
(2.3)
and f(0;λ0, λ1) = exp(−λ0T ). The model will be referred to as “dynamic hurdle” model, and
we write f(y;λ0, λ1) = DHurdle(y;λ0, λ1). If λ0 = λ1, it can be shown that (2.3) simplifies to
the probability function of the Poisson distribution.
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2.2.2 Interpretation of parameters
The parameters of the model have a straightforward interpretation. λ0 is the hazard rate for the
first visit (or “stage 0” hazard), λ1 the hazard rate for subsequent visits (or “stage 1” hazard).
For instance, parameterizing λ0 = exp(x
′β0), where x is a (k × 1) vector of covariates and β0
a conformable vector of regression parameters, β0∆x is the approximate relative change in λ0
associated with a small change in x. In the context of two-part or zero-inflated models, β0 and
β1 are often denoted as “extensive margin” and “intensive margin” effects, respectively. The
mean of the model has generic form
E(Y (0, T )) = Pr(y > 0) + Et[EY (t, T )], 0 ≤ t ≤ T
Since EY (t, T ) = λ1(T−t), where T−t is the time from the first visit to the end of the calendar
quarter, the intensive margin effect depends not only on λ1 but on the expected duration of
stage 1, and thus on λ0, as well. In the model, a co-payment for the first visit means that it
tends to happen later, leaving less time for accumulating further visits. It is therefore the case
that the number of visits after the first visit is affected by the co-payment, even if λ1 is not.
Using properties of the Poisson and exponential distributions, we obtain the following closed
form expression for the mean:
E(Y (0, T )) = λ1T + (1− λ1/λ0)[1− exp(−λ0T )] (2.4)
As required, the expected value of the distribution reduces to the Poisson mean when λ0 = λ1.
The expected value is greater than λ1 when λ0 > λ1, and smaller otherwise. A relative small
value of λ0 is an indication of “zero-inflation”, or “extra-zeros”, relative to the Poisson model,
a situation encountered in many count data applications (Mullahy, 1986).
2.2.3 Discussion
The implied model for the first visit is identical to that used in a class of hurdle count data
models introduced by Mullahy (1986). The probability function of the fixed hurdle model is
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given by
Pr(Y = y) =


p0(λ0) for y = 0
(1− p0(λ0)) f(y;λ1)
1− f(0;λ1) for y ≥ 1
where f(y;λ1) denotes the probability function of a standard count data model, e.g., Poisson
or negative binomial distribution, and p0(λ0) is a complementary log-log model. Pohlmeier and
Ulrich (1995) argue that such a hurdle model can be appropriate for modelling the demand for
health care. In their interpretation, the first contact decision for a general practitioner often
triggers a number of re-appointments or referrals to specialists that are subject to a different
mechanism and thus a different λ.
The standard hurdle model is not derived from an underlying stochastic process, however.
It treats λ0 and λ1 as unrelated parameters that can be separately estimated. It ignores the
random timing of the first visit, and thus the effect of λ0 on the length of the period for which
visits have a zero co-payment. In a fixed hurdle model, conditional-on-positives expressions
such as Pr(Y = y|Y > 0, x) or E(Y |Y > 0, x) depend on λ1 only, not on λ0. It therefore rules
out spill-over effects and cannot address path dependence generated by non-linear pricing.
By contrast, the dynamic hurdle model (2.3) naturally accounts for the timing of the first
visit. The co-payment leads to a lower stage 0 rate and decreases the expected time available
for subsequent visits. Although the timing of the first visit is unobserved, the corresponding
count data model can be derived under the maintained assumptions. In the application below,
we provide results for both fixed and dynamic hurdle models. While we argue that the dynamic
model is a-priori preferable, it is of course possible that the underlying assumptions justifying
the model are not satisfied in this particular application.
2.2.4 Identifying the effect of a co-payment on demand
In general, the two rates of the model can be expressed as functions of a number of exogenous
factors x, such as prior health status, income, gender, employment status and the like. Suppose
that λi0 = exp(x
′
iβ0) and λi1 = exp(x
′
iβ1). The above model suggests that with non-linear
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pricing, λi0 < λi1, and thus
exp(x′i(β0 − β1)) < 1 for all i
However, attributing any such difference in rates to the existence of a co-payment for the
first visit requires the absence of other explanations. But there are a number of factors that can
rationalize a low initial rate and a higher one thereafter. Perhaps the leading explanation has
been explored in the aforementioned paper by Pohlmeier and Ulrich (1995) argue, where visits
occur in clusters and a first visit is followed by additional appointments for a given sickness
spell. Thus a more convincing identification strategy uses difference-in-differences. Specifically,
the co-payment did apply between 2004 and 2012 for those covered by SHI. Privately insured
people were not affected and can serve as control group. We consider the following hazard rate
specification:
λit,j = exp(θt,j+β1,j SHIi+β2,j COPAYit+x
′
itγj) j = 0, 1, t = 2003, 2005, 2011, 2013
where θt,j are year dummies (2003 is dropped) and COPAYit is a dummy variable equal to
one if the person is covered by SHI and the year is either 2005 or 2011, and else equal to zero.
Thus, COPAYit = 1 indicates active treatment, and β2,0 is the extensive margin treatment
effect under the “parallel trends assumption”. This assumption implies that the counterfactual
hazard rate for a first visit for the SHI population in the absence of a co-payment is equal to the
actual SHI rate when no co-payment was in place (e.g., in 2003) multiplied by the appropriate
trend growth factor obtained from the PHI population (e.g., exp(θ2005,0)).
Similarly, one could formulate a DiD model to estimate the effect on the (second) hazard
rate for further visits, λit,1. This offers a kind of placebo test, as, within the above model, the
reform did not change the incentives conditional on a first visit, and no effect should therefore
be observed (i.e., the null hypothesis H0 : β2,1 = 0 should not be rejected). There are good
reasons not to put too much weight on such a test, though. First, there was a concurrent
increase in the co-payments for prescription drugs on January 1, 2004, and we know from
previous research that such out-of-pocket expenses tend to reduce the number of doctor visits
as well (Winkelmann, 2004). Second, a referral from the first doctor was needed in order to
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receive free consultations by further doctors (or specialists). Thus, the co-payment may have
increased the time- and effort costs of additional visits.
2.2.5 Dealing with mismatch
The empirical analysis is based on information from the SOEP on the number of visits “during
the previous three months”. Since interviews typically do not take place at the end of a calendar
quarter, the reporting period overlaps with two calendar quarters. As noted by (Farbmacher and
Winter, 2013) the standard models are invalid in this case. By contrast, our model prescribes
a method to deal with mismatch in a theory consistent way, owing to the derivation of the
dynamic hurdle model from an underlying stochastic process, which the standard hurdle model
lacks. Consider a reporting period (0 + r, T + r) that differs from the calendar quarter (0, T )
(e.g., T = 90 if time is measured in days). r ∈ (0, T ] is a known value in our data, since the
day of the interview is recorded. Suppose a person gets interviewed on May 1st in a year. In
this case, the relevant calendar quarter started on April 1st, r = 30, and the reporting period
covers the final two months of the 2nd quarter and the first month of the 3rd quarter.
— — — Figure 2.1 about here — — —
This situation is illustrated in Figure 2.1, where visits are reported for periods B and C,
whereas the calendar quarter includes A and B. In this case, the probability of no visit is the
product of the probability of no visit in C times the probability of no visit in B, which in turn
depends on whether or not a visit has taken place in A. In our model, the probability of a
pre-reporting period visit is Pr(YA > 0) = 1− exp(−λ0r), and therefore,
Pr(YB = 0) = (1− exp(−λ0r)) exp(−λ1(T − r)) + exp(−λ0r) exp(−λ0(T − r)) (2.5)
and
Pr(YB+C = 0) = Pr(YB = 0)× exp(−λ0r) (2.6)
where Pr(YB = 0) is defined in (2.5). Ignoring mismatch would lead one to assume a different
probability expression, in this case exp(−λ0T ), and thus a misspecified model.
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The expressions get more complex for Y ≥ 1. The total number of events in the reporting
period, Y , is then given by the sum Y = YB + YC , and
Pr(Y = k) =
k∑
s=0
Pr(YB = s) Pr(YC = k − s) (2.7)
This equation requires independence between two quarters which is guaranteed under the as-
sumptions of the model. The assumption of full independence can be relaxed: independence
conditional on observed or unobserved characteristics (e.g. a common log-normally distributed
unobserved heterogeneity term) would be sufficient.
Equation (2.7) depends on two probabilities. The second probability is easy to establish
since Pr(YC = k − s) = DHurdle(k − s;λ0, λ1, r). The first probability is a mixture of two
distributions:
1. There has been at least one visit in A, i.e., the arrival time of the first event, t, predates
r. In this case, counts in period B follow a Poisson distribution with mean λ1(T − r).
2. The arrival time of the first event exceeds r. In this case, counts in period B follow a
dynamic hurdle model with parameters λ0, λ1, and T − r.
Combining terms,
Pr(YB = s) = (1−exp(−λ0r))×Poisson(s;λ1(T−r))+exp(−λ0r)×DHurdle(s;λ0, λ1, T−r)
Substituting these expressions into (2.7), it is clear that
Pr(YA+B = k) = Pr[Y (0, T ) = k] 6= Pr(YB+C = k) = Pr[Y (r, T + r) = k]
and the model is far from stationary (unless λ0 = λ1, of course). The key point is that the
standard model assumes observation period and calendar quarter to be identical. If the two
diverge, it is not clear whether the hazard of the observation period starts at λ0 or at λ1, since
we do not know, whether or not an event has already taken place in the previous quarter.
As a corollary, all standard models used in the previous literature on first-visit co-payment
effects (probit, logit and hurdle count models) are misspecified, and thus inconsistent when ap-
plied to a sample from survey data with mismatched reporting period. For consistent parameter
estimation, one can use a subset of observations for which reporting period and calendar quar-
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ter are roughly aligned. But this only works, if the timing of the interview is random and
not correlated with unobservable determinants of health utilization. It is therefore much bet-
ter to estimate a model, such as the one derived here, that explicitly accounts for mismatch
and is consistent even with non-random timing, and otherwise more efficient, by allowing for
maximum likelihood estimation using the entire sample.
2.3 Data and Results
Data have been extracted from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) that is made available by
DIW Berlin. Four years are used, 2003, 2005, 2011 and 2013 and the analysis is restricted to
individuals between the ages of 20 and 60. We do not impose a balanced panel, nor do we make
the assumption of independence of observations across time. This affects the way standard
errors should be computed, as we use clustered standard errors throughout. We consider two
samples: The “restricted sample” includes all persons, who were interviewed within ±10 days to
the end of a calendar quarter. There are 6,236 such observations. In the restricted sample, the
average distance to the nearest end-of-quarter is around 5 days. The second, the “full sample”,
includes all persons regardless of their time of interview. There are 32,888 such observations,
and thus more than five times as many as in the restricted sample. The average distance to
the nearest end-of-quarter in the full sample is about 24 days.
— — — Table 2.1 about here — — —
Table 2.1 reports means (and their standard errors) of variables employed in the estima-
tion, separately for treatment group (SHI) and control group (PHI) and the two samples. Civil
servants are excluded from the analysis due to their non-standard insurance arrangement. Se-
lection into PHI is primarily based on income, as is evident in Table 2.1, where the mean log
household income of PHI individuals is 0.5 above that of SHI individuals (in the full sample),
corresponding to a 65 percent income difference. PHI individuals are also older on average (by
about 3 years), more educated (by about 2 years) and more likely to be male. The regression
analyses control for these factors, but the differences still raise the question of the comparability
of the two groups, and hence of the validity of the parallel trends assumption underlying the
DiD identification strategy. A formal test of this assumption was conducted by (Farbmacher
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and Winter, 2013), using the same kind of data from the SOEP, and they could not reject the
null-hypothesis of parallel trends during the pre-treatment years.
The bottom panel of Table 2.1 splits the two samples further into two subsamples, the
treatment years 2005 and 2011, and the non-treatment years 2003 and 2013 and shows for
each group the average number of visits as well as the share with at least one visit. The non-
treatment sample is somewhat smaller. The reason is that we had to drop all respondents who
were surveyed during the first quarter of 2013, because their reporting period overlapped with
the abolition of the co-payment by January 1st, 2013.
In terms of mean utilization, and using the full sample, we find that the SHI reported on
average about 0.05 (or 2.5 percent) more visits in years without the co-payment in place than
in years with co-payment. However, a similar trend is observed for the PHI individuals, who
report about 0.1 fewer visits on average, so that the naive DiD effect, based on means only,
is close to zero. A somewhat noisier picture emerges for the restricted sample, where the size
of the control population (417 in treatment years and 310 in non-treatment years) leads to
considerably more sampling uncertainty. If we look at the probability of any visit instead – the
extensive margin – not much is found either. The probability actually increases somewhat for
SHI individuals in years where the co-payment is in place. Of course, it would be premature
to dismiss the possibility of a treatment effect based on this descriptive evidence alone.
2.3.1 Baseline result
In a next step, we estimated the fixed and dynamic hurdle Poisson models with a full set of
control variables. The upper half of Table 2.2 shows the results. In terms of overall fit, the
simple Poisson model is clearly inferior to the two-part generalizations that introduce different
parameters for the utilization (yes/no) decision and for the intensity of use. The dynamic
hurdle model leads to a substantially higher loglikelihood value relative to the fixed hurdle
model (-12,690.4 as compared to -13,252.4).
Recall that λ0 is the hazard rate for the time to a first visit. The probability of no visit is
then equal to the survivor rate exp(−λ0). Harzard rate and survivor rate are inversely related,
i.e., factors increasing the hazard rate lower the probability of no visit, and vice versa. With
the exponential parameterization, the displayed coefficients provide the predicted approximate
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relative change in the hazard rate associated with a unit change in the associated regressor.
The exact relative change is obtained by applying the transformation exp(βˆj)−1. For instance,
according to the dynamic hurdle model, the hazard rate for a first visit for men is (exp(−0.357)−
1)× 100 = 30 percent below that of women. Their predicted probability of no visit, evaluated
at the mean probability of 0.64, is 10 percentage points above that of women.
— — — Table 2.2 about here — — —
There are some interesting asymmetries between first-visit hazard (λ0) and that of subse-
quent visits (λ1). For instance, income has no effect on the former, but a statistically significant
negative effect on the latter, where a 10 percent increase in income is predicted to reduce the
hazard rate for each further doctor visit by 1.5 percent. Taken at face value, this would
mean that health care is an inferior good. More likely, the negative effect is due to a positive
correlation between income and unobserved health status, capturing fewer visits by healthier
individuals. As expected, individuals with disabilities have higher hazard rates in both states,
and thus a higher predicted number of doctor visits, than individuals without.
The statistically insignificant point estimate of the treatment effect corresponds to a 1.6
percent reduction in the hazard rate for the first visit. The standard error is large, so sizeable
positive or negative effects cannot be ruled out either. This finding is perhaps not too surprising,
keeping in mind that a small change in the cost of a visit combined with a potentially low
elasticity of demand should not have much of an effect. The effect on the stage 1 hazard (were
a narrow interpretation of the model would predict none) is positive and relatively large, but
again, the standard error is large and the coefficient is statistically insignificant as well.
2.3.2 Adding unobserved heterogeneity
All models can be extended to allow for unobserved heterogeneity, for instance by adding a
multiplicative random effect to the exponential rates:
λ˜ij = exp(x
′
iβj)ui
Here, ui captures individual level differences in the demand for doctor visits, for example due
to differences in latent health. In the context of our dynamic hurdle model, it seems reasonable
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to assume that the two rates for the first and for subsequent visits are multiplied by the
same factor. Moreover, we will assume that the heterogeneity term is the same for repeated
observations on the same individual, and thus λ˜it,j = exp(x
′
itβj)ui.
The models discussed in Section 2 now hold conditional on ui. To take the models to the
data, the ui term has to be eliminated from the likelihood function by taking expectations.
Specifically, suppose that ln ui is normally distributed, independently of xi, with mean −0.5σ2
and variance σ2. Then ui is lognormal with E(ui) = 1 and Var(ui) = exp(σ
2) − 1. The
marginal likelihood has no closed-form solution, but it can be numerically approximated using
Gauss-Hermite quadrature.
The lower part of Table 2.2 provides estimation results for the three models with log-normal
unobserved heterogeneity. In the case of the fixed hurdle model, heterogeneity is introduced
only for the conditional-on-positives part, and the λ0 estimates are thus identical to those in
Table 2.2. Clearly, the improvements over the models without unobserved heterogeneity are
large and statistically significant across the board. Unobserved heterogeneity changes the log-
likelihood ordering of the three models, the fixed hurdle model having the highest log-likelihood
in this case.
Point estimates for the important predictors of health care utilization, i.e., unemployment,
disability and gender, are rather stable, regardless of whether unobserved heterogeneity is
allowed for or not. The estimates for the reform effect remain statistically insignificant. Note
that our specification imposes that the introduction and the abolition of the co-payment have
the same effect size (and opposite sign), an assumption, that may be too restrictive. By 2012,
many insured, in particular younger ones, had switched to new types of SHI contracts that
offered co-payment waivers in return for joining a primary care model. We therefore estimated
all models using the introduction sample only (2003 and 2005, results are available on request)
but all substantive conclusions remain unchanged.
2.3.3 Full sample results
We also estimated the adjusted dynamic hurdle model, as discussed in Section 2.2.5, for the
entire sample, in this case based on 32,888 observations. Otherwise, the specification remained
unchanged. Results shown here are for the specification without unobserved heterogeneity. For
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the first visit, or stage 0, we obtained the log of the predicted hazard (with standard errors in
parentheses):
ln λˆit,0 = 0.037
(.045)
COPAYit + 0.598
(.029)
Disabilityit − 0.353
(.017)
Malei + other terms
The standard errors decrease roughly with the root of the sample size, compared the results
presented in Table 2.2, and there is the expected efficiency gain from using the larger sample.
The point estimates are in line with previous results. Again, no statistically significant reform
effect is found.
For the stage 1 hazard, we get
ln λˆit,1 = −0.041
(.081)
COPAYit + 0.537
(.040)
Disabilityit − 0.068
(.029)
Malei + other terms
The finding of a large and about evenly distributed disability effect remains robust, as does the
pattern that men have a substantially lower stage 0 hazard than women, whereas their stage 1
hazard does not differ much.
2.4 Concluding remarks
This paper introduced a new econometric model of health care demand under non-linear pricing,
based on a Poisson process for the arrival of sickness events. In the model, a co-payment for the
first visit during a calendar quarter potentially lowers the hazard rate for the first visit, leaving
the subsequent hazard for further visits unchanged. The model was applied to an evaluation of
a German health care reform of 2004 when a co-payment of 10 Euros was introduced for those
covered by statutory health insurance. The co-payment was again abolished in 2013. In none
of our various specifications, with or without unobserved heterogeneity and with or without
reporting mismatch, did we find statistically significant effect of the co-payment on the number
of doctor visits.
While the results thus are in line with those of two earlier studies by Augurzky, Bauer and
Schaffner (2006) and Schreyo¨gg and Grabka (2010) who also found no effect of the co-payment
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on utilization, the new methodological approach of this paper offers a number of additional
insights that might prove useful for future research in related contexts. For instance, the
perspective of a stochastic process is useful to understand that any changes to the first hazard
likely also affects the distribution of additional visits, simply because it changes the time left
in the quarter to accumulate such visits.
Second, the approach also points towards a theory consistent way to derive the likelihood
of mismatched observations, i.e., observations for which reporting period and calendar quarter
do not coincide. Such an approach avoids a loss of information incurred by limiting the sample
to people interviewed at the end of a calendar quarter, and thus increases power. Of course,
such data problems could also be addressed by using data from insurance claims rather than
survey data. However, such claim data have their own problems. First, they usually include
only a very limited set of socio-economic control variables, precluding certain types of analyses.
Furthermore, they often do not allow for a DiD analysis, as it is unlikely that a useful control
group can be established in a given claims dataset.
The models discussed in this paper should be useful in a number of other applications
as well. For instance, in order to reduce absenteeism, firms have started to offer bonuses to
workers with zero sick leave days per year. Depending on how the details of such schemes are
designed, they may imply that the first absence is rather costly (the loss of the bonus) whereas
subsequent absences have much lower cost. Similar non-linear pricing schemes can be observed
for re-offenses in the context of fare dodging, were fines usually increase after the first offense.
Moreover, this paper contributes to the literature on zero-inflated count data that are often
encountered in health economic applications, adding a new, alternative model to the existing
toolkit.
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Figure 2.1: Mismatch between reporting period and calendar quarter
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics by insurance status for restricted and full sample (Means,
cluster robust standard errors in parentheses)
Restricted Sample Full Sample
PHI SHI PHI SHI
Co-payment (yes/no) 0 0.580 0 0.577
(0.006) (0.002)
Distance to nearest end-of-quarter 4.642 5.254 23.721 23.811
(0.115) (0.043) (0.224) (0.079)
Age 44.281 40.899 43.890 41.004
(0.418) (0.162) (0.226) (0.090)
Male (yes/no) 0.597 0.452 0.614 0.447
(0.021) (0.008) (0.012) (0.004)
Years of schooling 14.096 12.032 14.148 11.969
(0.124) (0.038) (0.071) (0.022)
Disability (yes/no) 0.045 0.069 0.043 0.074
(0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Log net household income 10.954 10.490 10.962 10.466
(0.025) (0.009) (0.014) (0.005)
N 727 5,509 3,725 29,163
Years with co-payment (2005,2011)
Number of doctor visits 1.830 2.048 1.902 2.072
(0.135) (0.051) (0.067) (0.024)
Any visit (yes/no) 0.607 0.643 0.603 0.652
(0.025) (0.009) (0.011) (0.004)
N 417 3,197 2,096 16,833
Years without co-payment (2003,2013)
Number of doctor visits 2.216 2.039 1.988 2.123
(0.197) (0.061) (0.076) (0.028)
Any visit (yes/no) 0.619 0.638 0.622 0.649
(0.027) (0.010) (0.012) (0.004)
N 310 2,312 1,629 12,330
Note: PHI: private health insurance; SHI: social health insurance.
Source: Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), version 30, doi:10.5684/soep.v30
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Table 2.2: Poisson and hurdle models of health care utilization, restricted sample (N=6,236)
Poisson Fixed Hurdle Dynamic Hurdle
λ λ0 λ1 λ0 λ1
Panel A: without unobserved heterogeneity
SHI -0.196 0.007 -0.234 0.079 -0.447
(0.094) (0.082) (0.093) (0.076) (0.169)
Co-payment (yes/no) 0.158 0.041 0.150 -0.016 0.297
(0.119) (0.104) (0.123) (0.098) (0.209)
Unemployment (yes/no) 0.329 -0.014 0.369 -0.079 0.567
(0.080) (0.078) (0.076) (0.068) (0.122)
Disability (yes/no) 0.823 0.817 0.535 0.654 0.563
(0.055) (0.075) (0.054) (0.060) (0.086)
Male (yes/no) -0.330 -0.380 -0.146 -0.357 -0.105
(0.038) (0.036) (0.039) (0.033) (0.061)
Log net household income -0.105 -0.053 -0.091 -0.025 -0.145
(0.032) (0.030) (0.033) (0.028) (0.054)
Log likelihood -14,781.7 -13,252.4 -12,690.4
Panel B: with unobserved heterogeneity
SHI -0.263 0.007 -0.241 0.104 -0.363
(0.105) (0.082) (0.095) (0.103) (0.155)
Co-payment (yes/no) 0.275 0.041 0.175 -0.016 0.244
(0.134) (0.104) (0.138) (0.131) (0.191)
Unemployment (yes/no) 0.288 -0.014 0.271 -0.119 0.542
(0.093) (0.078) (0.095) (0.093) (0.117)
Disability (yes/no) 0.772 0.817 0.613 0.794 0.584
(0.069) (0.075) (0.089) (0.080) (0.079)
Male (yes/no) -0.335 -0.380 -0.185 -0.421 -0.150
(0.038) (0.036) (0.045) (0.044) (0.056)
Log net household income -0.090 -0.053 -0.106 -0.043 -0.111
(0.032) (0.030) (0.032) (0.037) (0.049)
ln(σ) -0.002 -0.296 -0.517
(0.020) (0.024) (0.023)
Log likelihood -11,976.5 -11,781.3 -11,833.6
Note: Dependent variable: Number of doctor visits. All models include three year dummies, a
constant, a quadratic in age and level of schooling. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered
at the individual level. PHI: private health insurance; SHI: social health insurance.
Source: Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), version 30, doi:10.5684/soep.v30
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Chapter 3
Analyzing educational achievement differences between
second-generation immigrants: Comparing Germany and
German-speaking Switzerland
A version of this chapter is published as: Kunz, Johannes S. 2016. “Analyzing Educational
Achievement Differences between Second-Generation Immigrants: Comparing Germany and
German-Speaking Switzerland.” German Economic Review 17(1): 61-91.1
In this study, I provide evidence that the educational achievement of second-generation
immigrants in German-speaking Switzerland is greater than in Germany. The impact of the
first-generation immigrants’ destination decision on their offspring’s educational achievement
seems to be much more important than has been recognized by the existing literature. I identify
the test score gap between these students that cannot be explained by differences in individual
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3.1 Introduction
This study contributes to a growing body of literature evaluating the educational performance
of children born to first-generation immigrants in Western European countries (inter alia, Algan
et al., 2010; Belzil and Poinas, 2010; Dustmann, Frattini and Lanzara, 2012; Heath, Rothon
and Kilpi, 2008; Lu¨demann and Schwerdt, 2012; Schneeweis, 2011; Song, 2011). The litera-
ture has documented severe disadvantages faced by second-generation immigrants in terms of
educational achievement, wage income, and unemployment probabilities relative to their host
countries’ native peers. In addition to these relative assessments, I will argue that absolute
achievement and learning processes of second-generation immigrants need to receive greater
attention. Focusing on second-generation immigrant students alone helps to answer the ques-
tion of what the parental sorting decision implies for the educational opportunities of their
children. Likewise, it indicates the effectiveness of the host countries’ educational institutions
in accommodating the needs of immigrants’ children. Understanding their absolute learning
process can help policy makers to turn their immigrant populations into a productive strength
in society.
The economics of education literature has concentrated on integration by assessing within-
country educational differences between children of natives and first-generation immigrants.
These relative within-country differences are then compared across countries. Conditioning on
individual and family background, native-immigrant achievement gaps are reduced significantly
but remain at high levels in most Western European countries. However, this approach cannot
reveal the relevant parameters of the immigrant children’s learning process due to the following
reasons: First, imagine a family deciding upon a destination country, the relevant counter-
factual is what would be the educational achievement of their offspring had they decided for
another country, not had they been native parents in the chosen destination. Second, from the
reduction in native-immigrant achievement differences alone it cannot be concluded that the
performance of these immigrants’ children is satisfactory. Instead the reduction of the perfor-
mance gap might be entirely due to conditional changes in performance of natives’ children.
Moreover, when conditioning on the educational background of the parent population, these
educational backgrounds have to be comparable across heterogeneous home countries to be
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meaningful. It is possible, if not probable, that having received secondary education in Turkey
captures a different proficiency level than having completed the same education in Germany.
Additionally, the covariate cells for native students with parents that have no primary education
are empty or nearly empty in most developed countries. The variable language spoken at home
– which has recently gained prominence in native-immigrant comparisons – is most problem-
atic in this regard; we do not know to whom we compare the immigrants’ children, and what
these conditional differences tell us. Third, little is known about which educational institutions
support the absolute performance of second-generation immigrants in Western European coun-
tries. Assessing language acquisition using a non-integration based approach seems to be most
fruitful, since this learning process differs between immigrants’ and natives’ children.
Using the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 2009 survey, I compare
second-generation immigrant students’ reading test scores directly across countries. Large scale
and internationally comparable performance tests like PISA facilitate comparisons of students’
educational achievement across countries. A drawback of these large-scale student evaluations
in assessing second-generation immigrants is missing information on pre-migration characteris-
tics of the parent generation, such as the reason for or the time of migration. Self-selection and
self-sorting of migrants to host countries create heterogeneous immigrant populations across
countries. To account for this selectivity without observing pre-migration characteristics, I fo-
cus on Germany and the German-speaking part of Switzerland. Comparing these two regions
has several advantages in dealing with potential self-selection and self-sorting of first-generation
immigrants: First, both countries are high immigration countries that have experienced a sim-
ilar migration history, resulting in relatively homogeneous immigrant populations (Castles,
1986), which allows for an assessment of the country of origin. This is important when the
human capital of the parents differs by their country of origin. Second, because they are in
a similar language area, the results will be confounded neither by language differences nor by
self-selection of immigrants into a certain language environment. Third, comparing countries
with the same test language allows for a meaningful assessment of differences in reading liter-
acy. Being a measure of language acquisition, it is highly relevant for the immigrants’ children
assimilation and learning processes.
The key contribution of this study is the comparison of reading literacy between immigrants’
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children in Germany and German-speaking Switzerland. First, I show that second-generation
immigrant-native gaps diminish in both countries when conditioning on parental background
characteristics, as commonly found in previous studies. Next, I decompose the achievement
difference between second-generation immigrant students in Germany and German-speaking
Switzerland into a component attributable to differences in background characteristics and a
component that cannot be explained by those characteristics.2 The decomposition into ex-
plained and unexplained components is performed parametrically and semi-parametrically to
allow for non-linear impacts of the background characteristics and failures in the out-of-support
validity. Then, I show how the unexplained gap evolves over the test score distribution, and pro-
vide evidence separately for unfavorably endowed children of immigrants, Turkish descendants
the largest overlapping immigrant population, and native students for reasons of comparabil-
ity. Finally, I present how the gap varies with school characteristics that might support the
immigrants’ children learning process.
The results suggest that the performance of immigrants’ children in Switzerland is substan-
tially higher than in Germany. This disparity is largest for very low-performing and unfavorably
endowed second-generation immigrants. Differences reduce but prevail when conditioning on
the parents’ country of origin and when restricting attention to Turkish descendants. By con-
trast, the improvement in educational achievement does not extend to children of native-born
parents, as they score almost as well in Germany as in German-speaking Switzerland. Among
several school characteristics one that seems to explain a large part of the disparity between
immigrants’ children is the average test score performance of pupils in school.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows: In the next section, I discuss the literature,
historical patterns of migration into Germany and Switzerland, and their educational systems;
Section 3.3 describes the PISA 2009 dataset, covariates used, and the econometric procedure;
Section 3.4 presents the results and a suggestive discussion on possible reasons for the difference
in educational achievement; and Section 3.5 concludes.3
2Due to the missing information on pre-migration characteristics, the resulting differences are interpreted as
decompositions rather than causal effects. Another reason for the decomposition interpretation is that there is
no obvious manipulable policy action, as discussed by Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo (2011).
3There are three appendices in the Supplementary Material: Appendix C.1 replicates the analysis using
math literacy as the outcome variable; Appendix C.2 presents robustness checks for all language areas of
Switzerland, all immigrants in both countries, sampling weights, different matching estimators, plausible values,
and different imputation procedures; and Appendix C.3 presents information about the sample selection, missing
values/imputation, common support, and covariate balance before and after matching.
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3.2 Literature, migration history, and school systems
First, I highlight the present article’s approach in comparison to those pursued in the literature.
Subsequently, I briefly summarize the migration policies and histories of the two countries to
motivate the sample of comparison, and discuss their educational systems.
3.2.1 Previous literature
The economic literature on educational achievement of second-generation immigrants in West-
ern Europe – based on internationally comparable performance tests – focuses predominantly
on integration. In these studies, integration is taken to be the difference in test score perfor-
mances of immigrants’ children and their host countries’ native peers; cross-country studies
then compare these national gaps across countries. The most detailed study has been per-
formed by Dustmann, Frattini and Lanzara (2012). In their study, the PISA 2006 survey is
used to analyze test score disparities between second-generation immigrant and native students
across a large number of countries. They find that within-country gaps reduce substantially
when taking into account the intergenerational correlation, as proxied by parental education
levels. For Germany and Switzerland, their analysis reveals that even after conditioning on the
children’s family background, the gap in Germany is double the size of the gap in Switzerland.
In this study, I compare these second-generation immigrant students directly, instead of
comparing their within-country immigrant-native test score gaps. This comparison has two
advantages: First, within-country immigrant-native comparisons are problematic, since it is
not clear whether differences originate from differential performance among the children of na-
tives, immigrants, or both. Moreover, comparing the educational achievement of natives to
that of second-generation immigrants, even when conditioning on parental education, might be
misleading. For example, if receiving primary education in Turkey is different – in terms of
knowledge acquisition – from primary education in Germany or Switzerland and if the intergen-
erational correlation in education operates through knowledge transmission, then conditioning
on parental education will not reveal the effect of the destination country’s school system upon
immigrant children. Additionally, some covariate cells are empty and out-of-support validity is
at least dubious. For example, in industrialized countries the category no primary education
83
for native parents is almost empty as a result of compulsory schooling laws. A related problem
arises when conditioning on the language spoken at home, a procedure that traditionally reduces
the second-generation immigrant-native gap significantly. By this conditioning it is not clear
to whom we compare these immigrant students, or what the conditional correlations tell us.
Second, related but different is the question whether educational researchers and policy
makers shall concentrate on relative or absolute performance. In other words, how to weight
the educational equity-efficiency trade-off when focusing on immigrants’ children. Here, I do
not aim to take a general stand on this subject. Generally, each comparison is interesting in its
own right. Comparisons to natives’ children can, for example, answer questions about discrim-
ination, which the literature has documented in some detail. On the other hand, comparing
immigrants with immigrants (in different countries) can identify which institutions support the
immigrant students’ learning process, in particular, when their learning process is different from
the one of natives’ children as in (second-)language acquisition. Complementing the literature
by this non-integration based measure is the central motivation of this study.
So far, little is known about which educational institutions promote the second-generation
immigrants’ learning process, in an absolute sense, irrespective of their native peers. A notable
exception is Levels, Dronkers and Kraaykamp (2008), who compare second-generation immi-
grants’ performance directly. By pooling destination countries, their study precludes a detailed
comparison across individual countries. Schnepf (2008) studies countries separately by compar-
ing educational inequalities using the dispersion between the 5th and the 95th percentile of the
test score distribution within countries. She finds that both Switzerland and Germany have a
10-20% larger dispersion within the performance of second-generation immigrants than within
natives. Schnepf (2008) argues that liberal migration policies in Western Europe created het-
erogeneous populations of first-generation immigrants within countries, which led to substantial
inequality among their children through intergenerational transmission. Her study highlights
the importance of accounting for the heterogeneity among immigrants’ children within countries
by looking at the distribution of test scores.
This study also fits into a developing branch of the literature that introduces new reference
groups in order to assess selectivity or origin effects. Dronkers and Heus (2010) investigate
negative selection of immigrants by studying their difference from non-emigrant peers. Dust-
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mann, Frattini and Lanzara (2012, 170) address “the opportunities or disadvantages migration
implies for the children of immigrants” by comparing children of Turkish immigrants to their
peers who have not emigrated, and thus were born and raised in Turkey. Country of origin
effects are assessed within a single destination country (e.g., Luthra, 2010; Ours and Veenman,
2003) or a single country of origin in different destination countries, again relative to the host
countries’ native peers (e.g. Song, 2011). My study adds to this new branch of the literature
by including those whose parents have emigrated to different destination countries. This is an
important reference group, because it reveals the consequences implied by the parental sorting
decision. Moreover, this study includes a larger number of countries as sources of immigration,
as well as a cross-country dimension.
3.2.2 Migration history
When comparing second-generation immigrant students across countries it is essential to find
suitable comparison groups. Unfortunately, internationally comparable student assessments do
not contain information on pre-migration characteristics of the foreign-born parents and across
countries it is hard to find overlapping immigrant populations, especially when considering
the country of origin. Therefore, I compare Germany and German-speaking Switzerland as
they attracted very similar immigrant populations due to their migration policy regimes and
language environments. In the following, I briefly summarize the relevant migration histories
until 1994 when the second-generation immigrants are born (within the countries of testing).4
After the Second World War, war losses and post-war reconstruction lead to a substantial
under-supply of un- and semi-skilled labor in Western Europe. The employment-to-population
ratio was further diminished by low birth rates, extended compulsory education, and increas-
ing life expectancies. Industrial expansion and new methods of mass production created an
extensive demand for labor migration into Western Europe (Castles, 1986).
In 1948, Switzerland established large-scale imports of labor based on bilateral agreements
with Italy, followed by Germany in 1955 (Liebig, 2004). According to Hansen (2003), recruit-
ment in Southern Europe was due to the expectation of a smoother assimilation into the labor
market compared to more distant areas or ethnicities. Both countries then started to recruit
4This section summarizes the overview of Castles (1986) and draws from Schmid (1983), Liebig (2004), and
Zimmermann (1995).
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in Spain and Greece – in reaction to increasing competition for cheap labor and exhaustion of
Southern European labor resources – they turned to Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia, and
Yugoslavia.
In Switzerland, employers recruited for themselves, but admission and organization was
centralized by the Swiss government. The German government created a state recruitment
administration, controlled by the Federal Labor Office. Employers had to apply for foreign
labor and the Federal Labor Office set up recruitment offices in Mediterranean countries to
select suitable workers. Complex legal and administrative frameworks were put in place to
regulate and control foreign labor, aiming to prevent settlement by maintaining rapid turnover,
a common feature of all European guest-worker programs (Castles, 1986).
By the sixties, international competition and employers’ requests for a more stable workforce
induced the governments of Switzerland and Germany to liberalize foreign labor policies. This
initiated the phase of family migration, which allowed workers to reunify with their families.
In 1963, Switzerland introduced a ceiling on the stock of foreigners per firm, which was rather
unrestrictive and therefore replaced by global quotas in 1970 (Liebig, 2004, 164). These quotas
set an upper limit to newly entering labor migrants into the country. In the wake of the oil
crisis in 1973, the guest-worker systems came to a halt in all European countries.
In the 1980s, the ban of recruitment left family migration and later the asylum migration
as the only channels to legally enter the German or Swiss labor markets. Conversely to the
expected return migration, only a few of the former guest-workers returned to their home
countries.5 Most had settled and could not be expelled. Asylum migration became substantial
after 1989. First, the fall of the Iron Curtain led to large inflows of Eastern Europeans. Second,
the Balkan war pushed many Yugoslavian refugees and asylum-seekers into Western Europe
(Hansen, 2003; Algan et al., 2010).
In 1991 both countries reorganized their labor migration. In Germany, nationals of countries
that were not part of the European Economic Community or some other exceptions were only
allowed to fill vacancies in sectors with unmet labor demand. The Swiss government introduced
the Three-Circles-Model. The first cycle granted preferential status for nationals from the
European Economic Area, in the second cycle immigrants from the United States, Canada,
5In 1983, Germany offered financial incentives for voluntary repatriation, but only a few immigrants re-
sponded to the policy.
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Australia, and New Zealand could be recruited if demand could not be met within the first
cycle, and the third cycle included nationals from all other countries who could only be recruited
on a subsidiary basis (Liebig, 2004).
Overall, these patterns of migration were similar in both countries and resulted in homoge-
nous immigrant populations (at least relative to other country pairs).6 Nevertheless, despite the
similarities, there are some notable differences in the immigrant populations of Germany and
German-speaking Switzerland: First, the reintegration of ethnic Germans – called Aussiedler
– from Poland and the Former Soviet Union is only observed in Germany. Second, Western
European (from Germany, France, or Lichtenstein) and Albanian immigrants are only observed
in Switzerland. These groups could possibly have had other reasons to migrate than guest-
workers and their relatives. Hence, I exclude these three categories as they have no equivalent
in the other country.7 Students descending from other countries overlap. Although there are
more immigrants descending from former Yugoslavia in Switzerland than in Germany, and
the reverse pattern for immigrants from Turkey, their compositions will be balanced by the
estimation procedure explained below.
Restricting the comparison countries to the same language area accounts for several selection
aspects, such as language preferences. Yet, it is important to keep in mind, that the every-day
spoken language in German-speaking Switzerland is Swiss German (a variety of dialects) which
is not fully equivalent to Standard German. Nevertheless, in school children learn the written
language Swiss Standard German, which is similar in most respects to Standard German. This
should favor the children of immigrants in Germany, since they are exposed to Standard German
not only in school but also in every-day spoken language.
3.2.3 Educational systems
In both counties, the educational systems are decentrally governed and organized by federal
states: 16 “Bundesla¨nder” in Germany and 26 “Kantone” in Switzerland. PISA assesses 15-year
olds, hence participants of the 2009 wave were born between 1993 and 1994 in the respective
6In the literature, it is common to contrast the German or Swiss experience with countries that have very
different immigration policies such as traditional countries of migration like Canada or Australia (Entorf and
Minoiu, 2005) or the United Kingdom and France (Algan et al., 2010).
7The sample proportions before and after exclusion can be found in Appendix C.3. I present the main results
including these three groups of immigrants in Appendix C.2, Table C.2.2; the effects are similar to the preferred
specification.
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country of testing. In this section, I briefly summarize the main features of the educational
systems within this time period. Table 3.1 presents some key indicators of the school systems
based on the sample of immigrant students used throughout the study (and explained in Section
3.3.1).
— — — Table 3.1 about here — — —
Within the children’s first three years of life parents had optional access to early childhood
care in both countries. From age three to six, children can visit a type of preschool called
Kindergarten. In the PISA 2009 survey 92.38% of the immigrants’ children in Germany and
98.77% in German-speaking Switzerland report that they have attended at least one year of
Kindergarten. In Table 1, the average time spent in preschool is slightly longer in Switzerland.
Despite the focus on second-language acquisition due to the different dialects in Switzerland,
there were no country-wide institutional arrangements on how to support non-German-speaking
children of immigrants. Every Kanton developed its own institutions of which most offered
courses in German as a second-language already in Kindergarten (EDK, 2002). Similarly, there
was no unified approach to support immigrants’ children in Germany. Governed by the federal
states, attention was paid on the testing of German language skills before entering primary
school. Children identified with poor language skills were offered courses in German as a
second language (KB, 2006).
In both countries, compulsory primary education starts with the sixth birthday with cut-off
dates ranging from 30th of June to 30th of September in Germany and, with rare exceptions,
form 30th April to 30th June in Switzerland. Hence, the effective range of school entrance ages
lies between late five years and early seven years of age. In the sample, the average age at
school entry is 6.40 in Germany and 6.69 in German-speaking Switzerland.
Tracking is generally organized similar and takes place early on in the children’s school
career. In Germany, tracking occurs after 4 years of school (with the exceptions of Berlin
and Brandenburg that track in sixth grade). Generally in Switzerland tracking takes place
later, after 5 to 6 years (and rare exceptions in fourth grade). In both countries, tracking is
mainly based on teacher recommendations and grades in primary school. In both countries,
there is some evidence for discrimination between immigrants’ and natives’ children at the
transition from primary to secondary school (see Lu¨demann and Schwerdt (2012) for Germany
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and Ha¨berlin, Imdorf and Kronig (2004) for Switzerland).
At the time of testing, when the children are at the age of 15 (or early 16), the majority of
second-generation immigrant children is attending grade nine (56.47% in Germany and 66.87%
in Switzerland). The average grade level of 15-year olds is 8.97 in Germany, and 8.80 in
German-speaking Switzerland. Both countries have fairly high rates of grade repetition. The
probability of repeating one or more grades is 34% in Germany and 30% in German-speaking
Switzerland (where the probability for repeating more than one grade is small, approximately
4% in Germany and 1% in Switzerland).
In the discussion of the results below, I address some aspects of the school systems that
might cause differential performance of immigrants’ children in the two countries. In particular,
I consider the amount of German lessons (per week), as well as the overall amount of lessons (per
week), the proportion of second-generation immigrants in school, and the average performance
among fellow immigrants’ and natives’ children in school.
It is important to note that there might be other explanations instead of the educational
systems that might cause a disparity in performance between the two countries, such as atti-
tudes towards immigrants or integration efforts in general. Yet, Mayda (2006) suggests that
attitudes towards immigrants are similar and Liebig (2004) argues for parallels in integration
efforts. Still, children of immigrants may perceive their inclusion into the host society differ-
ently and expect for example greater returns to education in Switzerland than in Germany.
This might create incentives to invest in education and knowledge acquisition that in turn
result in higher test scores. Another explanation could be that the Swiss educational system
simply better fits the test. Yet, PISA evaluates “skills for life” that capture what is considered
to be necessary knowledge independently of the student’s curricula and that appear to be of
particular importance for students with a migration background who need at the very least
be able to actively participate in their host societies. In addition, it could be that intrinsic
motivation to perform well on a test is different between the two groups (e.g., Segal, 2012).
However, this too can be considered as an important skill that is relevant for later performance
in life. If it is also resulting from the new environment it could be argued that it should be
part of the achievement difference.
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3.3 Data, estimation strategy, and interpretation
In this section, I present the PISA 2009 survey, the sample selection process, and the background
characteristics. Subsequently, I describe the parametric decomposition developed by Blinder
(1973) - Oaxaca (1973) [henceforth BO] and the semi-parametric propensity score matching
decomposition.
3.3.1 Data
A comprehensive summary of the PISA dataset is given in OECD (2009); here, I briefly summa-
rize the features relevant for my analysis. PISA is an internationally standardized achievement
test with mean (of 500) and standard deviation (of 100), facilitating an interpretation in terms
of percentage points of the international standard deviation. The target population is 15-year
olds enrolled in school. PISA evaluates the students’ “knowledge and skills for life” in three
categories: Reading, math, and science literacy. I concentrate the discussion on reading liter-
acy results, since I believe that reading literacy and language acquisition are integral parts of
the immigrants’ assimilation and learning processes.8 Due to difference in every-day spoken
language – German compared to Swiss German – the results might differ depending on the
competences considered. I therefore included the results based on math literacy test scores in
Appendix A of the Supplementary Material. The results are qualitatively the same, though the
differences are larger in magnitude and of greater statistical significance.
Similar to Dustmann, Frattini and Lanzara (2012), I define second-generation immigrants as
being born in the country of testing while having both parents born in a foreign country. This
definition excludes children with one foreign and one native-born parent, as they are found to be
statistically different from children that have both parents born in a foreign country (Ohinata
and van Ours, 2012).
Ammermu¨ller, Heijke and Wo¨ßmann (2005) note that missing information on students’
background characteristics mainly stem from low-performing students, and is thus not missing
at random but shall be imputed. Accordingly, I perform median imputations on the school level
(including native students in school) of the variables mother and father education, the highest
8Moreover, reading literacy was the central focus of the PISA 2009 survey with most testing time allocated.
In each wave, the central focus of PISA changes. It was science literacy in 2006 and math literacy in 2003.
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occupation status, and number of books at home.9 One observation with missing information
on gender has been dropped. If the language spoken at home is missing, I coded it as being
different than the national testing language. As discussed above, I dropped the children of
immigrants whose parents both originated from Western Europe, Aussiedler -countries or Alba-
nia.10 Children with a mixed foreign background – with both parents born in a foreign country
but from different areas – are included in the another origin category. Since the children of
immigrants form a selective subpopulation of the overall student population in both countries,
sampling weights are not likely to recover the target population of interest. The sampling de-
sign is the same in both countries, hence selection is unlikely to be correlated with the country
indicator. For that reason, I refrain from using sampling and replication weights in the main
analysis.11
This selection generates a sample size of 1,180 second-generation immigrant students: 824
in Switzerland and 356 in Germany.12 In Table 3.2, the descriptive statistics of the background
characteristics are presented.
— — — Table 3.2 about here — — —
In the top row, the average reading literacy test scores exhibit already a substantial dif-
ference between the countries. The reading literacy is a standardized test measuring reading
comprehension. PISA provides five plausible values, of which I take the average.13 Overall, the
characteristics seem to be relatively similar in both countries.
9In Appendix C.1, Table C.3.1 and C.3.2 show that the missing values are positively correlated with each
other and negatively with the test scores and that dropping these will change the outcome considerably. The
total number of observations with at least one imputed value is 473. The number of imputations/missings due
to the covariates can be found in Table C.3.3. In order to show that my results are not driven by the imputation
mechanism, I present in Appendix C.2 Table C.2.7 a median imputations based on country level and in B.8 a
regression based imputation that takes into account the covariance structure of the imputed covariates. The
results are very similar. For the school characteristics presented in Table 3.1, I first impute the values only on
immigrant students in school (to account for example for extra German lessons), and if these are not sufficient
I impute them including natives.
10There is more information about the sample selection in Appendix C.1 Table C.3.4. The results including
these groups of immigrants’ children can be found in Appendix C.2 Table C.2.2.
11The main specification using sampling weights is presented in Appendix C.2 Table C.2.3. Using replication
weights instead of bootstrapping seems to result in smaller standard errors (results not reported).
12Hereafter, the Swiss second-generation immigrant population always refers to those in the German-speaking
part. As a sensitivity check, I estimate the decompositions including the French- and the Italian-speaking parts
which exhibit a similar pattern (cf. Appendix C.2, Table C.2.1). The Swiss sample includes the PISA extension
survey for cantonal representativeness and has therefore a larger number of observations.
13In Appendix C.2 Table C.2.6, I present the main results using only one plausible value as recommended by
the PISA manual, results are almost indistinguishable.
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There are some differences in the educational levels of the parent generation as measured
by the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED), which is assessed by four
dummy variables the first capturing no formal education, the second primary up to lower sec-
ondary, the third measures upper secondary/non-tertiary, and the fourth theoretically oriented
tertiary education. In Switzerland there is a smaller share of uneducated parents and a larger
share of parents who have only completed primary or lower secondary education. Conversely,
in Germany a larger share of the parent generation obtained an upper secondary degree, and
the proportion completed a tertiary education is smaller than in Switzerland.
On the other hand, the highest occupational status measured by the Highest Socio-Economic
Index of Occupational Status (HISEI) – that ranks occupations by the returns to education
and takes the highest one among the parents – is almost identical in both countries.14 There is
a considerably larger number of immigrant families that speak a language other than German
at home in Switzerland (81%) than in Germany (67%). In conventional immigrant-native com-
parisons these students are necessarily out-of-support. Finally, as discussed above, in the Swiss
sample more children of Southern European immigrants (mainly Italians), less Turkish, and
more former Yugoslavians are represented. As previous studies indicated, there is correlation in
the test score performance of immigrants’ children and their descent (e.g., Dustmann, Frattini
and Lanzara, 2012; Dronkers and Heus, 2010; Song, 2011). Despite of the disparity between the
proportions, the overlap of types of immigrants in Switzerland and Germany is much greater
compared to other country pairs that have been contrasted in the literature. This enables me
to control for the country of origin in greater detail than previous studies.
3.3.2 Estimation strategy
The goal of this paper is to compare the average reading test scores of immigrants’ children in
Switzerland Y¯CHE and Germany Y¯DEU
∆ = Y¯CHE − Y¯DEU (3.1)
and to decompose this average test score gap ∆, into a part that can be associated with the
covariates described above and the remaining part that is not attributable to these background
14For more information on this index, see Ganzeboom, De Graaf and Treiman (1992).
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characteristics. The latter can capture, for example, greater integration into the host society,
or more inclusive school institutions.15 These two effects are decomposed by simulating the
mean and the distribution of individual and family backgrounds of the students in Switzerland
(Germany) within the distribution of students’ background characteristics in Germany (Switzer-
land). In other words, reweighing the student population in the one country to reproduce the
covariate-distribution of the other.
In the parametric BO decomposition, the covariate-adjusted mean is estimated by perform-
ing separate linear regressions of test scores on characteristics for both groups and combining the
estimated coefficients of one regression with the covariate vector of the other regression (Blin-
der, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973). Adding and subtracting this estimated covariate-adjusted mean,
Equation (3.1) can be written as
∆ = βˆCHE(X¯CHE − X¯DEU)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆X
+ (βˆCHE − βˆDEU)X¯DEU︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆S
, (3.2)
or equivalently in the reverse decomposition
∆ = (βˆCHE − βˆDEU)X¯CHE︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆S
+ βˆDEU(X¯CHE − X¯DEU)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆X
, , (3.3)
where ∆X refers to the difference due to characteristics, and the main interest lies in ∆S
which presents the difference not explained by characteristics, called the structure effect.16 The
covariate vector X includes different sets of explanatory variables: I use Other covariates as a
baseline specification which includes gender, age in months, educational level of parents (four
dummies each), highest occupation of the parents, and number of books at home (six dummies).
Additionally, I control for German spoken at home (one dummy variable) and the country of
origin (four dummies), separately and jointly.
Matching generalizes the BO decomposition such that it does not rely on assumptions
regarding functional form or out-of-support validity (N˜opo, 2008). It accounts for the possibility
that the background characteristics have non-linear impacts, and that conditioning on several
covariates might create subcategories that have no equivalent in the other country. Moreover,
15A similar cross-country decomposition strategy was taken by Ammermu¨ller (2007). He decomposes the
PISA test score gap between Germany and Finland, although, not specific to immigrants’ children.
16For a comprehensive treatment of decomposition methods see Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo (2011).
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matching decomposition can be performed on the propensity score without imposing additional
assumptions (Fro¨lich, 2007).
The matching estimator replacing, for example, βˆCHEX¯DEU is the kernel-weighted average
over the test score distribution of second-generation immigrants in Switzerland:
1
NDEU
∑
i∈IDEU
∑
j∈ICHE
w(i, j)Yj,CHE
where w(i, j) are the kernel weights that weigh observations according to the similarity of
their propensity scores (background characteristics) to those of the other countries’ students.
NDEU (NCHE) is the number of immigrants’ children in Germany (Switzerland), and IDEU
(ICHE) is the set of immigrants’ children in the common support of the other country. Analo-
gous to the parametric procedure, the covariate-adjusted mean is added and subtracted from
Equation (3.1) to write it as a sum of the components ∆X and ∆S (see Fro¨lich, 2007, for a
more comprehensive treatment).
Propensity scores are estimated by logit regressions of a country dummy on the same char-
acteristics as in the parametric decomposition. The supports overlap greatly and imposing
the common support therefore discards only very few observations.17 The kernel weights are
constructed by a Nadaraya-Watson kernel regression with Gaussian kernel and bandwidth held
constant at 0.1 across specifications.18 The quantile gaps are calculated by the horizontal
differences between estimated quantiles of the actual and the covariate-adjusted test score dis-
tributions, constructed by the matching specification. Standard errors are bootstrapped in
all decompositions with 500 replications, and the propensity scores are re-estimated in each
replication.
3.3.3 Interpretation
In principle, any unexplained gap between Germany and Switzerland can be due to differences
between the countries (e.g. school institutions) or due to unobserved differences in the com-
position of the first-generation immigrant populations. Under the assumption that there is no
selection bias conditional on the included background characteristics, the gap represents the
17In Appendix C.1 Figure C.3.1 I present the distribution of propensity scores over the common support.
18I present the main results using Nearest Neighbor matching with 1 and 5 neighbors and bandwidths 0.95
and 0.105 in Appendix C.2: Table C.2.4 and C.2.5. The effects are similar to those in my preferred specification.
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genuine country effect. In consequence, the observed test score performance of the matched
immigrants’ children in one country identifies the counterfactual outcome, i.e. the performance
of the immigrants’ children had their parents migrated to the respective other country. In the
following, I discuss possible threats to the validity of this assumption. The assumption would
be violated, if unobserved variables differ between the countries and correlate with children’s
test score performance.
Despite of the similar migration histories and recruitment efforts, differential self-selection
of migrants between Switzerland and Germany might violate the assumption. For example, it
could be the case that more motivated individuals decided to emigrate to Switzerland (which
might not be accounted for by the included covariates). If their motivation is transmitted to
their children and subsequently translated into higher test scores, then the unexplained part in
the decomposition would comprise this selection bias. Indeed, the parental education appears
to be slightly more favorably distributed among immigrants in Switzerland (cf. Table 3.2).
This could imply a positive bias in the unexplained part in favor of Switzerland. Yet, the
number of books at home – a control variable intended to capture parents’ esteem in education
and academic success (Schu¨tz, Ursprung and Wo¨ßmann, 2008) – and the parents’ occupations
are almost indistinguishable between the two countries. Moreover, there are reasons to belief
that the scope for such a selection bias is limited. First, the guest-worker scheme allowed
migrant workers to temporarily leave their home countries to work and accumulate savings
before they returned to their home countries. Schmid (1983) argues that this was in line with
the intentions of the migrant workers. Yet, they were unable to accumulate sufficient savings
and found themselves trapped in their host countries where they became permanent migrants
(see also Castles, 1986). This unplanned migration pattern probably prevented sophisticated
migration decisions. Second, it seems unlikely that they gathered sufficient information that
enabled them to differentiate in detail between the two countries, given how similar the countries
must have seemed to an outsider. Third, the migration costs must have been very similar to
migrants from the same area, because Germany and Switzerland shared a common language,
geographic location and prospering economic condition.
In addition, the parents might differ by the country they received their education in, which
cannot be ruled out due to missing pre-migration information. For instance, it could be the
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case that the parents that migrated to Germany had acquired some of their education in
Germany while those who migrated to Switzerland migrated after they finished their education
in their home countries. However, I expect that most of these differences are controlled for
by conditioning on the parents’ level of education, occupation, and especially whether they
speak German at home. All of these factors should correlate strongly with the country where
an individual received its education in. Furthermore, as discussed in detail above the similar
migration patterns suggest similar life-cycle stages of the migrants, i.e. guest-workers must
have finished their education before migrating.
Another potential confounder is the return migration. Even when both sending populations
would have been identical, if the migrants that returned to their home countries differed between
the countries then the disparity will entail a selection bias due to return migration. Nevertheless,
as discussed above, the return migration was minor in both countries; conversely to the attempts
of the respective governments (see, inter alia, Castles, 1986; Liebig, 2004).
Finally, it could be the case that the differences in test scores stem from the differences in the
ethnic composition of the immigrant populations (rather than from composition of the country
of origin which is controlled for in the analysis). However, so far little is known about how the
educational performance differs by ethnicity (of the second-generation) or if the composition of
ethnicities differs between the two countries in a significant manner. It seems very promising
to assess potential differences resulting from differences in ethnicity. Unfortunately, large scale
and internationally comparable student assessments do not contain information on ethnicity
which prevents a detailed analysis of ethnicity.
In sum, I focus the comparison on immigrant populations which migrated from similar
areas to similar countries that share the “same” language and migration history. Moreover,
I balance out differences by controlling for important background characteristics such as the
parents’ education level, their occupation, the language they speak at home, and their origin.
Still, it is inherently possible that there is some selection based on unobservables. However,
the analogies between the Swiss and the German migration experiences are rarely observed
across other country pairs and time periods. Keeping these concerns in mind, it is interesting
to answer how much of the test score disparity, observed in Table 3.2, can be explained by
the covariates described above. Moreover, comparing the performance of those immigrants’
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children can shed light on the learning process of immigrants’ children and what the parental
migration decision implied for their children.
3.4 Results
In this section, I provide answers to the question “How would the children of immigrants perform
in Switzerland (Germany) if they had the same distribution of background characteristics as
those in Germany (Switzerland)?” I start by replicating the commonly used within-country
second-generation immigrant-native test score regressions, in order to provide a reference for
my main results.
— — — Table 3.3 about here — — —
Table 3.3 presents separate regressions of reading test scores on an immigrant indicator
and the covariate vectors explained in Section 3.2 for Germany and Switzerland. The results
are comparable to those in Dustmann, Frattini and Lanzara (2012, Table 3.4) for the survey of
2006. In Column 1 Panel A, the unconditional reading test score gap between second-generation
immigrant and native students is -58.32 test score points in Germany and -48.72 in Switzerland
(Panel B). Including individual and family characteristics reduces the gap significantly, as
presented in Column 2. Furthermore, the gap narrows substantially by adding the German
spoken at home indicator, leaving only -7.91 points remaining unexplained in Germany and -6.62
in Switzerland (Column 3). In Columns 4 to 6, I present the same procedure for the subsample
of immigrants exposed to a German-speaking environment and with the exclusion of Aussiedler,
Albanians, and Western European immigrants’ children. The regression coefficients are larger
in Germany, implying that Aussiedler have driven the gap downwards. In Switzerland, the
selected subsample seems to perform slightly worse than the overall sample. As discussed in
detail earlier, it is impossible to draw conclusions regarding which country better supports the
educational achievement of second-generation immigrants from these results alone.
Turning to my main analysis, Figure 3.1 depicts the unconditional reading test score den-
sities of immigrants’ children in Germany and in German-speaking Switzerland (left panel).
— — — Figure 3.1 about here — — —
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The left graph shows that reading test scores tend to be higher in Switzerland. The right
graph depicts the unconditional quantile gap, which is the horizontal difference between the
countries’ distribution functions at various quantiles. The quantile gap is positive almost ev-
erywhere and is particularly large and statistically significant among low-performing students.
This indicates, that the low-performing second-generation immigrants score substantially higher
in German-speaking Switzerland than in Germany. In the following, I present evidence that
this relationship holds when conditioning on background characteristics.
3.4.1 Mean difference
I start by decomposing the average reading test score difference, shown in Table 3.4. In Panel A,
I adjust the second-generation immigrant population in Switzerland to match the characteristics
of the second-generation immigrants in Germany. In Panel B, I reversely adjust the children of
immigrants’ characteristics in Germany to match those in Switzerland.
Column 1 presents the unconditional average reading test scores of immigrants’ children in
Switzerland (457.09) and Germany (439.05). The unconditional mean difference ∆S is 18.05,
which is both significantly different from zero and large in magnitude (and of course equivalent
in Panel A/B). As a reference, this is roughly 30% of what an additional school year adds in
my subsample of immigrants’ children.19
Columns 2-5 present the parametric BO decomposition and Columns 6-9 the semi-parametric
matching decomposition. Column 2 (and 6) uses the vector of Other background characteris-
tics as above, 3 (and 7) adds the German spoken at home indicator, 4 (and 8) controls instead
for the country of origin, and the last specification in Column 5 (and 9) uses in addition both
language and origin indicators.
— — — Table 3.4 about here — — —
Starting with Panel A Column 2, the covariate-adjusted mean among Swiss students with
German students’ characteristics is 453.03. Although their performance decreases, it remains
13.99 points higher than what was actually observed in Germany. This difference is large in
magnitude and statistically significant. Controlling for the language spoken at home widens
19Ammermu¨ller (2007, 271) finds that “[a]n additional year of schooling adds [...] 38 points in Germany” for
the overall student population.
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the gap, leaving 17.05 points unexplained. By contrast, when the adjustment is performed
including the country of origin, instead of the language indicator, the test score disparity
narrows. Including both jointly, it amounts to 9.50 which is not statistically significant but
relevant in magnitude.
Compared to the matching decompositions in Columns 6 to 9, the results are confirmed
with higher point estimates for the unexplained part. Here, when conditioning on country of
origin in Column 8, the differences are larger than in the BO decomposition. The gap amounts
to 13.39 test score points when including both language and origin (Column 9). Differences to
the BO decompositions might be explained by violations of linearity or validity out-of-support,
since the BO decomposition procedure simply predicts values for empty covariate-cells.
Panel B presents the results for the reverse adjustment. The structure effect now measures
the difference between children of immigrants in Switzerland and immigrants’ children in Ger-
many with adjusted characteristics. Interestingly, in Column 2, the adjusted gap is larger than
the unconditional gap. This is because adjusting to the characteristics of immigrants’ children
in Switzerland causes even lower performance for students in Germany, 430.66 on average,
than those of the actual second-generation immigrant population in Germany, demonstrating
a negative composition effect. The structure effect increases from 26.44 to 30.43 when adding
German spoken at home as an additional control in Column 3. Recall that this is more than
half a school year in the sample of immigrants and almost a full year equivalent for the overall
student population. In Column 4, adding the origin of the student’s parents instead decreases
the gap to 23.20 and controlling for both the gap is 27.25 – statistically significant and large
in magnitude. Compared to the matching results in Columns 6-9, the effects show the same
increasing pattern when the adjustment is performed on individual and family characteristics,
and further increases when the language indicator is included. The specifications that include
country of origin exhibit a smaller disparity in performance.
In sum, I find the gap that cannot be explained by differences in covariates to be positive in
all, and large in magnitude and statistically significant in most specifications. The key finding is
that the students in Switzerland outperform those in Germany at the mean. Of this disparity
only a small part is attributable to differences in background characteristics. Noteworthy,
including the language spoken at home increases the unexplained part in all specifications.
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This suggests that Switzerland supports performance especially well for those who do not
speak German at home. In the next section, I extend the analysis to the distribution of the
reading test scores.
3.4.2 Distribution
The decompositions along the test score distribution are presented in Figures 3.2 and 3.3.
Panel A presents the adjustments including the vector of Other background covariates and
the German spoken at home, and Panel B adds the origin indicators. As in Figure 3.1, the
left panel presents the reading test score densities and the right panel the quantile gaps. The
adjusted quantile gaps are depicted by the solid lines and bootstrapped confidence intervals by
the dotted lines (black for 95% and gray for 90% confidence intervals). As a reference, I add
the unadjusted quantile gap (dashed line) from Figure 3.1.
— — — Figure 3.2 about here — — —
Starting with the adjustment of Swiss students to Germans characteristics, the density of
immigrants’ test scores in Switzerland does not align to the one of Germany. Accordingly, the
gap remains roughly unchanged, as can be observed by the adjusted quantile gap in the right
panel (solid line). This shows that, conditional on background characteristics, the large per-
formance gap among low-performing children of immigrants remains and even widens slightly
for the very well performing students. Including the origin of the parents aligns the adjusted
Swiss students test score density more closely with the density of second-generation immi-
grants in Germany. Nevertheless, the gap for the very low-performing immigrants’ children
remains statistically significant and of considerable magnitude. The adjusted quantile gap is
positive almost everywhere, though smaller in the medium percentiles and greater in the top
percentiles than without taking the origin of the parents into account. Conditioning on origin
increases the noise substantially rendering the gap only marginally significant at some parts of
the distribution.
— — — Figure 3.3 about here — — —
The reverse adjustment is presented in Figure 3.3. In Panel A, the adjusted test score
density among German students increases at a score of about 400 and decreases above 500
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points. This projects an even lower performance for adjusted German students than the actual
German students as discussed above. As shown in the right panel, the quantile gap increases
in almost all quantiles. Including the country of origin indicators in Panel B, the density
of German students adjusted to Swiss students’ characteristics aligns more closely with the
immigrants’ children in Switzerland when the country of origin is included. Again, the very
low-performing students are only found in Germany. Overall, the quantile gap appears to be
positive in general, but is only marginally significantly different from zero.
Investigating the effects along the distributions of reading test scores, I find the structure
effect to be largest among the very low-performing students. In all adjustments, the unexplained
differences are substantial in magnitude for those that need the most support. The results
confirm that performance is higher in Switzerland in all specifications and the gap remains
mostly positive and marginally significant throughout the distribution when the country of
origin is controlled for.
3.4.3 Subgroup analysis
“Which country supports the children of immigrants that face the most disadvantageous cir-
cumstances?” is one of the key questions for Western European policy makers, that are facing
a growing number of children with migration background. “How do children descending from
a specific origin compare to the results above?” and “does this disparity also exist between
children of natives?” In Table 3.5, I address these questions by performing the decompositions
separately on restricted samples of the student population, namely to: Those who have the
most unfavorable background characteristics (Columns 1-3); children of Turkish immigrants,
the larges overlapping immigrant population (Columns 4-6); and native students (Columns 7-
9). Each first column presents the unconditional gap, the second the BO adjustment, and the
third the matching adjustment.
— — — Table 3.5 about here — — —
In Columns 1-3, I restrict attention to second-generation immigrant students whose parents
have either no education or only primary to lower secondary education (ISCED 0-2) and who
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do not speak German at home.20 This procedure drastically reduces the sample to 296 obser-
vations – 57 in Germany and 212 in Switzerland – so results have to be interpreted cautiously.
Unsurprisingly, the average test scores are lower in both countries (Column 1). Meanwhile, the
unconditional gap increases sharply to 56.45 points, which is statistically significant and very
large in magnitude. This subset of students performs better by more than a full year equivalent
of schooling in Switzerland than in Germany. In Panel A Columns 2 and 3, when Swiss students
are adjusted to German students’ characteristics, the parametric and semi-parametric estimates
of the structure effect are similar and substantial in magnitude, ranging from 30.15 to 36.78 test
score points. Although parametric and matching estimates are still very large in magnitude, in
the reverse decomposition (Panel B), they exhibit a greater dispersion ranging from 22.64 to
43.25 points. The gap is much larger in magnitude compared to the unconstrained sample of
immigrants’ children, suggesting that this subset is served much better in Switzerland than in
Germany.
The parents’ country of origin has been discussed as a potential explanation for some of
the international variation in second-generation immigrant-native test score gaps. The children
of Turkish descendants have attracted some attention since they represent a large enough
population to be compared across countries (e.g., Dustmann, Frattini and Lanzara, 2012; Song,
2011). In Columns 4 to 6, I present the mean results for children of Turkish descent only, using
all Other covariates and the German spoken at home indicator. Unconditionally, children
of Turkish descent score 431.26 in Switzerland and 417.97 in Germany. While both scores
are far below the international average of 500, they score 13.29 points higher in Switzerland
than in Germany, although the difference is not statistically significant (probably due to the
reduced sample size). In the Panel A decomposition, the unexplained gap amounts to 20.31 test
score points, and in the reverse decomposition of Panel B to 34.22 test score points, which is
statistically significant. The unexplained gap is large and consistently positive throughout the
decompositions. The students – whose parents migrated from Turkey and who are subsequently
born and raised within a German-speaking environment – in Switzerland substantially out-
perform those in Germany, especially after adjusting for background characteristics.
The economics of education literature has predominantly focused on educational integra-
20Applying these restrictions effectively constrains the books at home, since there are no observations with
more than 200 books at home in Germany and only two in Switzerland.
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tion, hence it is natural to ask what the adjustment mechanism returns when applied to natives’
children. In Columns 7 to 9, I present the mean achievement gap for native students. First,
it is important to note that the parental education category of no primary education is empty
in Germany and nearly empty in Switzerland and consequently excluded from the specifica-
tion. In Column 7, the average performance of Swiss children is better than that of German
children, which would even increase some difference-in-differences measure of integration. Con-
ditionally, this gap is reversed in both adjustments, meaning that the Swiss (German) students
with German (Swiss) characteristics perform better (worse) than the observed Swiss (German)
students, but only by a relatively small amount. Hence, natives’ children also perform better
in Switzerland, but notably less than their counterparts with a migration background.
3.4.4 Discussion
It is difficult to single out which institutional factors cause the large performance disparity,
since educational institutions differ not only between but also within countries. I therefore end
with a suggestive discussion of some features that might explain the large unexplained test
score differences documented above. The decomposition results including school characteristics
are presented in Table 3.6 (the descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in Table 3.1
above). Columns 3 and 7 of Table 3.4 are presented again in Columns 1 and 5 to serve as a
benchmark.
— — — Table 3.6 about here — — —
Since the unexplained performance gap always increases when conditioning on language
spoken at home, the Swiss system seems to be more capable in teaching its immigrants’ children
German reading literacy, especially to those who do not speak German at home. One possible
explanation could be that – since all Swiss students do speak some dialect at home – the Swiss
educational system has developed institutions that enhance second-language acquisition better
than those in Germany. One way to assess whether there is a greater emphasis on learning
German in the Swiss curriculum is to compare the amount of German language-lessons per week.
On average, immigrant students in Switzerland report to visit more German classes as well as
overall lessons per week than those in Germany (cf. Table 3.1). In Columns 2 and 7, I perform
the decomposition using the Other background characteristics, the German spoken at home,
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the amount of German lessons, and the overall amount of lessons in school. It is important to
note that there are a few missing values at the school level, hence the decompositions are based
on a slightly reduced sample with average test scores of 456.22 in Switzerland and 442.49 in
Germany. The unconditional gap amounts to 13.74 and essentially remains unaffected by the
inclusion of the amount of lessons in all four decompositions. Notwithstanding, the amount of
teaching is distinct from its quality which still might greatly influence the students’ achievement.
Interestingly, as shown in Table 3.1 above, the children in Germany visit twice as many out-of-
school-time lessons in German.21 It remains an open question whether the reading test score
gap would even have been larger without the additional instruction time.
Early ability tracking is an intensively debated institution in both countries. The Swiss
system tracks students between one and two years later in their school careers than the German
system. This might cause the low performing students in Germany to fall behind their Swiss
counterparts. On a distinct but related note, a result of early tracking could be segregation
and placement of disadvantaged students in schools and/or classes. Similarly, Cattaneo and
Wolter (2012) discuss that changes in the school composition – due to the increased number of
children that speak German at home – can positively impact PISA performance of immigrant
students with a migration background. Accordingly, if immigrant students are segregated they
might have little reason or opportunity to learn German. Hence, the test score disparity may
reflect the disparity in school compositions.
To address potential segregation, I calculate the proportions of second-generation immigrant
students in school and define a categorical variable measured in 10% steps. On average in
Germany, immigrants’ children have 40% immigrants as peers in school, whereas the share is
34% in Switzerland (one should keep in mind that the overall share of immigrants is larger
in Switzerland than in Germany). In Columns 3 and 8, when adjusting for the proportion of
immigrants’ children in school the unexplained gap reduces in all decompositions by a relatively
small amount.
Another way to address the segregation is to control for the performance of the students’
peers. Despite being highly endogenous, as explained by Manski (1993), it is still interesting
21The out-of-school-time lessons were assessed by the question: How many hours do you typically spend per
week attending out-of-school-time lessons in German (at school, at home or somewhere else)? The answer
categories were: 0, 0-2, 2-4, 4-6, 6 hours. To compare the averages, I take midpoint of the categories, 0 for the
lowest, and 6 for the highest category.
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to assess if peer performance can account for some of the unexplained test score gap. First,
I calculate the average performance of second-generation immigrant students in school. In a
second step, I additionally include native students.22 The average reading test scores of the
immigrant peers (and additional natives) is 470.27 (496.42) in Switzerland and 456.81 (476.54)
in Germany. Including the performance of immigrants’ children in the decomposition (Columns
4 and 9), the unexplained part of the gap reduces substantially. In addition, including the
performance of natives’ children (Columns 5 and 10), the disparity almost drops to 0, being
insignificant in all specifications.
I do not want to over-emphasize these results due to the obvious endogeneity and the
non-causal nature of the decomposition estimates. Yet, keeping in mind that the measure is
problematic, the results point to a greater segregation and clustering of low-performing students
in Germany. It seems promising to explore if the better performance is caused on the school level
in greater detail. Furthermore, the finding highlights that if we seek to understand the second-
generation immigrant students’ achievement process, we have to find suitable comparison groups
and a promising candidate being second-generation immigrant students in similar environments.
In sum, it appears that immigrants’ children in German-speaking Switzerland exhibit greater
reading (and math, cf. Appendix C.1) literacy than their counterparts in Germany. This
difference prevails or even increases when adjusting for their personal, socio-economic, and
educational characteristics. While the results are strong and unequivocal, their interpretation
require caution, one must bear in mind that there might be other potential factors causing these
differences in test scores which are not part of educational institutions, such as attitudes towards
immigrants or integration efforts in general. In addition, it is of course possible that there is
still some selection on unobservables. However, by decomposing the educational achievement
gap conditionally on important background characteristics and using only those students that
migrated from similar areas to similar countries that share the “same” language and migration
history, it seems implausible that selection on unobservables alone causes these large differences
in educational performance. Moreover, as the gap vanishes almost entirely by the inclusion
of school system characteristics raises confidence in an explanation based on the educational
systems.
22I use a categorical variable based on 25 test score point steps between 300 to 650. For the average peer test
scores and the proportion of immigrants in school, results are robust to variations in the binning steps (results
available upon request).
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3.5 Conclusion
In this study I have proposed a new approach to investigate second-generation immigrants’
learning processes by contrasting their performance across countries. Applying this reasoning,
I have compared the immigrants’ children in Germany with those in the German-speaking part
of Switzerland to assure the students’ comparability. Based on PISA 2009 survey results, I
adjusted the test score distributions in Germany and German-speaking Switzerland for the
composition of the second-generation immigrant population in the respective other country.
My results establish that the second-generation immigrants’ reading literacy is substantially
greater in Switzerland. This difference is large in magnitude, especially for low-performing stu-
dents. The most crucial difference seems to be the language spoken at home. When it is different
from German, it always increases the gap that cannot be explained by the students’ background
characteristics. These differences are robust to the inclusion of the parents’ country of origin.
Additionally, Switzerland seems to be particularly beneficial for unfavorably-endowed children
of immigrants and the children of Turkish immigrants while being relatively less beneficial for
children of native-born parents.
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Figure 3.1: Second-generation immigrants kernel reading test score densities and
unconditional quantile gap
Note: Left graph: Reading test score kernel densities; right graph: Quantile gap (dashed line) and
bootstrapped confidence intervals (dotted lines: 90% gray; 95% black) based on 500 replications.
Source: PISA 2009, own calculations
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(A) Adjustment based on background characteristics and German spoken at home
200 300 400 500 600 700
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
5
Reading test scores
D
e
n
si
ty
Immigant children in Switzerland
Adjusted immigant children in Switzerland
Immigant children in Germany
0 20 40 60 80 100
−
1
0
0
1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
Quantiles
Gap actual
Gap adjusted
95% Confidence interval
90% Confidence interval
(B) Adjustment based on background characteristics, German spoken at home, and country of origin
Figure 3.2: Second-generation immigrants kernel reading test score densities and quantile
gap, Swiss students adjusted to German characteristics
Note: Left graph: Reading test score kernel densities; right graph: Unconditional quantile gap (dashed line),
adjusted quantile gap (solid line), and bootstrapped confidence intervals for the adjusted quantile gap (dotted
lines) based on 500 replications; Panel A: adjustment is performed by propensity score matching including
gender, age in months, educational level of parents, highest occupation of parents, number of books at home,
and German spoken at home. Panel B: Additionally includes the parents’ country of origin.
Source: PISA 2009, own calculations
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(A) Adjustment based on background characteristics and German spoken at home
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(B) Adjustment based on background characteristics, German spoken at home, and country of origin
Figure 3.3: Second-generation immigrants kernel reading test score densities and quantile
gap, German students adjusted to Swiss characteristics
Note: Left graph: Reading test score kernel densities; right graph: Unconditional quantile gap (dashed line),
adjusted quantile gap (solid line), and bootstrapped confidence intervals for the adjusted quantile gap (dotted
lines) based on 500 replications; Panel A: adjustment is performed by propensity score matching including
gender, age in months, educational level of parents, highest occupation of parents, number of books at home,
and German spoken at home. Panel B: Additionally includes the parents’ country of origin.
Source: PISA 2009, own calculations
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of school characteristics visited by second-generation
immigrant students by country
Variables Switzerland Germany
Years visited preschool 2.79 2.67
(0.44) (0.61)
[814] [341]
Age at school entry 6.69 6.41
(0.60) (0.59)
[778] [335]
Grade at testing 8.80 8.97
(0.57) (0.73)
[824] [335]
Grade repetition 0.30 0.34
[820] [343]
Number of
German lessons in school 4.34 4.10
(1.10) (0.99)
[824] [345]
all lessons in school 33.65 31.81
(3.44) (3.84)
[809] [343]
German lessons out-of-school 0.32 0.68
(1.03) (1.48)
[593] [219]
Proportion of migrants in school 0.34 0.40
Average reading test score
immigrants’ children in school 470.27 456.81
(65.75) (81.32)
+ natives in school 496.42 476.54
(57.63) (77.10)
Note: Switzerland refers to the German-speaking part only. School level vari-
ables imputed on school level first on immigrants’ children responses and if still
missing on those of natives as well. Standard deviations are given in round
and number of observations if they differ from those in the main specification
(CHE: 824; DEU: 356) in squared brackets. Grade repetition is an indicator
variable that is one when the student repeated one or more grades and can be
interpreted as percentage points. German lessons out-of-school was assessed
categorically, the average is taken after redefinition by the midpoint of the
categories that represent hours (the highest category was 6 and more, which is
coded as 6). Proportion of second-generation migrants in school is calculated
by the ratio of immigrants’ children to immigrants’ and native’ children in
school, and then binned into 10 percentage point steps. The average reading
test scores are first calculated by using only the second-generation migrants in
school and then additionally using the natives in school. These are then also
binned into categories of 25 test score point steps from 300 to 650.
Source: PISA 2009, own calculations.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics of second-generation immigrant students by country
Variables Switzerland Germany
Reading literacy score 457.09 439.05
(87.52) (95.95)
Age (in months) 189.83 189.71
(3.39) (3.48)
Male 0.51 0.52
Education mother (ISCED)
No education (0) 0.06 0.20
Primary (1,2) 0.42 0.21
Secondary (3,4) 0.29 0.42
Tertiary (5,6) 0.23 0.17
Education father (ISCED)
No education (0) 0.03 0.16
Primary (1,2) 0.36 0.17
Secondary (3,4) 0.30 0.41
Tertiary (5,6) 0.31 0.26
Highest occupation (HISEI) 41.61 40.51
(14.18) (13.93)
Books at home
0 - 10 0.29 0.31
11 - 25 0.26 0.21
26 - 100 0.29 0.28
101 - 200 0.09 0.12
201 - 500 0.05 0.05
More than 500 0.02 0.03
German spoken at home 0.19 0.33
Country of origin
Southern Europe 0.14 0.06
Yugoslavia 0.48 0.07
Turkey 0.13 0.53
Another origin 0.16 0.29
Observations 824 356
Note: Switzerland refers to the German-speaking part only. All numbers are rel-
ative frequencies except for reading literacy, age in months, and hisei, for which
standard deviations are given in round brackets. Reading literacy is the average of
five plausible values provided by PISA. The parental education is summarized by
four indicators according to the International Standard Classification of Education
(ISCED), whereNo education (0) indicates that the parent has no formal education;
Primary (1, 2) captures primary and lower secondary education; Secondary (3, 4)
indicates upper secondary education and post-secondary (no tertiary education);
and Tertiary (5, 6) indicates any tertiary education. The highest occupational
status of the parents (HISEI) as provided by PISA, measures highest occupa-
tional status of the parents where higher values correspond to occupations with
high returns to education. Southern Europe includes Greece, Italy, Portugal, and
Spain; Yugoslavia: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYR Montenegro and Serbia;
Another country was a category in the PISA Questionnaire and includes parents
originating from different areas.
Source: PISA 2009, own calculations.
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Table 3.3: Second-generation immigrant-native students reading test score gaps
Overall sample Selected sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Germany
without Aussiedler
Immigrant -58.32 -21.65 -7.91 -73.66 -32.31 -18.99
(4.39) (4.07) (4.49) (5.30) (5.29) (6.13)
Observations 3,791 3,791 3,791 3,632 3,632 3,632
Panel B: Switzerland
German-speaking
Immigrant -48.72 -17.86 -6.62 -54.06 -21.86 0.24
(2.33) (2.32) (2.71) (3.27) (3.24) (4.39)
Observations 8,292 8,292 8,292 5,249 5,249 5,249
German-speaking without
Western Europeans
and Albanians
Immigrant -55.47 -21.72 -0.18
(3.30) (3.35) (4.70)
Observations 5,189 5,189 5,189
Covariates
Other No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Language No No Yes No No Yes
Note: Immigrants’ children are born within the country of testing and have
both parents born outside of the country. Natives’ children have both par-
ents born in the country of testing. (1) and (4) report OLS regressions of
reading test scores on an Immigrant indicator variable; (2) and (5) addition-
ally include individual and family background characteristics (Other); (3)
and (6) add the German speaking at home indicator, each for the respective
sample selection. Robust standard errors are given in brackets.
Source: PISA 2009, own calculations.
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Table 3.4: Mean gap decomposition between Swiss and German immigrants’ children reading
test scores, adjusted to other countries characteristics
Actual BO adjustment Matching adjustment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Swiss students adjusted to German students’ characteristics
YCHE 457.09 453.03 456.09 445.78 448.54 455.56 458.22 451.26 452.44
YDEU 439.05
∆X 4.06 1.00 11.31 8.55 1.53 -1.13 5.84 4.65
(3.60) (3.93) (5.44) (5.59) (3.08) (3.15) (5.82) (5.49)
∆S 18.05 13.99 17.05 6.74 9.50 16.52 19.18 12.21 13.39
(5.78) (6.05) (5.74) (6.79) (7.13) (5.71) (5.76) (7.24) (7.09)
Panel B: German students adjusted to Swiss students’ characteristics
YCHE 457.09
YDEU 439.05 430.66 426.67 433.90 429.85 438.00 433.84 444.75 443.97
∆X -8.39 -12.38 -5.15 -9.20 -1.04 -5.21 5.70 4.92
(4.75) (5.47) (9.09) (9.62) (3.76) (4.27) (6.98) (7.03)
∆S 18.05 26.44 30.43 23.20 27.25 19.09 23.25 12.34 13.13
(5.78) (6.41) (6.72) (9.65) (9.99) (6.03) (6.24) (8.36) (8.03)
Covariates
Other No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
German No No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Origin No No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations
N 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,152 1,153 1,023 1,037
NCHE 824 824 824 824 824 797 798 668 682
NDEU 356 356 356 356 356 355 355 355 355
Note: Immigrants’ children are born within the country of testing and have both parents born outside of the
country. (1) Unconditional gap; (2) to (5) BO adjustment: uses a twofold Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
based on (2) gender, age in month, educational level of parents, highest occupation of the parents and number
of books at home; (3) adds German spoken at home; (4) uses (2) and country of origin, and (5) uses (2), (3),
and (4); (6) to (9) Matching adjustment is performed by propensity score matching with Gaussian kernel
and bandwidth 0.1, the propensity scores are estimated by logit regressions on the same covariates as the in
BO adjustment. All standard errors given in brackets, are simulated with 500 bootstrap replications.
Source: PISA 2009, own calculations.
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Table 3.5: Mean gap decomposition between Swiss and German children reading test scores,
adjusted to other countries characteristics
Unfavorable background Turkish Natives
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Swiss students adjusted to German students’ characteristics
YCHE 441.08 414.77 421.41 431.26 439.23 438.28 512.62 518.30 514.51
YDEU 384.63 417.97 513.52
∆X 26.31 19.67 -7.97 -7.03 -5.68 -1.89
(9.12) (9.65) (11.28) (9.69) (1.08) (0.66)
∆S 56.45 30.15 36.78 13.29 21.26 20.31 -0.90 4.78 0.99
(13.83) (13.88) (14.41) (10.70) (13.08) (13.95) (2.03) (1.69) (1.74)
Panel B: German students adjusted to Swiss students’ characteristics
YCHE 441.08 431.26 512.62
YDEU 384.63 418.44 397.83 417.97 397.11 397.03 513.52 507.34 510.38
∆X 33.82 13.20 -20.87 -20.94 -6.18 -3.14
(13.68) (10.50) (9.00) (8.25) (1.28) (0.82)
∆S 56.45 22.64 43.25 13.29 34.15 34.22 -0.90 5.28 2.25
(13.83) (16.03) (13.58) (10.70) (11.37) (11.73) (2.03) (1.76) (1.76)
Covariates
Other* No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
German No No No No Yes Yes No No No
Observations
N 269 269 196 296 296 287 7,600 7,600 7,594
NCHE 212 212 140 109 109 105 4,362 4,362 4,359
NDEU 57 57 56 187 187 182 3,238 3,238 3,235
Note: Immigrants’ children are born within the country of testing and have both parents born outside
of the country. Unconditional gap for immigrants’ children with low parental background characteristics
(1), Turkish descendants (4) and native students (both parents born in the country of testing) (7); *(2),
(5) and (8) BO adjustment: uses a twofold Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition based in (2) on gender, age in
month, educational level of parents categories (cat.: 1 and 2), highest occupation of the parents and number
of books at home (cat.: 1 to 3) and those that do not speak German at home; (5) uses all Other covariates
of Table 3.4; (8) uses those of (5) without the primary education category for parental schooling; In (3),
(6), and (9) adjustment is performed by propensity score matching with Gaussian kernel and bandwidth
0.1, the propensity scores are estimated by logit regression on the same covariates as in the respective BO
adjustments. All standard errors given in brackets, are simulated with 500 bootstrap replications.
Source: PISA 2009, own calculations.
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Table 3.6: Mean gap decomposition between Swiss and German immigrants’ children reading
test scores, adjusted to other countries characteristics
School characteristics
BO adjustment Matching adjustment
(1) (2)* (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)* (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: Swiss students adjusted to German students’ characteristics
YCHE 456.09 454.37 451.92 444.17 440.01 458.22 456.16 454.44 448.46 446.17
YDEU 439.05 442.49 439.05 439.05 439.05 439.05 442.49 439.05 439.05 439.05
∆X 1.00 2.72 5.17 12.92 17.08 -1.13 0.06 2.66 8.63 10.93
(3.72) (4.22) (4.33) (5.40) (5.59) (3.35) (3.87) (3.45) (4.28) (3.86)
∆S 17.05 11.01 12.88 5.13 0.97 19.18 13.67 15.39 9.42 7.12
(5.93) (6.02) (5.59) (4.05) (4.66) (5.74) (6.04) (5.38) (4.16) (4.92)
Panel B: German students adjusted to Swiss students’ characteristics
YCHE 457.09 456.22 457.09 457.09 457.09 457.09 456.22 457.09 457.09 457.09
YDEU 426.67 431.01 435.98 446.95 451.87 433.84 433.23 441.37 447.10 452.13
∆X -12.38 -11.48 -3.07 7.90 12.82 -5.21 -9.25 2.33 8.05 13.08
(5.82) (5.80) (5.58) (5.55) (5.81) (4.48) (5.44) (4.91) (5.02) (5.41)
∆S 30.43 25.21 21.11 10.15 5.22 23.25 22.99 15.72 10.00 4.96
(6.58) (6.55) (6.22) (3.79) (4.52) (6.02) (6.60) (5.94) (4.45) (5.17)
Covariates
Lessons No Yes No No No No Yes No No No
Prop. Mig. No No Yes No No No No Yes No No
Peer Migrants No No No Yes No No No No Yes No
+ Natives No No No No Yes No No No No Yes
Observations
N 1,180 1,152 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,153 1,139 1,146 1,147 1,105
NCHE 824 809 824 824 824 798 808 790 792 750
NDEU 356 343 356 356 356 355 331 356 355 355
Note: Immigrants’ children are born within the country of testing and have both parents born outside of the
country. All specifications condition include Other covariates and German spoken at home indicator. (1) and
(5) are the same as Columns (3) and (7) from Table 3.4. (2)* and (7)* include number of German lessons in
school. In this decompositions the reference sample is reduced due to the inability to impute based on school
level. The test score average before adjustment is 456.22 in Switzerland, 442.49 in Germany, leaving a raw gap
of 13.74. (3) and (8) include the proportion of migrants in school. (4) and (9) add the average reading test score
of immigrant students in school only, and (5) and (9) additionally include native students in school. (1) to (5)
present BO adjustment. In (6) to (10), adjustment is performed by propensity score matching with Gaussian
kernel and bandwidth 0.1, the propensity scores are estimated by logit regression on the same covariates as the in
BO adjustment. All standard errors given in brackets, are simulated with 500 bootstrap replications.
Source: PISA 2009, own calculations.
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Figure A.1.1: Local labor markets, 96 Raumordnungregionen [Ror]
Source: BBSR (2013)
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Figure A.1.2: Robustness: The role of the option value in a dynamic model of educational
choice
Notes: Predicted probabilities constructed using estimates from Column (5) of Table 1.6 and evaluated at
x′βj = 0, j = 1, 2, 3. Source: SOEP 2000-2013, INKAR 2012, own calculations.
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Figure A.1.3: Robustness: The role of academic ability and unobserved heterogeneity
Notes: Predicted probabilities constructed using estimates from Column (8) of Table 1.6, evaluated at
x′βj = 0, j = 1, 2, 3. High GPA = High θ = Φ
−1(0.75), Low GPA = Low θ = Φ−1(0.25).
Source: SOEP 2000-2013, INKAR 2012, own calculations.
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Table A.1.1: Descriptive statistics by subsample
(A) (B) (C) (D) (F)
p 0.776 0.772 0.781 0.769 0.778
(0.198) (0.201) (0.192) (0.197) (0.190)
GPA (std) 0.000 -0.018 0.012 0.041 0.077
(1.000) (1.019) (1.009) (1.024) (1.016)
Rec: Lower Track (yes/no) 0.132 0.135 0.134 0.109 0.106
(0.338) (0.342) (0.341) (0.311) (0.308)
Rec: Intermediate Track (yes/no) 0.259 0.272 0.270 0.247 0.249
(0.438) (0.445) (0.444) (0.431) (0.433)
Rec: High school (yes/no) 0.402 0.347 0.360 0.384 0.400
(0.490) (0.476) (0.480) (0.487) (0.490)
In high school (yes/no) 0.411 0.359 0.371 0.415 0.432
(0.492) (0.480) (0.483) (0.493) (0.496)
Locus of control (std) 0.003 -0.038 -0.020 -0.053 -0.036
(0.928) (0.973) (0.964) (1.015) (1.001)
Risk attitudes (std) 0.001 -0.085 -0.082 -0.153 -0.149
(0.924) (0.972) (0.968) (0.969) (0.970)
Openness (std) -0.000 -0.014 0.010 0.001 0.027
(0.942) (0.977) (0.970) (1.014) (1.014)
Agreeableness (std) 0.002 -0.006 0.006 -0.011 0.006
(0.944) (0.984) (0.980) (0.995) (1.002)
Extraversion (std) -0.002 -0.010 0.009 -0.002 0.023
(0.945) (0.953) (0.949) (0.963) (0.964)
Neuroticism (std) -0.000 -0.015 -0.029 -0.027 -0.046
(0.943) (0.979) (0.974) (1.019) (1.021)
Conscientiousness (std) 0.002 0.111 0.131 0.176 0.194
(0.942) (0.951) (0.944) (0.961) (0.954)
Female (yes/no) 0.504 0.506 0.508 0.496 0.499
(0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500)
Nr. siblings 1.570 1.639 1.630 1.633 1.622
(1.316) (1.339) (1.323) (1.335) (1.322)
Second-generation migrant (yes/no) 0.623 0.739 0.731 0.843 0.840
(0.485) (0.439) (0.443) (0.364) (0.367)
Parent college-educated (yes/no) 0.283 0.259 0.267 0.292 0.304
(0.450) (0.438) (0.443) (0.455) (0.460)
Parent cur. unemployed (yes/no) 0.103 0.124 0.120 0.130 0.129
(0.304) (0.329) (0.325) (0.336) (0.335)
Log. net household income 10.377 10.341 10.368 10.374 10.391
(1.834) (1.800) (1.773) (1.822) (1.804)
Cyclical youth unemployment (in Ror) 0.074 0.211 0.211 0.267 0.260
(1.026) (1.034) (1.035) (1.083) (1.082)
Nr. of apprenticeship positions (in Ror) 98.791 97.920 97.886 97.447 97.362
(5.279) (4.988) (5.039) (5.034) (5.067)
Nr. of students (in Ror) 24.095 22.952 23.018 22.395 22.572
(14.223) (13.594) (13.511) (13.492) (13.517)
Nr. of high school graduates (in Ror) 26.775 25.137 25.188 24.491 24.582
(6.673) (5.514) (5.520) (5.155) (5.158)
Nr. of Universities (in Ror) 10.585 10.333 10.321 10.208 10.225
(9.938) (9.850) (9.849) (9.651) (9.637)
N 3,610 2,116 1,919 1,372 1,255
Note: Table presents sample means and standard deviations in brackets in total and by subsample
considered in Table 1.3.
Source: SOEP 2000-2013, INKAR 2012, own calculations.
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Table A.1.2: Variable definitions
Variables Description Age Missings
Core variables Missing values in the core variables are dropped from the estimation sample.
p Subjective completion belief is a elicited measure, it ranges from 0 to 1, in 0.1 steps. 17 58
GPA (std) Average of German and Math grades, standardized over the sample population, as a robustness
check we additionally standardize within educational track (cf. Table A.2.3).
17 59
Educational outcomes: From the longitudinal information we assess whether the student has started/completed a respective
educational track.
17-31 -
d ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} Aspiration/Start/Complete, disaggregated by the tracks: drop out, apprenticeship, tertiary appren-
ticeship (high school and apprenticeship), and university (includes all higher learning institutions).
d1 ∈ {0, 1, 2} First stage in structural model: drop out, apprenticeship, and high school.
d2 ∈ {0, 1} Second stage in structural model: tertiary apprenticeship and university.
Start apprenticeship Not used in the analysis, all individuals that stared before are dropped from the estimation sample. 17 487
Still in school Used in aspiration regressions, but dropped in the investment/completion analysis. 17 1,073
Academic variables
Recommendations: To visit a secondary-school track teachers evaluate the students (age the age of 10), the base
category is no recommendation, three indicators for Lowest Track (yes/no), Intermediate Track
(yes/no), and High school (yes/no)
17 249
In high school (yes/no) An indicator whether the student is currently in high school when answering the youth question-
naire.
17 105
Personality variables We standardize the personality variables to mean 0 and standard deviation 1.
Locus of control (std) First principal component of 10 questions, of which two are reversed. 17 459
Risk attitudes (std) Assessed by a single question, ranging from 1-10. 17 306
Openness (std) First principal component of 3 questions. 17 381
Agreeableness (std) First principal component of 3 questions, of which one is reversed. 17 375
Extraversion (std) First principal component of 3 questions, of which one is reversed. 17 378
Neuroticism (std) First principal component of 3 questions, of which one is reversed. 17 378
Conscientiousness (std) First principal component of 3 questions, of which one is reversed. 17 381
Individual and family characteristics Parental information, based on parents’ questionnaires, are merged with the children’s information.
Female (yes/no) An indicator whether the individual is female. 17
Nr. of siblings Count of the number of siblings. 17 179
Second-generation migrant (yes/no) An indicator whether the individual’s parents are born in a foreign country, if information is missing
recoded as second-generation migrant.
17 2,029
Parent college-educated (yes/no) An indicator whether the individual has at least one college educated parent. 17 13
125
Parent cur. unemployed (yes/no) An indicator whether the individual has at least one currently unemployed parent. 17 152
Log. net household income Log of household pre-governmental income imputed by SOEP (0 income is treated as missing) 17 65
Fixed effects
Year Year of answering youth questionnaire, which is roughly identical to year of birth 17
Region Five regions based on federal states which are the level of educational-jurisdiction, cf. footnote 24
and Table A.2.3
17 109
Regional labor market information Information from INKAR 2012/Statistical agency, merged onto the students residence with 17 and
lagged by one year. Some are twice assessed for the estimation of the structural model, based on
residence with 17 to avoid endogeneity due to moving (there are no missings as the location is
always known at 179.
Cyclical youth unemployment Cyclical component of local youth unemployment, extracted by HP-filter. 16/18
Nr. of apprenticeship positions Number of apprenticeship positions by all potential apprentices times 100. 16/18
Nr. of students Number of students enrolled in higher learning institutions by all residents in the age group times
1000.
16/18
Nr. of high school graduates Number of students with a high school degree in the region over all school-leavers times 1000. 16/18
Nr. of universities Count of higher learning institutions in the Ror, due to minimal variation over time we keep it
constant.
16
Note: Table presents variable descriptions and missing values for the baseline sample. All available individuals add up to 4,192, which then reduce to 3,610. The remaining
missings are conditional on the estimation sample. All variables besides core variables are included in the estimation along with missing value indicators. More information
on the regional indicators can be found under http://www.inkar.de
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A.2 Robustness
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Table A.2.1: Determinants of subjective completion beliefs, fractional response regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GPA (std) 0.037 0.030 0.029 0.030
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Rec: Lowest Track (yes/no) 0.023 0.024 0.024 0.025
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
Rec: Intermediate Track (yes/no) 0.057 0.054 0.049 0.051
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Rec: High school (yes/no) 0.045 0.040 0.033 0.036
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
In high school (yes/no) 0.004 0.002 -0.005 -0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Locus of control (std) 0.022 0.020 0.019
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Risk attitudes (std) 0.007 0.005 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Openness (std) 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Agreeableness (std) 0.008 0.008 0.008
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Extraversion (std) 0.015 0.017 0.017
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Neuroticism (std) 0.000 0.002 0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Conscientiousness (std) 0.030 0.033 0.033
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Female (yes/no) -0.011 -0.012
(0.007) (0.007)
Nr. siblings -0.002 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
Second-generation migrant (yes/no) -0.023 -0.009
(0.007) (0.013)
Parent college-educated (yes/no) 0.007 0.008
(0.007) (0.007)
Parent cur. unemployed (yes/no) -0.002 0.002
(0.012) (0.012)
Log. net household income 0.006 0.006
(0.002) (0.002)
N 3’610 3’610 3’610 3’610
p¯ 0.776 0.776 0.776 0.776
SD(p) 0.198 0.198 0.198 0.198
R2n 0.054 0.114 0.122 0.129
Academic + + + +
F(pval) 193.883 (0.000) 130.487 (0.000) 109.471 (0.000) 107.115 (0.000)
Personality - + + +
F(pval) 194.414(0.000) 201.546(0.000) 199.798(0.000)
Family Background - - + +
F(pval) 31.445(0.000) 19.705(0.012)
Labor market + FE - - - +
F(pval) 29.572(0.162)
Note: The Table presents Bernoulli pseudo-maximum likelihood with probit conditional expectation function, as proposed by
Papke and Wooldridge (1996, 2008). We report marginal effects and robust standard errors in round brackets, our goodness of fit
measure is a nonlinear R-squared measure and is calculated as the squared correlation coefficient between the estimated conditional
expectation and the observed subjective beliefs: R2n = corr(pˆ, p)
2, where pˆ = Φ(x′βˆ) due to the probit specification. The regressions
of subjective beliefs are presented on varying sets of covariates, in (1) only on academic, (2) adds personality, (3) family background
and individual characteristics, and (4) local labor market characteristics, region and time fixed effects (coefficients not presented).
We present the unconditional mean p¯ and standard deviation SD(p) of the dependent variable.
Source: SOEP 2000-2013, INKAR 2012, own calculations.
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Table A.2.2: Robustness: dichotomizing subjective beliefs (p ≥ 0.70)
probit bivariate probit
ρ = .05 ρ = .1 ρ = .2 ρ = .3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(A) Intention-to-invest
p 0.380 0.321 0.280 0.274 0.188 0.103 -0.067 -0.236
(0.066) (0.069) (0.069) (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) (0.069) (0.067)
[0.068] [0.055] [0.047] [0.045]
R2n 0.027 0.040 0.048 0.059
R2n(p) 0.041 0.049 0.055 0.065
Sample: N = 3, 610, d¯ = 0.908, p¯ = 0.793, SD(p) = 0.406
(B) Actual investment
p 0.490 0.453 0.439 0.429 0.343 0.257 0.087 -0.084
(0.107) (0.111) (0.114) (0.120) (0.119) (0.119) (0.117) (0.115)
[0.045] [0.039] [0.035] [0.028]
R2n 0.086 0.100 0.122 0.184
R2n(p) 0.110 0.120 0.140 0.198
Sample: N = 2, 116, d¯ = 0.956, p¯ = 0.789, SD(p) = 0.408
(C) Actual investment, conditional on intentions
p 0.471 0.453 0.443 0.437 0.351 0.264 0.092 -0.080
(0.119) (0.122) (0.125) (0.131) (0.131) (0.130) (0.129) (0.126)
[0.040] [0.037] [0.033] [0.025]
R2n 0.083 0.095 0.115 0.205
R2n(p) 0.105 0.114 0.132 0.220
Sample: N = 1, 919, d¯ = 0.961, p¯ = 0.805, SD(p) = 0.396
(D) Actual completion
p 0.231 0.225 0.209 0.196 0.109 0.022 -0.153 -0.328
(0.089) (0.091) (0.093) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.093) (0.092)
[0.092] [0.089] [0.083] [0.078]
R2n 0.087 0.093 0.102 0.123
R2n(p) 0.091 0.097 0.105 0.125
Sample: N = 1, 372, d¯ = 0.544, p¯ = 0.794, SD(p) = 0.405
(E) Actual completion, conditional on intentions
p 0.259 0.271 0.269 0.259 0.171 0.083 -0.094 -0.271
(0.097) (0.099) (0.100) (0.102) (0.102) (0.101) (0.101) (0.099)
[0.103] [0.108] [0.107] [0.103]
R2n 0.092 0.098 0.108 0.127
R2n(p) 0.097 0.103 0.112 0.131
Sample: N = 1, 244, d¯ = 0.547, p¯ = 0.809, SD(p) = 0.393
Academic - + + + + + + +
Personality - - + + + + + +
Family Background - - - + + + + +
Labor market - - - + + + + +
Note: Table presents coefficients (robust standard errors in round and average marginal effects in squared brackets),
from probit (1)-(4) and probit endogenous explanatory variable (5)-(8) regressions of varying educational outcomes on
subjective completion beliefs and varying sets of covariate, in (1) on in high school, region and time fixed effects, (2)
adds academic, (3) adds personality, (4) to (8) family background, individual, and local labor market characteristics.
In the bivariate probit regressions we restrict the correlation between the errors to be 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3. For each
outcome in Panels (A) to (E), we present McFadden’s pseudo-R2 with and without p, and sample statistics for the
varying subsamples. In the appendix we present analogous probit and bivariate probit regressions.
Source: SOEP 2000-2013, INKAR 2012, own calculations.
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Table A.2.3: Robustness: GPA standardized within high school and using federal states fixed
effects
GPA, by hs attendance Federal states fe
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(A) Intention-to-invest
p 0.921 0.810 0.727 0.717 0.928 0.817 0.733 0.722
(0.142) (0.146) (0.148) (0.150) (0.142) (0.146) (0.148) (0.150)
[0.140] [0.122] [0.108] [0.104] [0.141] [0.123] [0.109] [0.106]
R2n 0.029 0.040 0.048 0.059 0.027 0.038 0.046 0.058
R2n(p) 0.049 0.055 0.059 0.069 0.048 0.054 0.058 0.069
Sample: N = 3, 610, d¯ = 0.908, p¯ = 0.776, SD(p) = 0.198
(B) Actual investment
p 0.997 0.918 0.911 0.870 1.033 0.959 0.947 0.888
(0.223) (0.228) (0.241) (0.250) (0.224) (0.229) (0.242) (0.252)
[0.069] [0.062] [0.056] [0.044] [0.071] [0.064] [0.057] [0.045]
R2n 0.087 0.100 0.122 0.183 0.089 0.102 0.124 0.180
R2n(p) 0.113 0.121 0.141 0.199 0.117 0.124 0.144 0.197
Sample: N = 2, 116, d¯ = 0.956, p¯ = 0.772, SD(p) = 0.201
(C) Actual investment, conditional on intentions
p 0.901 0.849 0.840 0.730 0.924 0.877 0.862 0.729
(0.256) (0.262) (0.272) (0.276) (0.255) (0.263) (0.273) (0.279)
[0.058] [0.053] [0.048] [0.031] [0.058] [0.054] [0.049] [0.032]
R2n 0.085 0.095 0.114 0.205 0.089 0.098 0.118 0.204
R2n(p) 0.104 0.110 0.129 0.214 0.108 0.115 0.133 0.213
Sample: N = 1, 919, d¯ = 0.961, p¯ = 0.781, SD(p) = 0.192
(D) Actual completion
p 0.434 0.410 0.351 0.331 0.408 0.378 0.333 0.312
(0.181) (0.184) (0.189) (0.192) (0.180) (0.184) (0.188) (0.191)
[0.172] [0.162] [0.139] [0.131] [0.162] [0.150] [0.132] [0.124]
R2n 0.089 0.093 0.102 0.123 0.078 0.082 0.092 0.112
R2n(p) 0.092 0.096 0.104 0.124 0.081 0.085 0.093 0.113
Sample: N = 1, 372, d¯ = 0.544, p¯ = 0.769, SD(p) = 0.197
(E) Actual completion, conditional on intentions
p 0.467 0.479 0.439 0.421 0.454 0.455 0.430 0.410
(0.198) (0.202) (0.206) (0.210) (0.197) (0.200) (0.205) (0.208)
[0.185] [0.189] [0.174] [0.167] [0.180] [0.180] [0.170] [0.162]
R2n 0.095 0.098 0.108 0.127 0.084 0.087 0.097 0.117
R2n(p) 0.099 0.101 0.110 0.129 0.088 0.090 0.099 0.119
Sample: N = 1, 244, d¯ = 0.547, p¯ = 0.778, SD(p) = 0.190
Academic - + + + - + + +
Personality - - + + - - + +
Family - - - + - - - +
Labor market - - - + - - - +
Note: Table presents coefficients (robust standard errors in round and average marginal effects
in squared brackets), from probit (1)-(4) and probit endogenous explanatory variable (5)-(8)
regressions of varying educational outcomes on subjective completion beliefs and varying sets
of covariate, in (1) on in high school, region and time fixed effects, (2) adds academic, (3) adds
personality, (4) to (8) family background, individual, and local labor market characteristics.
Source: SOEP 2000-2013, INKAR 2012, own calculations.
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Table A.2.4: Robustness: GPA standardized within federal states and including a fifth order
polynominal in GPA
GPA, std by federal states GPA, polynomial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(A) Intention-to-invest
p 0.921 0.811 0.727 0.718 0.921 0.807 0.724 0.716
(0.142) (0.146) (0.148) (0.150) (0.142) (0.146) (0.149) (0.150)
[0.140] [0.122] [0.108] [0.105] [0.140] [0.121] [0.108] [0.104]
R2n 0.029 0.040 0.048 0.058 0.029 0.041 0.049 0.060
R2n(p) 0.049 0.055 0.059 0.069 0.049 0.056 0.060 0.071
Sample: N = 3, 610, d¯ = 0.908, p¯ = 0.776, SD(p) = 0.198
(B) Actual investment
p 0.997 0.923 0.915 0.865 0.997 0.889 0.883 0.839
(0.223) (0.228) (0.240) (0.249) (0.223) (0.227) (0.240) (0.250)
[0.069] [0.062] [0.056] [0.044] [0.069] [0.057] [0.051] [0.040]
R2n 0.087 0.100 0.122 0.184 0.087 0.109 0.132 0.192
R2n(p) 0.113 0.121 0.141 0.199 0.113 0.128 0.149 0.206
Sample: N = 2, 116, d¯ = 0.956, p¯ = 0.772, SD(p) = 0.201
(C) Actual investment, conditional on intentions
p 0.901 0.858 0.847 0.729 0.901 0.838 0.832 0.719
(0.256) (0.261) (0.272) (0.275) (0.256) (0.263) (0.275) (0.282)
[0.058] [0.054] [0.049] [0.031] [0.058] [0.050] [0.045] [0.030]
R2n 0.085 0.095 0.114 0.205 0.085 0.102 0.123 0.212
R2n(p) 0.104 0.110 0.129 0.214 0.104 0.117 0.137 0.221
Sample: N = 1, 919, d¯ = 0.961, p¯ = 0.781, SD(p) = 0.192
(D) Actual completion
p 0.434 0.412 0.354 0.334 0.434 0.421 0.368 0.352
(0.181) (0.185) (0.189) (0.192) (0.181) (0.185) (0.190) (0.193)
[0.172] [0.163] [0.140] [0.133] [0.172] [0.167] [0.146] [0.140]
R2n 0.089 0.093 0.102 0.123 0.089 0.097 0.106 0.127
R2n(p) 0.092 0.096 0.104 0.124 0.092 0.099 0.108 0.129
Sample: N = 1, 372, d¯ = 0.544, p¯ = 0.769, SD(p) = 0.197
(E) Actual completion, conditional on intentions
p 0.467 0.479 0.440 0.423 0.467 0.498 0.463 0.445
(0.198) (0.202) (0.206) (0.210) (0.198) (0.203) (0.207) (0.211)
[0.185] [0.190] [0.174] [0.167] [0.185] [0.197] [0.183] [0.176]
R2n 0.095 0.098 0.108 0.127 0.095 0.102 0.111 0.131
R2n(p) 0.099 0.101 0.110 0.129 0.099 0.105 0.114 0.133
Sample: N = 1, 244, d¯ = 0.547, p¯ = 0.778, SD(p) = 0.190
Academic - + + + - + + +
Personality - - + + - - + +
Family - - - + - - - +
Labor market - - - + - - - +
Note: Table presents coefficients (robust standard errors in round and average marginal effects
in squared brackets), from probit (1)-(4) and probit endogenous explanatory variable (5)-(8)
regressions of varying educational outcomes on subjective completion beliefs and varying sets
of covariate, in (1) on in high school, region and time fixed effects, (2) adds academic, (3) adds
personality, (4) to (8) family background, individual, and local labor market characteristics.
Source: SOEP 2000-2013, INKAR 2012, own calculations.
131
Table A.2.5: Robustness: separate regressions by high school attendance
Not in high school In high school
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(A) Intention-to-invest
p 0.988 0.880 0.802 0.801 0.655 0.446 0.424 0.466
(0.160) (0.164) (0.167) (0.168) (0.303) (0.311) (0.324) (0.335)
[0.178] [0.158] [0.142] [0.139] [0.071] [0.048] [0.043] [0.042]
R2n 0.018 0.030 0.042 0.052 0.030 0.042 0.059 0.088
R2n(p) 0.045 0.051 0.058 0.068 0.036 0.044 0.062 0.091
N 2’125 2’125 2’125 2’125 1’485 1’476 1’476 1’473
(B) Actual investment
p 1.018 0.993 1.002 0.992 1.122 0.557 -0.013 -1.082
(0.243) (0.249) (0.261) (0.277) (0.622) (0.605) (0.726) (0.966)
[0.097] [0.092] [0.086] [0.068] [0.036] [0.010] [0.000] [0.000]
R2n 0.067 0.080 0.103 0.183 0.078 0.187 0.328 0.464
R2n(p) 0.097 0.106 0.128 0.204 0.099 0.191 0.328 0.469
N 1356 1356 1356 1355 584 582 582 577
(C) Actual investment, conditional on intentions
p 0.950 0.979 0.992 0.934 0.710 0.088 -0.634 -3.554
(0.281) (0.285) (0.291) (0.311) (0.653) (0.651) (0.823) (1.551)
[0.080] [0.080] [0.074] [0.044] [0.024] [0.002] [-0.002] [0.000]
R2n 0.081 0.090 0.115 0.249 0.071 0.183 0.330 0.505
R2n(p) 0.103 0.113 0.136 0.264 0.078 0.183 0.333 0.538
N 1207 1207 1207 1206 546 544 544 539
(D) Actual completion
p 0.534 0.501 0.420 0.367 0.247 0.193 0.213 0.230
(0.212) (0.215) (0.219) (0.225) (0.347) (0.359) (0.380) (0.391)
[0.203] [0.190] [0.159] [0.139] [0.097] [0.076] [0.084] [0.088]
R2n 0.055 0.062 0.071 0.103 0.115 0.120 0.141 0.170
R2n(p) 0.061 0.067 0.075 0.105 0.116 0.120 0.141 0.171
N 802 802 802 801 570 570 568 564
(E) Actual completion, conditional on intentions
p 0.490 0.500 0.441 0.401 0.460 0.411 0.414 0.468
(0.238) (0.241) (0.246) (0.252) (0.362) (0.374) (0.394) (0.406)
[0.183] [0.187] [0.165] [0.150] [0.180] [0.161] [0.162] [0.179]
R2n 0.063 0.067 0.076 0.107 0.110 0.114 0.132 0.163
R2n(p) 0.068 0.072 0.080 0.109 0.112 0.115 0.134 0.165
N 709 709 709 708 535 535 533 529
Academic - + + + - + + +
Personality - - + + - - + +
Family - - - + - - - +
Labor market - - - + - - - +
Note: Table presents coefficients (robust standard errors in round and average marginal effects
in squared brackets), from probit (1)-(4) and probit endogenous explanatory variable (5)-(8)
regressions of varying educational outcomes on subjective completion beliefs and varying sets
of covariate, in (1) on in high school, region and time fixed effects, (2) adds academic, (3) adds
personality, (4) to (8) family background, individual, and local labor market characteristics.
Source: SOEP 2000-2013, INKAR 2012, own calculations.
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B.1 Derivation of the probability function of the dy-
namic hurdle model
The probability of a zero in the DH model equals the probability of a zero in a Poisson model
with rate λ0, further visit follow a Poisson distribution with λ1, which depends on the remaining
time in the quarter T − t. The density can be written
Pr(Y = k|λ0, λ1) =
∫ T
0
exp(−λ0t)λ0 exp(−λ1(T − t))(λ1(T − t))
k−1
(k − 1)! dt.
If λ0 = λ1 = λ, it reduces to the standard Poisson:
Pr(Y = k|λ) =
∫ T
0
exp(−λt)λ exp(−λ(T − t))(λ(T − t))
k−1
(k − 1)! dt
= exp(−λT )λ
k
k!
∫ T
0
k(T − t)k−1dt
= exp(−λT )λ
k
k!
(
−(T − t)k
∣∣∣T
0
)
= exp(−λT )(λT )
k
k!
For example, if λ0 < λ1 and k = 1, the probability is
Pr(Y = 1|λ0, λ1) =
∫ T
0
exp(−λ0t) exp(−λ1(T − t))dt
= λ0 exp(−λ1T )
∫ T
0
exp((λ1 − λ0)t)dt
= λ0 exp(−λ1T )exp((λ1 − λ0)T )− 1
(λ1 − λ0)
=
λ0
λ1 − λ0 [exp(−λ0T )− exp(−λ1T )]. (B.1)
In general, for k = 1, 2, 3, . . . , we have
Pr(Y = k|λ0, λ1) =
∫ T
0
exp(−λ0t)λ0 exp(−λ1(T − t))(λ1(T − t))
k−1
(k − 1)! dt
= λ0λ
k−1
1 exp(−λ1T )
∫ T
0
exp((λ1 − λ0)t)(T − t)
k−1
(k − 1)! dt,
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integrating by parts, yields
∫ T
0
exp((λ1 − λ0)t)(T − t))
k−1
(k − 1)! dt =
∫ T
0
v′(t)u(t) = v(t)u(t)−
∫ T
0
v(t)u′(t)dt
u′(t) = (k − 1)(T − t)
k−2
(k − 1)! =
(T − t)k−2
(k − 2)!
v(t) =
exp(λ1 − λ0)t
λ1 − λ0
rewriting the term under the integral
Pr(Y = k|λ0, λ1) = λ0λk−11 exp(−λ1T )
×
(
exp((λ1 − λ0)t)(T − t)k−1
(λ1 − λ0)(k − 1)!
∣∣∣∣T
0
+
∫ T
0
exp((λ1 − λ0)t)(T − t)k−2
(λ1 − λ0)(k − 2)! dt
)
= −λ0λ
k−1
1 exp(−λ1T )
(λ1 − λ0)(k − 1)! T
k−1
+
λ1
λ1 − λ0
∫ T
0
exp(−λ0t)λ0 exp(−λ1(T − t))λ
k−2
1 (T − t)k−2
(k − 2)! dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(Y=k−1|λ0,λ1)
=
λ1
λ1 − λ0︸ ︷︷ ︸
α
Pr(Y = k − 1|λ0, λ1)− λ0λ
k−1
1 exp(−λ1T )
(λ1 − λ0)(k − 1)! T
k−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ck
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Solving the recursive equation pk = αpk−1 + ck and pluging in equation (1), we have
Pr(Y = k|λ0, λ1) = αk−1Pr(k = 1|λ0, λ1) +
k−2∑
j=0
αjck−j
=
λk−11
(λ1 − λ0)k−1
λ0
λ1 − λ0 [exp(−λ0T )− exp(−λ1T )]
−
k−2∑
j=0
λj1
(λ1 − λ0)j
λ0λ
k−j−1
1 exp(−λ1T )
(λ1 − λ0)(k − j − 1)!T
k−j−1
=
λ0λ
k−1
1
(λ1 − λ0)k [exp(−λ0T )− exp(−λ1T )]
− λ0λk−11 exp(−λ1T )
k−2∑
j=0
1
(λ1 − λ0)j+1
T k−j−1
(k − j − 1)!
=
λ0λ
k−1
1
(λ1 − λ0)k [exp(−λ0T )− exp(−λ1T )] +
λ0λ
k−1
1
(λ1 − λ0)k exp(−λ1T )
− λ0λk−11 exp(−λ1T )
k−1∑
j=0
1
(λ1 − λ0)j+1
T k−j−1
(k − j − 1)!
=
λ0λ
k−1
1
(λ1 − λ0)k exp(−λ0T )− λ0λ
k−1
1 exp(−λ1T )
k−1∑
j=0
1
(λ1 − λ0)j+1
T k−j−1
(k − j − 1)!
=
λ0λ
k−1
1 exp(−λ0T )
(λ1 − λ0)k
(
1− exp(−(λ1 − λ0)T )
k−1∑
j=0
(λ1 − λ0)(k−1)−j
((k − 1)− j)! T
(k−1)−j
)
=
λ0λ
k−1
1 exp(−λ0T )
(λ1 − λ0)k
(
1−
k−1∑
j=0
exp(−(λ1 − λ0)T )(λ1 − λ0)
j
j!
T j
)
Where from line 3 to 4, we use
∑k−2
j=0 fj(x) =
∑k−1
j=0 fj(x)−fk−1(x) and k−j−1 = k−(k−1)−1 =
0. In sum, the individual density of the dynamic hurdle model can be written as
DHurdle(k, λ0, λ1, T ) =
exp(−λ0T )
(λ0T )k
k!
, for λ0 = λ1
exp(−λ0T )1[k=0] ×
[
λ0λ
k−1
1 exp(−λ0T )
(λ1−λ0)k
(
1−∑k−1j=0 exp(−(λ1 − λ0)T ) (λ1−λ0)jj! T j)]1[k>0] , else.
Dealing with mismatch
Consider the reporting period (0 + r, T + r). Observations with r = T , follow dynamic hurdle
process given above. Suppose the first sickness event occurred between 0 and r for which the
visits are not reported, this occurs with probability given by Pr(YA > 0) = 1 − exp(−λ0r).
Then the individual already payed the fee and has 0 monetary costs from visiting a doctor.
Consequently, all visits between r and end of quarter T follow a Poisson distribution with
Poisson(s;λ1(T − r)). By contrast, if there was no previous visit Pr(YA = 0) = exp(−λ0r)
there is simply a dynamic hurdle process with a reduced duration DHurdle(s;λ0, λ1, T − r).
136
Additionally, the second period overlapping with the new quarter which follows a dynamic
hurdle process DHurdle(k−s;λ0, λ1, r). Since it is unknown when doctoral visits occurred, we
sum over all possible combinations:
DHurdlerep(k, λ0, λ1, r)
= DHurdle(k;λ0, λ1, 1)
1[r=T ] ×
[
k∑
s=0
Pr(YB = s) Pr(YC = k − s)
]1[r 6=T ]
= DHurdle(k;λ0, λ1, T )
1[r=T ]
×
[
k∑
s=0
[(1− exp(−λ0r))× Poisson(s;λ1(T − r)) + exp(−λ0r)×DHurdle(s;λ0, λ1, T − r)]
×DHurdle(k − s;λ0, λ1, r)]1[r 6=T ] .
Estimation
For our main estimation, we use longitudinal information and estimate the pooled model l =
i× t, the individual likelihood can be written
ll(yl;λl,0, λl,1, T ) = DHurdle(yl;λl,0, λl,1, T ).
We replace the DHurdle(·) with the DHurdlerep(·) for the reporting time mismatch.
Now we introduce log-normal unobserved heterogeneity, by
ll(yl;λl,0, λl,1, T ) =
∫
DHurdle(yl;λl,0, λl,1, T, εi)f(εi) dεi
which we approximate by Gauss-Hermit Quadrature using m-quadrature points, exploiting the
panel dimension with the assumption that the heterogeneity is constant across time. Due to
numerical properties, we estimate the model in wide format by appropriately constraining the
parameters to be equal across time periods. The log-likelihood can be written
logL(yit; σ, λit,0, λit,1, T ) =
∑
i
log
1√
pi
∑
m
wm
∏
t
DHurdle(yit;λit,0
√
2amσ;λit,1
√
2amσ, T ),
where am and wm are quadrature abscissas and weights. We replace the DHurdle(·) with the
DHurdlerep(·) for the reporting time mismatch.
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B.2 Monte Carlo Simulation
We illustrate the small sample properties of the dynamic hurdle model by Monte Carlo simu-
lations.
Model 1
The data generating process is given by:
n = 5, 000;
xi1 ∼ Unifrom(0, 2)
xi2 = 1[xi1 + 0.2ri1 > 1], with ri1 ∼ N(0, 1)
λi0 = exp(−0.5 + 0.5xi1 − 0.2xi2)
λi1 = exp(0.1 + 0.8xi1 + 0.5xi2)
ti = − ln(ri2)/λi0, with ri2 ∼ Unifrom(0, 1)
yi =

 0 if ti > 1,1 + ri4 otherwise, where ri4 ∼ Poisson(λi1(1− ti)).
In the Table B.2.1 we present the maximum likelihood estimation results of a poisson, a cloglog
and zero truncated poisson (fixed hurdle), and our dynamic hurled regression, in that order.
Table B.2.1: Monte Carlo Simulation results: DGP 1 (1,000 replications)
True Poisson Fixed Hurdle Dynamic Hurdle
λ0 λ1 λˆ λˆ0 λˆ1 λˆ0 λˆ1
Cons -0.5 0.1 -0.41 -0.50 0.04 -0.50 0.10
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
x1 0.5 0.8 0.90 0.50 0.72 0.50 0.80
(0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05)
x2 -0.2 0.5 0.16 -0.20 0.38 -0.20 0.50
(0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06)
ll -10,640.75 -8,910.06 -8,800.90
The results are reassuring even for a relatively small sample of 5,000 cross-sectional observations.
The dynamic hurdle regression is performing well. For this basic example, the fixed hurdle also
does relatively well at least qualitatively.
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Model 2
The model is identical to Model 1, besides the log-normal unobserved heterogeneity which is
generated by
εi = exp(−1.9)ri3, with ri3 ∼ N(0, 1)
λεij = λijεi, for j = 0, 1
In Table B.2.2 we present the maximum likelihood estimation results of a poisson, a cloglog
and zero truncated poisson (fixed hurdle), and our dynamic hurled regressions. Both zero
truncated and the dynamic hurdle now allow for a log-normal unobserved heterogeneity, which
is approximated by Gauss-Hermit quadrature.
Table B.2.2: Monte Carlo Simulation results: DGP 2 (500 replications)
True Poisson Fixed Hurdle Dynamic Hurdle
λ0 λ1 λˆ λˆ0 λˆ1 λˆ0 λˆ1
Cons -0.5 0.1 -0.40 -0.50 -0.02 -0.50 0.10
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
x1 0.5 0.8 0.90 0.50 0.72 0.50 0.80
(0.03) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05)
x2 -0.2 0.5 0.17 -0.20 0.39 -0.20 0.50
(0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.6)
ln(σ) -1.9 -1.00 -1.98
(0.05) (0.39)
ll -10,866.09 -8,919.53 -8,898.51
The dynamic hurdle model works well for this data generating process. Note, however, that
the dynamic hurdle model did not converge in 14/500 replications.
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Model 3
The model is identical to Model 1, besides that we vary the reporting time rg such that (rg, T +
rg). Therefore, we generate two time periods (quarters) of 90 days. Within each time period
(0, T ) and (T, 2T ) we draw the first and second event as above but allocating events to days
in each quarter. We randomly select observations to one of two groups g, for which we set the
reporting interval to r1 = 0 and r2 = 15, respectively.
In Table B.2.3 we present the maximum likelihood estimation results of a poisson, a cloglog
and zero truncated poisson (fixed hurdle), and our dynamic hurled regressions. For the models
besides the dynamic hurdle drop observations where rg = 15.
Table B.2.3: Monte Carlo Simulation results: DGP 3 (500 replications)
True Poisson Fixed Hurdle Dynamic Hurdle
λ0 λ1 λˆ λˆ0 λˆ1 λˆ0 λˆ1
Cons -0.5 0.1 -0.41 -0.50 0.05 -0.50 0.10
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
x1 0.5 0.8 0.90 0.50 0.72 0.50 0.80
(0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
x2 -0.2 0.5 0.15 -0.21 0.38 -0.21 0.49
(0.05) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
N 2,498 2,498 1,491 5,000
ll -5,303.06 -4,450.61 -8,825.88
Similar to the previous data generating processes, the dynamic hurdle does very well estimating
the parameters. Also the second advantage, of adjusting the the mismatch in terms of sample
size comes into play here. Note, that in the simulation the rg is independent of the covariates
which is questionable in real applications, therefore, results are likely to be worse in practice
for the other models.
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Model 4
The model is identical to Model 1, besides both unobserved heterogeneity as in Model 2 and
reporting time mismatch as in Model 3.
In Table B.2.4 we present the maximum likelihood estimation results of a poisson, a cloglog
and zero truncated poisson (fixed hurdle), and our dynamic hurled regressions. Again number
of observations are reduced for all models besides the dynamic hurdle model, and both the zero
truncated poisson as well as our dynamic hurdle account for the unobserved heterogeneity.
Table B.2.4: Monte Carlo Simulation results: DGP 4 (50 replications)
True Poisson Fixed Hurdle Dynamic Hurdle
λ0 λ1 λˆ λˆ0 λˆ1 λˆ0 λˆ1
Cons -0.5 0.1 -0.40 -0.49 -0.02 -0.49 0.10
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
x1 0.5 0.8 0.89 0.49 0.72 0.50 0.80
(0.04) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
x2 -0.2 0.5 0.17 -0.20 0.39 -0.20 0.50
(0.05) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
ln(σ) -1.9 -1.00 -1.99
(0.07) (0.40)
N 2,498 2,498 1,491 5,000
ll -5,406.33 -4,449.53 -8,924.77
Also for the most complicated data generating process the dynamic hurdle does very well even
for the small sample size. Note, the dynamic hurdle did not converge in 3/100 cases.
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C.1 Math literacy
In this Appendix, I present the analysis using math literacy scores as dependent variable (aver-
age of five Plausible Values), all other steps are equal to in the main specification. The results
are highly significant economically and statistically. Qualitatively the math results confirm the
reading results presented in the main text.
Table C.1.1: Second-generation immigrant-native math test score gaps
Overall sample Selected sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Germany
without Aussiedler
Immigrant -60.24 -23.09 -8.31 -76.25 -35.47 -20.23
(4.37) (4.24) (4.83) (5.21) (5.47) (6.51)
NObs 3,791 3,791 3,791 3,632 3,632 3,632
Panel B: Switzerland
German-speaking
Immigrant -62.47 -32.74 -22.21 -69.04 -36.23 -11.11
(2.40) (2.44) (2.85) (3.42) (3.46) (4.71)
NObs 8,292 8,292 8,292 5,249 5,249 5,249
German-speaking without
Western Europeans
and Albanians
Immigrant -70.84 -36.73 -12.28
(3.46) (3.56) (5.01)
NObs 5,189 5,189 5,189
Covariates
Other No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Language No No Yes No No Yes
Note: Immigrants’ children are born within the country of testing and
have both parents born outside of the country. Natives’ children have
both parents born in the country of testing. (1) and (4) report OLS
regressions of reading test scores on an Immigrant dummy; (2) and
(5) additionally include individual and family background characteris-
tics (Other); (3) and (6) add the German speaking at home indicator,
each for the respective sample selection. Robust standard errors are given
in brackets. NObs stands for Number of Observations.
Source: PISA 2009, own calculations.
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Table C.1.2: Mean gap decomposition between Swiss and German immigrants’ children math
test scores, adjusted to other countries characteristics
Actual BO adjustment Matching adjustment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Swiss students adjusted to German students’ characteristics
YCHE 484.81 487.14 484.41 492.58 490.05 484.58 487.10 484.55 484.92
YDEU 452.15
∆X 2.33 -0.40 7.77 5.24 0.22 -2.30 0.25 -0.12
(3.78) (4.02) (5.71) (5.70) (3.12) (3.19) (5.94) (5.61)
∆S 32.66 30.33 33.06 24.89 27.42 32.43 34.95 32.41 32.77
(6.01) (6.35) (6.15) (7.17) (7.45) (5.87) (6.20) (7.47) (7.56)
Panel B: German students adjusted to Swiss students’ characteristics
YCHE 484.81
YDEU 452.15 442.01 438.11 436.03 432.04 449.70 446.23 451.22 450.49
∆X -10.14 -14.04 -16.12 -20.11 -2.45 -5.91 -0.93 -1.66
(4.60) (5.40) (9.12) (9.40) (3.47) (4.08) (6.24) (6.55)
∆S 32.66 42.80 46.70 48.78 52.76 35.11 38.57 33.58 34.32
(6.01) (6.51) (6.93) (9.57) (9.83) (5.92) (6.44) (8.06) (8.10)
Covariates
Other No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
German No No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Origin No No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Number of Observations
N 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,152 1,153 1,023 1,037
NCHE 824 824 824 824 824 797 798 668 682
NDEU 356 356 356 356 356 355 355 355 355
Note: Immigrants’ children are born within the country of testing and have both parents born outside
of the country. (1) Unconditional gap; (2) to (5) BO adjustment: uses a twofold Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition based on (2) gender, age in month, educational level of parents, highest occupation of the
parents and number of books at home; (3) adds German spoken at home; (4) uses (2) and country of
origin; and (5) uses (2), (3), and (4); (6) to (9) Matching adjustment is performed by propensity score
matching with Gaussian kernel and bandwidth 0.1, the propensity score is estimated by logit regression
on the same covariates as in the BO adjustment. All standard errors given in brackets, are simulated
with 500 bootstrap replications.
Source: PISA 2009, own calculations.
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Table C.1.3: Mean gap decomposition between Swiss and German children math test scores,
adjusted to other countries characteristics
Unfavorable background Turkish Natives
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Swiss students adjusted to German students’ characteristics
YCHE 463.77 473.75 458.12 464.29 454.25 476.65 555.70 550.65 557.86
YDEU 414.99 434.60 529.25
∆X 9.98 5.66 -10.04 -12.37 -5.05 -2.17
(9.18) (8.49) (11.07) (9.75) (0.95) (0.64)
∆S 48.79 38.81 43.13 29.68 39.72 42.05 26.45 31.50 28.61
(11.88) (13.81) (13.29) (10.89) (12.97) (13.47) (2.08) (1.78) (1.93)
Panel B: German students adjusted to Swiss students’ characteristics
YCHE 463.77 464.29 555.70
YDEU 414.99 432.59 423.00 434.60 414.24 417.87 529.25 522.82 526.04
∆X 17.60 8.01 -20.36 -16.73 -6.43 -3.21
(13.10) (8.75) (7.82) (6.78) (1.20) (0.83)
∆S 48.79 31.19 40.77 29.68 50.04 46.42 26.45 32.88 29.66
(11.88) (16.10) (11.62) (10.89) (11.41) (11.48) (2.08) (1.89) (1.83)
Covariates
Other* No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
German No No No No Yes Yes No No No
Number of Observations
N 269 269 196 296 296 287 7,600 7,600 7,594
NCHE 212 212 140 109 109 105 4,362 4,362 4,359
NDEU 57 57 56 187 187 182 3,238 3,238 3,235
Note: Immigrants’ children are born within the country of testing and have both parents born outside
of the country. Unconditional gap for immigrants’ children with low parental background characteristics
(1), Turkish descendants (4) and native students (both parents born in the country of testing) (7); *(2),
(5), and (8) BO adjustment: uses a twofold Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition based in (2) on gender, age in
month, educational level of parents categories (1) and (2), highest occupation of the parents and number
of books at home (1) to (3) and those that do not speak German at home; (5) uses all Other covariates of
Table 3.4; (8) uses those of (5) without the primary education category for parental schooling; (3), (6), and
(9) Matching adjustment performed by propensity score matching with Gaussian kernel and bandwidth
0.1, the propensity score is estimated by logit regression on the same covariates as in the respective BO
adjustments. All standard errors given in brackets are simulated with 500 bootstrap replications.
Source: PISA 2009, own calculations.
146
Table C.1.4: Descriptive statistics of school characteristics visited by second-generation
immigrant students by country
Variables Switzerland Germany
Number of
Math lessons in school 4.62 4.22
(1.10) (1.06)
[824] [345]
all lessons in school 33.65 31.81
(3.44) (3.84)
[809] [343]
Math lessons out-of-school 0.55 0.79
(1.25) (1.49)
[598] [227]
Average math peer quality
immigrants’ children in school 497.03 466.57
(71.31) (79.41)
+ natives in school 530.95 487.85
(62.58) (79.13)
Note: Switzerland refers to the German-speaking part only. School level
variables imputed on school level. Standard deviations are given in round
and number of observations if they differ from those in the main specifi-
cation (CHE: 824; DEU: 356) in squared brackets. Math lessons out-of-
school was assessed categorically, the average is taken after redefinition
by the midpoint of the categories that represent hours (the highest cat-
egory was 6 and more, which is coded as 6). The average peer quality
is first estimated by using only the second-generation migrants in school
and then additionally using the natives in school. These are then binned
into categories of 25 test score point steps from 300 to 650.
Source: PISA 2009, own calculations.
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Table C.1.5: Mean gap decomposition between Swiss and German immigrants’ children math
test scores, adjusted to other countries characteristics
School characteristics
BO adjustment Matching adjustment
(1) (2)* (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)* (8) (9) (10)
Panel A: Swiss students adjusted to German students’ characteristics
YCHE 485.21 484.58 479.53 457.83 447.55 487.10 482.59 482.57 465.45 461.93
YDEU 452.15 455.21 452.15 452.15 452.15 452.15 455.21 452.15 452.15 452.15
∆X -0.40 -0.50 5.28 26.98 37.26 -2.30 1.50 2.24 19.35 22.88
(3.92) (4.54) (4.48) (5.55) (5.99) (3.32) (3.94) (3.81) (4.22) (4.44)
∆S 33.06 29.37 27.37 5.68 -4.60 34.95 27.37 30.42 13.31 9.78
(6.35) (6.60) (5.53) (4.05) (5.07) (5.96) (5.95) (5.82) (4.62) (5.26)
Panel B: German students adjusted to Swiss students’ characteristics
YCHE 484.81 484.08 484.81 484.81 484.81 484.81 484.08 484.81 484.81 484.81
YDEU 438.11 439.61 448.56 477.42 483.91 446.23 444.35 454.99 473.06 483.11
∆X -14.04 -15.60 -3.59 25.27 31.76 -5.91 -10.86 2.84 20.92 30.96
(5.55) (5.62) (5.40) (5.77) (5.96) (4.18) (5.17) (4.69) (5.71) (5.72)
∆S 46.70 44.47 36.25 7.39 0.90 38.57 39.73 29.82 11.74 1.70
(6.55) (6.81) (6.18) (4.19) (5.19) (5.97) (6.45) (6.16) (5.06) (5.76)
Covariates
Other Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
German Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lessons No Yes No No No No Yes No No No
Prop. Mig. No No Yes No No No No Yes No No
Peer quality
Migrants No No No Yes No No No No Yes No
+ Natives No No No No Yes No No No No Yes
Observations
N 1,180 1,152 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,153 1,137 1,146 1,143 1,105
NCHE 824 809 824 824 824 798 808 790 788 750
NDEU 356 343 356 356 356 355 329 356 355 355
Note: Immigrants’ children are born within the country of testing and have both parents born outside of the
country. (1) and (5) are the same as Columns (3) and (7) from Table A.2. (2)* and (7)* include number of math
lessons in school, in this decompositions the reference sample is reduced due to the inability to impute based on
school level, the test score average before adjustment is 484.08 in Switzerland, 455.21 in Germany, and a raw gap of
28.87. (3) and (8) include the proportion of migrants in school. (4) and (9) the average peer reading test schore of
migrants in school only, and (5) and (9) including additionally native children in school. (1) to (5) BO adjustment
as described in Table 3. (6) to (10) Matching adjustment is performed by propensity score matching with Gaussian
kernel and bandwidth 0.1, the propensity score is estimated by logit regression on the same covariates as in the
BO adjustment. All standard errors given in brackets, are simulated with 500 bootstrap replications.
Source: PISA 2009, own calculations.
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C.2 Robustness checks
In this Appendix, I present the main Table 3 using reading literacy scores (average of five Plau-
sible Values) as dependent variable. First, I include the French-, German- and Italian-speaking
parts of Switzerland. Second, I present the main results for all immigrant students including
Aussiedler, Albanians and Western Europeans. Third, I use sampling weights, Nearest Neigh-
bor matching (1 and 5), and vary the bandwidth (0.095 and 0.105) of the main specification.
Next, I use only the first plausible value, base the imputation mechanism on all observations
within a country and use regressions (ordered probit and ordinary least squares) to predict the
missing values.
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Table C.2.1: Mean gap decomposition between Swiss and German immigrants’ children reading
test scores, adjusted to other countries characteristics:
All areas
Actual BO adjustment Matching adjustment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Swiss students adjusted to German students’ characteristics
YCHE 460.59 466.99 467.37 480.38 480.22 457.71 457.52 446.90 446.77
YDEU 439.05
∆X 6.40 6.78 19.79 19.63 2.88 3.07 13.69 13.83
(3.01) (2.65) (4.28) (4.21) (2.10) (2.08) (5.02) (5.52)
∆S 21.55 15.15 14.76 1.76 1.92 18.67 18.47 7.86 7.72
(5.75) (5.88) (5.27) (5.95) (5.91) (5.25) (5.37) (6.45) (7.08)
Panel B: German students adjusted to Swiss students’ characteristics
YCHE 460.59
YDEU 439.05 434.74 435.76 437.09 437.43 440.14 440.61 449.06 449.12
∆X -4.31 -3.29 -1.96 -1.62 1.09 1.56 10.01 10.07
(4.81) (4.79) (7.84) (7.95) (3.34) (3.26) (6.20) (5.83)
21.55 25.86 24.84 23.51 23.17 20.46 19.99 11.54 11.48
(5.75) (6.18) (6.17) (8.31) (8.53) (5.45) (5.84) (7.18) (7.43)
Covariates
Other No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
German No No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Origin No No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations
N 1,962 1,962 1,962 1,962 1,962 1,940 1,950 1,742 1,753
NCHE 1,606 1,606 1,606 1,606 1,606 1,584 1,594 1,387 1,398
NDEU 356 356 356 356 356 356 356 355 355
Note: Immigrants’ children are born within the country of testing and have both parents born outside of the
country. (1) Unconditional gap; (2) to (5) BO adjustment: uses a twofold Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
based on (2) gender, age in month, educational level of parents, highest occupation of the parents and
number of books at home; (3) adds German spoken at home; (4) uses (2) and country of origin; and
(5) uses (2), (3), and (4); (6) to (9) Matching adjustment is performed by propensity score matching
with Gaussian kernel and bandwidth 0.1, the propensity score is estimated by logit regression on the
same covariates as in the BO adjustment. All standard errors given in brackets, are simulated with 500
bootstrap replications.
Source: PISA 2009, own calculations.
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Table C.2.2: Mean gap decomposition between Swiss and German immigrants’ children reading
test scores, adjusted to other countries characteristics:
All migrants
Actual BO adjustment Matching adjustment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Swiss students adjusted to German students’ characteristics
YCHE 458.50 458.44 453.4 461.93 455.07 460.55 463.60 457.65 459.88
YDEU 454.39
∆X -0.06 -5.10 3.43 -0.61 -2.05 -5.10 0.85 -1.38
(3.16) (3.68) (4.31) (4.38) (2.70) (2.96) (4.56) (4.48)
∆S 4.11 4.17 9.21 0.68 4.72 6.16 9.21 3.26 5.49
(5.21) (5.20) (5.09) (5.62) (5.25) (5.35) (5.21) (5.94) (5.85)
Panel B: German students adjusted to Swiss students’ characteristics
YCHE 458.50
YDEU 454.39 441.16 434.22 443.42 438.40 447.88 442.68 455.32 452.22
∆X -13.23 -20.17 -10.97 -16.35 -6.51 -11.71 0.93 -2.17
(4.35) (4.57) (7.53) (7.66) (3.60) (3.61) (5.57) (5.95)
∆S 4.11 17.34 24.28 15.09 20.46 10.62 15.82 3.18 6.28
(5.21) (5.54) (5.34) (8.19) (8.34) (5.37) (5.38) (6.50) (6.75)
Covariates
Other No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
German No No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Origin No No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations
N 1,399 1,399 1,399 1,399 1,399 1,373 1,375 1,261 1,274
NCHE 884 884 884 884 884 859 863 747 760
NDEU 515 515 515 515 515 514 512 514 514
Note: Immigrants’ children are born within the country of testing and have both parents born outside of the
country. (1) Unconditional gap; (2) to (5) BO adjustment: uses a twofold Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
based on (2) gender, age in month, educational level of parents, highest occupation of the parents and
number of books at home; (3) adds German spoken at home; (4) uses (2) and country of origin and
(5) uses (2), (3), and (4); (6) to (9) Matching adjustment is performed by propensity score matching
with Gaussian kernel and bandwidth 0.1, the propensity score is estimated by logit regression on the
same covariates as in the BO adjustment. All standard errors given in brackets, are simulated with 500
bootstrap replications.
Source: PISA 2009, own calculations.
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Table C.2.3: Mean gap decomposition between Swiss and German immigrants’ children reading
test scores, adjusted to other countries characteristics:
Sampling weights
Actual BO adjustment Matching adjustment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Swiss students adjusted to German students’ characteristics
YCHE 456.60 462.12 458.81 475.44 472.38 455.84 458.58 451.29 452.45
YDEU 441.42
∆X 5.52 2.21 18.84 15.78 0.77 -1.98 5.31 4.16
(4.20) (4.34) (5.59) (5.69) (4.01) (3.97) (6.37) (6.50)
∆S 15.18 9.66 12.97 -3.66 -0.60 14.41 17.16 9.87 11.02
(5.83) (6.28) (6.31) (7.07) (7.10) (5.74) (5.59) (7.73) (7.31)
Panel B: German students adjusted to Swiss students’ characteristics
YCHE 456.60
YDEU 441.42 432.64 429.34 436.79 433.73 437.90 433.66 444.84 443.73
∆X -8.78 -12.08 -4.63 -7.69 -3.52 -7.77 3.42 2.30
(5.06) (5.26) (8.87) (8.92) (4.50) (4.66) (6.75) (6.93)
∆S 15.18 23.96 27.26 19.81 22.87 18.70 22.95 11.76 12.88
(5.83) (6.66) (6.75) (9.75) (9.76) (6.95) (6.88) (7.88) (7.83)
Covariates
Other No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
German No No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Origin No No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations
N 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,152 1,153 1,023 1,037
NCHE 824 824 824 824 824 797 798 668 682
NDEU 356 356 356 356 356 355 355 355 355
Note: Immigrants’ children are born within the country of testing and have both parents born outside of the
country. (1) Unconditional gap; (2) to (5) BO adjustment: uses a twofold Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
based on (2) gender, age in month, educational level of parents, highest occupation of the parents and
number of books at home; (3) adds German spoken at home; (4) uses (2) and country of origin; and
(5) uses (2), (3), and (4); (6) to (9) Matching adjustment is performed by propensity score matching
with Gaussian kernel and bandwidth 0.1, the propensity score is estimated by logit regression on the
same covariates as in the BO adjustment. All standard errors given in brackets, are simulated with 500
bootstrap replications.
Source: PISA 2009, own calculations.
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Table C.2.4: Mean gap decomposition between Swiss and German immigrants’ children reading
test scores, adjusted to other countries characteristics:
Nearest Neighbor matching
Actual Matching adjustment (1:1) Matching adjustment (1:5)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Swiss students adjusted to German students’ characteristics
YCHE 457.09 472.49 450.13 457.67 476.84 453.29 460.30 451.73 453.72
YDEU 439.05
∆X 15.40 -6.96 0.58 19.75 3.80 -3.21 5.36 3.38
(8.76) (9.22) (10.76) (10.96) (6.32) (6.18) (8.03) (8.23)
∆S 18.05 2.64 25.01 17.47 -1.71 14.25 21.26 12.69 14.67
(6.11) (9.55) (9.72) (11.19) (11.17) (7.39) (7.56) (8.67) (9.69)
Panel B: German students adjusted to Swiss students’ characteristics
YCHE 457.09
YDEU 439.05 433.61 426.89 443.77 457.31 434.22 429.14 445.48 447.92
∆X -5.44 -12.16 4.73 18.26 -4.82 -9.90 6.44 8.87
(9.50) (9.22) (13.48) (15.01) (6.92) (7.38) (11.39) (13.28)
∆S 18.05 23.49 30.20 13.32 -0.22 22.87 27.95 11.61 9.17
(6.11) (8.71) (9.11) (13.32) (14.41) (7.58) (8.06) (11.65) (13.41)
Covariates
Other No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
German No No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Origin No No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations
N 1,180 1,152 1,153 1,023 1,037 1,152 1,153 1,023 1,037
NCHE 824 797 798 668 682 797 798 668 682
NDEU 356 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355
Note: Immigrants’ children are born within the country of testing and have both parents born outside of the
country. (1) Unconditional gap; (2) to (9) Matching adjustment is performed by propensity score matching
with Nearest Neighbor matching with 1 neighbor in (2) to (5) and 5 in (6) to (9), the propensity score
is estimated by logit regression on gender, age in month, educational level of parents, highest occupation
of the parents and number of books at home in (2) and (5); (3) and (6) adds German spoken at home;
(4) and (7) uses (2) and country of originand (5) and (9) uses (2), (3), and (4); All standard errors given
in brackets, are simulated with 500 bootstrap replications. Note that bootstrapping is not valid in the
Nearest Neighbor approach. However for comparison reasons I stick to procedure.
Source: PISA 2009, own calculations.
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Table C.2.5: Mean gap decomposition between Swiss and German immigrants’ children reading
test scores, adjusted to other countries characteristics:
Bandwidth
Actual Matching adjustment (BW 0.095) Matching adjustment (BW 0.105)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Swiss students adjusted to German students’ characteristics
YCHE 457.09 455.43 458.20 451.05 452.38 455.69 458.24 451.47 452.51
YDEU 439.05
∆X 1.66 -1.11 6.05 4.72 1.40 -1.15 5.62 4.58
(3.33) (3.27) (5.95) (5.93) (3.11) (3.13) (5.39) (5.68)
∆S 18.05 16.39 19.16 12.00 13.33 16.64 19.20 12.43 13.47
(5.92) (5.74) (5.86) (7.25) (7.23) (6.01) (5.70) (6.81) (7.22)
Panel B: German students adjusted to Swiss students’ characteristics
YCHE 457.09
YDEU 439.05 437.75 433.64 444.90 444.16 438.23 434.04 444.60 443.77
∆X -1.29 -5.41 5.86 5.11 -0.81 -5.01 5.55 4.72
(4.07) (4.22) (7.00) (7.20) (3.75) (4.26) (6.85) (6.99)
∆S 18.05 19.34 23.46 12.19 12.93 18.86 23.05 12.50 13.33
(5.92) (6.02) (6.08) (7.87) (8.09) (6.41) (6.44) (7.97) (7.86)
Covariates
Other No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
German No No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Origin No No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations
N 1,180 1,152 1,153 1,023 1,037 1,152 1,153 1,023 1,037
NCHE 824 797 798 668 682 797 798 668 682
NDEU 356 355 355 355 355 355 355 355 355
Note: Immigrants’ children are born within the country of testing and have both parents born outside of the
country. (1) Unconditional gap; (2) to (9) Matching adjustment is performed by propensity score matching
with Nearest Neighbor matching with 1 neighbor in (2) to (5) and 5 in (6) to (9), the propensity score is
estimated by logit regression on gender, age in month, educational level of parents, highest occupation of
the parents and number of books at home in (2) and (5); (3) and (6) adds German spoken at home; (4)
and (7) uses (2) and country of originand (5) and (9) uses (2), (3), and (4); All standard errors given in
brackets, are simulated with 500 bootstrap replications.
Source: PISA 2009, own calculations.
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Table C.2.6: Mean gap decomposition between Swiss and German immigrants’ children reading
test scores, adjusted to other countries characteristics:
Plausible Value 1
Actual BO adjustment Matching adjustment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Swiss students adjusted to German students’ characteristics
YCHE 455.31 451.66 454.62 444.28 446.92 454.15 456.73 449.20 450.42
YDEU 438.41
∆X 3.65 0.69 11.03 8.39 1.16 -1.43 6.11 4.89
(3.65) (4.01) (5.51) (5.68) (3.10) (3.27) (5.84) (5.56)
∆S 16.89 13.24 16.21 5.86 8.51 15.73 18.32 10.79 12.01
(5.89) (6.23) (5.85) (6.90) (7.31) (5.81) (5.92) (7.39) (7.31)
Panel B: German students adjusted to Swiss students’ characteristics
YCHE 455.31
YDEU 438.41 428.32 424.42 435.46 431.50 435.75 431.47 444.31 442.88
∆X -10.09 -13.99 -2.95 -6.91 -2.66 -6.94 5.89 4.47
(4.93) (5.61) (9.29) (9.98) (3.88) (4.42) (7.05) (7.22)
∆S 16.89 26.98 30.88 19.84 23.80 19.55 23.83 11.00 12.43
(5.89) (6.72) (7.08) (9.76) (10.42) (6.18) (6.47) (8.55) (8.12)
Covariates
Other No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
German No No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Origin No No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations
N 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,152 1,153 1,023 1,037
NCHE 824 824 824 824 824 797 798 668 682
NDEU 356 356 356 356 356 355 355 355 355
Note: Immigrants’ children are born within the country of testing and have both parents born outside
of the country. Instead of the main specification where the average of five Plausible Values is used, I
present here the analysis based on only the first Plausible Value. (1) Unconditional gap; (2) to (5) BO
adjustment: uses a twofold Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition based on (2) gender, age in month, educational
level of parents, highest occupation of the parents and number of books at home; (3) adds German spoken
at home; (4) uses (2) and country of origin; and (5) uses (2), (3), and (4); (6) to (9) Matching adjustment
is performed by propensity score matching with Gaussian kernel and bandwidth 0.1, the propensity score
is estimated by logit regression on the same covariates as in the BO adjustment. All standard errors given
in brackets, are simulated with 500 bootstrap replications.
Source: PISA 2009, own calculations.
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Table C.2.7: Mean gap decomposition between Swiss and German immigrants’ children reading
test scores, adjusted to other countries characteristics:
Imputation on country level
Actual Matching adjustment Matching adjustment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Swiss students adjusted to German students’ characteristics
YCHE 457.09 452.03 454.94 444.60 447.27 454.42 456.92 449.82 450.04
YDEU 439.05
∆X 5.06 2.15 12.49 9.82 2.67 0.17 7.27 7.06
(3.81) (4.04) (5.54) (5.69) (3.17) (3.34) (6.18) (5.97)
∆S 18.05 12.99 15.90 5.56 8.22 15.38 17.88 10.77 10.99
(5.78) (6.20) (5.81) (6.84) (7.22) (5.88) (5.99) (7.57) (7.48)
Panel B: German students adjusted to Swiss students’ characteristics
YCHE 457.09
YDEU 439.05 439.10 435.2 444.57 440.78 441.77 438.64 449.60 447.84
∆X 0.05 -3.85 5.52 1.73 2.73 -0.40 10.56 8.79
(5.40) (5.96) (9.60) (10.05) (4.26) (4.62) (6.81) (6.77)
∆S 18.05 18.00 21.90 12.53 16.32 15.32 18.45 7.49 9.26
(5.78) (6.74) (7.02) (9.93) (10.16) (6.18) (6.50) (8.02) (7.65)
Covariates
Other No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
German No No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Origin No No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations
N 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,144 1,132 997 970
NCHE 824 824 824 824 824 790 777 642 614
NDEU 356 356 356 356 356 354 355 355 356
Note: Immigrants’ children are born within the country of testing and have both parents born outside
of the country. Instead of using the children in school to impute missing values I use all children in the
country. (1) Unconditional gap; (2) to (5) BO adjustment: uses a twofold Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition
based on (2) gender, age in month, educational level of parents, highest occupation of the parents and
number of books at home; (3) adds German spoken at home; (4) uses (2) and country of origin; and
(5) uses (2), (3), and (4); (6) to (9) Matching adjustment is performed by propensity score matching
with Gaussian kernel and bandwidth 0.1, the propensity score is estimated by logit regression on the
same covariates as in the BO adjustment. All standard errors given in brackets, are simulated with 500
bootstrap replications.
Source: PISA 2009, own calculations.
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Table C.2.8: Mean gap decomposition between Swiss and German immigrants’ children reading
test scores, adjusted to other countries characteristics:
Regression based imputation
Actual BO adjustment Matching adjustment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: Swiss students adjusted to German students’ characteristics
YCHE 457.09 453.73 455.59 446.13 447.17 457.09 459.03 452.97 452.94
YDEU 439.05
∆X 3.36 1.50 10.96 9.92 0.00 -1.93 4.13 4.15
(3.79) (3.96) (5.58) (5.61) (3.23) (3.42) (5.83) (5.66)
∆S 18.05 14.69 16.54 7.08 8.13 18.04 19.98 13.92 13.89
(5.78) (6.08) (5.86) (6.96) (7.19) (5.86) (5.82) (7.29) (7.26)
Panel B: German students adjusted to Swiss students’ characteristics
YCHE 457.09
YDEU 439.05 433.74 429.97 439.55 437.09 441.76 437.04 452.10 451.76
∆X -5.31 -9.08 0.50 -1.96 2.72 -2.00 13.05 12.71
(4.80) (5.45) (9.01) (9.36) (3.96) (4.45) (6.96) (6.98)
∆S 18.05 23.36 27.13 17.55 20.00 15.33 20.05 5.00 5.34
(5.78) (6.50) (6.45) (9.22) (9.57) (6.12) (6.34) (8.00) (7.84)
Covariates
Other No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
German No No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Origin No No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations
N 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,146 1,152 1,042 1,057
NCHE 824 824 824 824 824 790 797 688 702
NDEU 356 356 356 356 356 356 355 354 355
Note: Immigrants’ children are born within the country of testing and have both parents born outside
of the country. Instead of the main specification where the missing values are imputed based on median
imputation within the school; I use ordered probit models based on all other variables in the model to
predict first number of books at home, including the predicted number of books I again use an ordered
probit regression iteratively for mothers’ and then fathers’ education, a probit regression for German
spoken at home and am ordinary least squares regression for HISEI (rounding the predicted values to
the next integer). (1) Unconditional gap; (2) to (5) BO adjustment: uses a twofold Blinder-Oaxaca
decomposition based on (2) gender, age in month, educational level of parents, highest occupation of the
parents and number of books at home; (3) adds German spoken at home; (4) uses (2) and country of
origin; and (5) uses (2), (3), and (4); (6) to (9) Matching adjustment is performed by propensity score
matching with Gaussian kernel and bandwidth 0.1, the propensity score is estimated by logit regression
on the same covariates as in the BO adjustment. All standard errors given in brackets, are simulated with
500 bootstrap replications.
Source: PISA 2009, own calculations.
157
C.3 Sample selection and covariate balance
C.3.1 Missing values
First, I present the missing values, their imputations and the sample selection procedure. Next,
I show the covariate balance before and after the matching and propensity scores over the
common support.
Table C.3.1: Reading test scores by missing values
Variable Switzerland Germany
All Without Only All Without Only
missings missings missings missings
Reading test scores 457.09 473.28 424.60 439.05 471.91 415.93
(87.52) (86.74) (79.85) (95.95) (88.47) (94.28)
N 824 556 268 356 151 205
Note: Switzerland refers to the German-speaking part only. Reading test score is the average of
five plausible values. If information of the student where missing in any of the variables mother ’s or
father ’s education, language spoken at home, number of books at home or highest occupational status
of the parents.
Source: PISA 2009, own calculations.
Table C.3.2: Missing value correlations matrix
Variables Missing
Reading Mother Father German Books HISEI
Reading test scores 1.000
Missing values in
Mother -0.178 1.000
Father -0.138 0.491 1.000
German -0.167 -0.001 -0.008 1.000
Books -0.131 0.066 0.023 0.043 1.000
HISEI -0.147 0.155 0.224 0.082 0.105 1.000
Note: Switzerland refers to the German-speaking part only. Correlation matrix between
missing value indicators and reading test scores.
Source: PISA 2009, own calculations.
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Table C.3.3: Number of missing values and imputations
Variables Migrants Natives
CHE DEU CHE DEU
Full sample
Total 824 356 4,362 3,238
Mother education (ISCED) 50 109 176 143
Father education (ISCED) 67 89 173 262
German not spoken at home 206 77 105 97
Books at home 9 6 40 40
Highest occupation (HISEI) 26 39 36 115
Subsample: Unfavorable background
Total 212 57
Mother education (ISCED) 1 8
Father education (ISCED) 1 6
German not spoken at home 63 20
Books at home 2 2
Highest occupation (HISEI) 6 12
Subsample: Turkish
Total 109 187
Mother education (ISCED) 9 64
Father education (ISCED) 12 49
German not spoken at home 29 39
Books at home 1 2
Highest occupation (HISEI) 6 19
Note: Switzerland refers to the German-speaking part only. Western Eu-
rope includes Austria, France, Germany and Liechtenstein; Southern Eu-
rope includes Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain; Former Yugoslavia: Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Croatia, FYRMontenegro and Serbia; Aussiedler includes
Poland and former USSR and Another country represents a category in the
PISA Questionnaire and includes parents originating from different areas.
Imputed data based on school level median (including native students);
German not spoken at home includes missing values.
Source: PISA 2009, own calculations.
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Table C.3.4: Sample selection
Variables Migrants Natives
CHE DEU CHE DEU
Observations (before selection) 1,697 515 6,598 3,276
Dropped due to
Gender 1 1
Parents no education (ISCED=0) 4 38
Non-German-speaking part 812 2,231
Country of origin
Albania 23
Aussielder 159
Western European 37
Observations (after selection) 824 356 4,362 3,238
Note: Switzerland refers to the German-speaking part only. Western Europe
includes Austria, France, Germany and Liechtenstein; Aussiedler includes immi-
grants from Poland and former USSR. Imputed data based on school level median
(including native students); German not spoken at home includes missing values.
Source: PISA 2009, own calculations.
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C.3.2 Covariate balance
Table C.3.5: Covariate balance: Adjusting Swiss students to German students’
characteristics, Panel A adjustments
Variables Actual Adjusted CHE Actual
DEU (1) (2) (3) (4) CHE
Age (in months) 189.71 189.70 189.74 189.69 189.77 189.83
Male 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.55 0.54 0.51
Education mother (ISCED)
No education (0) 0.20 0.15 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.06
Primary (1,2) 0.21 0.23 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.42
Secondary (3,4) 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.39 0.40 0.29
Tertiary (5,6) 0.17 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.23
Education father (ISCED)
No education (0) 0.16 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.03
Primary (1,2) 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.16 0.36
Secondary (3,4) 0.41 0.43 0.44 0.42 0.44 0.30
Tertiary (5,6) 0.26 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.31
Highest occupation (HISEI) 40.51 41.49 41.49 42.01 42.04 41.61
Books at home
0-10 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.31 0.30 0.29
11-25 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.26
26-100 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.29
101-200 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.09
201- 500 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05
More than 500 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
German spoken at home 0.33 - 0.30 - 0.30 0.19
Country of origin
Southern Europe 0.06 - - 0.07 0.07 0.14
Yugoslavia 0.07 - - 0.09 0.09 0.48
Turkey 0.53 - - 0.45 0.44 0.13
Another origin 0.29 - - 0.34 0.34 0.16
Observations 356 824
Note: Switzerland refers to the German-speaking part only. Besides the age in month and the hisei
the variables can be interpreted as percentage points of the immigrants children population in each
country. Columns (1) to (4) correspond to the adjustments of Table 3.4.
Source: PISA 2009, own calculations.
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Table C.3.6: Covariate balance: Adjusting German students to Swiss students’
characteristics, Panel B adjustments
Variables Actual Adjusted DEU Actual
CHE (1) (2) (3) (4) DEU
Age (in months) 189.83 189.76 189.87 189.88 189.94 189.71
Male 0.51 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.52
Education mother (ISCED)
No education (0) 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.20
Primary (1,2) 0.42 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.29 0.21
Secondary (3,4) 0.29 0.34 0.34 0.30 0.30 0.42
Tertiary (5,6) 0.23 0.27 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.17
Education father (ISCED)
No education (0) 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.16
Primary (1,2) 0.36 0.25 0.26 0.24 0.24 0.17
Secondary (3,4) 0.30 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.41
Tertiary (5,6) 0.31 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.26
Highest occupation (HISEI) 41.61 42.81 42.42 43.88 44.28 40.51
Books at home
0-10 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.31
11-25 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.21
26-100 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.28
101-200 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.12
201- 500 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
More than 500 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
German spoken at home 0.19 - 0.23 - 0.26 0.33
Country of origin
Southern Europe 0.14 - - 0.14 0.15 0.06
Yugoslavia 0.48 - - 0.28 0.28 0.07
Turkey 0.13 - - 0.18 0.18 0.53
Another origin 0.16 - - 0.24 0.25 0.29
Observations 824 356
Note: Switzerland refers to the German-speaking part only. Besides the age in month and the hisei
the variables can be interpreted as percentage points of the immigrants children population in each
country. Columns (1) to (4) correspond to the adjustments of Table 3.4.
Source: PISA 2009, own calculations.
162
C.3.3 Common support
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Switzerland: Off support Switzerland: On support
Germany: On support Germany: Off support
(1) Propensity score based on background characteristics
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Switzerland: Off support Switzerland: On support
Germany: On support Germany: Off support
(2) Propensity score based on background characteristics and
German spoken at home
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Switzerland: Off support Switzerland: On support
Germany: On support Germany: Off support
(3) Propensity score based on background characteristics and
country of origin
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Switzerland: Off support Switzerland: On support
Germany: On support Germany: Off support
(4) Adjustment based on background characteristics, German
spoken at home, and country of origin
Figure C.3.1: Common support graphs
Note: (1) Propensity scores are estimated on gender, age in months, educational level of parents, highest
occupation of parents, and number of books at home; (2) Additionally uses German spoken at home; (3) uses
parents’ country of origin instead; (4) uses both German spoken at home and country of origin.
Source: PISA 2009, own calculations
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